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A bstract
It is generally accepted that oil has been vitally important to the global 
economy and the world has experienced growth in oil consumption for the 
majority of years since the early 1900s. In all probability, this trend will 
continue with the majority of the growth coming from the emerging economies 
- hence the global importance of oil is likely to continue. Against this backdrop, 
this thesis aims to analyse empirically the relationship between oil and the level 
of growth in economic output (or income) from a number of different angles.
The thesis begins by investigating oil demand; in particular, the relation­
ship between oil consumption and income (as well as prices) across six re­
gions of the world by applying the Structural Time Series Modelling (STSM) 
technique. Furthermore, the estimates are used to produce different forecast 
scenarios of oil demand for each of the regions up to 2030. According to the 
reference case assumption, global oil demand is projected to rise from about 87 
mb/d in 2010 to 110.27 mb/d in 2030 consisting of strong growth in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia Pacific, compared to a marginal growth in Europe and 
Eurasia while North American oil consumption is projected to decline.
The thesis also investigates the co-movements and causality relationship 
between oil prices and GDP of non-OECD countries, grouped depending on 
whether a country is a net oil exporter or net oil importer using both time- 
series and panel data models. The results suggest that there is a long-run 
cointegrating relationship between oil prices and GDP and that oil prices 
‘ Granger-causes’ GDP for the group of net oil exporting countries but fails 
to ‘Granger-cause’ GDP for the net oil importing countries. This implies that 
oil prices have a strong influence on economic output of net oil exporting coun­
tries with little or no influence on the economic output of net oil importing 
countries.
Finally, the research considers the resource curse hypothesis debate by 
employing recently developed heterogeneous panel analysis to investigate the 
long-term effect of oil abundance on economic growth. It is concluded that oil 
as a resource, cannot be attributed to the poor economic performance of most 
oil rich countries, but perhaps might have come about by weak institutional 
base and oil price volatility which usually has an adverse effect on long-term 
economic performance.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
Since the early discovery of oil in the 1800s, the product has been vitally 
important to the world economy. According to Painter (1986), the invention 
of the internal combustion engine was the major influence in the rise in the 
importance of oil. Hathaway (2009) noted that the importance of oil has risen 
to the extent that in a world suddenly without oil, all the major distribution 
systems that allow economic transactions on a more than local basis would 
fail and the world economy would collapse.
According to British Petroleum (BP, 2012), the average global oil con­
sumption in 2011 was 88.03 million barrels per day, and with the 2011 world 
population figures reported in United Nations report (UN, 2012) at 7.022 bil­
lion people, it is roughly equivalent to every single person on the planet using 
two litres of oil a day. Along with this, the average nominal price of Brent 
crude for the first-half of 2012 stood at $113.45,1 so the global consumption 
of oil cost almost $10 billion every single day or $1.42 for every person.
Of course, the global distribution of oil consumption is not evenly spread 
as the advanced countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and oil rich countries consumes far more oil than less 
advanced countries and also, over the years, oil consumption has been declining
1 Crude oil prices obtained from EIA (2012)
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in the OECD countries.2 Given oil demand is generally accepted as being one of 
the most important factors that determines oil prices, it is therefore important 
to understand current and future oil consumption patterns and how they affect 
the oil market.
Oil prices and its attendant consequence on economic output still remains 
an important issue confronting a growing number of world economies. The 
relationship between oil prices and the level of economic activity has been the 
subject of much attention for some time as there has been extensive empirical 
literature on the oil price-GDP relationship, covering the last three decades. 
Derby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) were among the early studies and they 
conclude that most economic recessions were preceded by a sharp rise in the 
price of oil. This notion over the years weakened as later empirical studies 
shows oil prices having lesser influence on economic output.
The mechanisms through which oil price changes affect economic activity 
include both supply and demand channels.3 Despite the substantial research 
on the impact of oil prices on economic activity, the understanding of the 
transmission channels through which oil prices affect economic activity is far 
from a consensus. Moreover, the way oil prices influence the economy and the 
magnitude of their effects may have evolved through time. The mechanisms 
which were at work during the first two shocks in the 1970’s are not neces­
sary the same today (since the beginning of the 2000s). Indeed according to 
Hamilton (2009) the oil price hike of the 2000s, especially in 2007-08 was one
of the biggest shocks to oil prices on record, however, the causes were quite
2 See BP Statistical Review 2011
3 The theoretical literature has been of a general equilibrium nature, with different au­
thors assigning different weights for the supply and demand channels. See, for example 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
different from the events of those of the 1970s. Moreover, Hamilton (2009) 
notes that the impact on the economy of both oil importing and exporting 
countries is somewhat less than previous oil price shocks. While the historical 
oil price shocks were primarily caused by significant disruption in crude oil 
production that were brought about by largely exogenous geopolitical events, 
Hamilton (2009) argued that the 2007-08 event has not been that of a reduc­
tion in supply but a failure of production to increase between 2005 and 2007. 
According to Kilian (2010), one of the reasons why the recent events has had 
low impact on the economy could be attributed to the fact that the 1970’s 
were characterized by an increasing dependence of the economies on oil and 
poor macroeconomic performance but since 2000, economies (especially of the 
OECD countries) have tightened measures for controlling business shocks.
Furthermore, studies have shown that the consequence of oil price fluctu­
ations are likely to be different in oil exporting and oil importing countries. 
According to Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004), it is generally believed 
that an oil price increase should be considered good news in oil exporting 
countries and bad news in oil importing countries. However, some studies on 
the macroeconomic implications of oil abundance on the economies of major 
oil exporting countries shows relatively different results. Gelb (1988) and Gyl- 
fason et al. (1999) all establish a strong negative correlation between resource 
abundance (oil) and economic growth. The reality has been that oil export­
ing countries have persistently experienced slow and, in some cases, volatile 
growth even in periods of consistent higher oil prices. This outcome negates 
normal macroeconomic expectations and is often tagged in the literature as
the ‘resource curse’.4
4A more detailed discussion of what is meant by the ‘resource curse’ is provided in
This thesis therefore explores the various links between oil resource, prices 
and the economy. It seeks to investigate the long-term effect of oil prices/oil 
abundance on economic growth of non-OECD countries. However, before 
analysing these effects, it is important to try and understand the key fac­
tors that drive crude oil prices. The supply-side of the oil market is mainly 
concerned with crude oil reserve and the challenges involved in making them 
available in the market. As indicated earlier, geopolitical factors can easily 
disrupt crude oil supply - a factor that is quite difficult to anticipate. Never­
theless, most recent oil price shocks are demand induced as stated by Hamilton 
(2009). Therefore, the thesis also focuses on estimating oil demand relation­
ships which can serve as a useful tool for analysing long-term activities in the 
oil industry. As outlined in Energy Information Administration report (EIA, 
2012), oil demand has been declining in the advanced regions mainly due to ef­
ficiency improvements - hence, it is important to capture the impact of energy 
efficiency when estimating oil demand relationships.
The empirical literature on the impact of oil prices and economic output 
has been extensive; however, most of the studies investigate the relationship in 
a time series context on the US and other countries of the OECD. This thesis 
seeks to add to the oil price/GDP literature by analysing the relationship on 
groups of non-OECD countries in both a time-series and a panel data context.
As indicated earlier, empirical studies on the impact of oil abundance on 
economic growth have shown that oil rich countries experience slower growth 
even in the face of higher oil prices. These studies mostly follow the Sachs 
and Warner (1995) cross sectional estimation technique which has been criti­
Chapter 4
4
cised due to numerous problems associated with the technique.5 van der Ploeg 
(2011) suggested that future empirical work on natural resource curse should 
apply panel estimation techniques to avoid problems of omitted variable bias 
associated with cross-sectional estimation. Cavalcanti et al. (2011) further 
observed that panel approaches such as traditional fixed and random estimate 
and GMM estimators are also not appropriate since they impose high degree 
of homogeneity across the countries, suggesting the use of heterogeneous panel 
techniques.6 This thesis therefore, in one of the core chapters, re-investigates 
the resource curse hypothesis by applying a heterogeneous panel estimation 
technique using oil production and oil reserve as measures for resource abun­
dance.
In general, the thesis seeks to answer the following research questions.
1. How best can the impact of technical progress (TP) and other exoge­
nous factors be captured when estimating time-series oil demand rela­
tionships?
2. What are the long-term effects of price and income on global oil demand, 
and what is the possible pattern of future oil consumption?
3. What is the long-run Granger-causality relationship between oil prices 
and GDP for various groups of non-OECD countries and does the impact 
for the net oil exporting countries differ from that of the net oil importing 
countries?
5See Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Koedijk et al. (2011) and Cavalcanti et al. (2011) 
among others
6 This is discussed further in Chapter 3
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4. Does oil abundance lead to lower economic performance in oil rich ex­
porting countries, and what are the long-term effects of oil abundance 
on the levels of per-capita output?
These research questions are addressed in three key chapters of this thesis; 
research questions 1 and 2 are addressed in Chapter 2, research question 3 is 
addressed in Chapter 3 while research question 4 is addressed in Chapter 4.
Before going any further, it is important to clarify the country groupings 
used in this thesis and why The first key chapter (Chapter 2) analyses global 
oil demand for the six geo-political regions as classified by BP (2011) ( i.e 
‘North America’, ‘South and Central America’, ‘Europe and Eurasia’, ‘Middle 
East’, ‘Africa’ and ‘Asia Pacific’) given BP (2011) is the major source of data 
for the analysis. Given the research questions 3 and 4, Chapters 3 and 4 
employ a different classification. These chapters, which investigate the long­
term effects of oil prices/oil abundance on economic growth for non-OECD 
countries, are generally grouped into two broad categories - net oil exporting 
and net oil importing countries.
It is also useful before proceeding to the main part of the thesis, to give a 
general overview on global economic growth and the oil market. The next sub­
sections therefore provide information on the nature of oil and the oil market; 
oil supply, demand and prices in the long-term; oil price history and analysis 
and finally global population and economic growth.
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1.1 N a tu re  o f  O il and  th e  O il M arket
Crude oil is a naturally occurring substance which is found in widely differing 
amounts in various countries throughout the world. Oil is not used directly 
for any important purpose, rather it is refined and split into different prod­
ucts which are either used directly for final consumption or are in turn further 
processed. Different crude oils yield different proportions of these refined prod­
ucts, and since the value is related to the end uses, those crude oils yielding 
higher proportions of valuable by-products (petroleum motor spirit, diesel fu­
els, jet fuels, petroleum gas etc) will tend to sell at a premium relative to other 
crude oils. According to EIA (2010), heavy crudes tend to sell at a discount 
because of the negative effects on the efficiency of refining process.
A given crude oil price determined on a particular day varies by location 
and date of delivery. Since crude oil is expensive to transport (long distance 
trade has to take place since most of the major consumers produce little or 
no crude oil), the price at the point of production and at the point of import 
are quite different. Nakamura (2008), in a study of oil refining and markets, 
shows that the margin for transport cost, insurance and handling cost can be 
substantial as long hauls may take several weeks and holding large inventories 
can be very expensive. Therefore, firms facing uncertain future demand often 
wish to purchase ‘forward’ that is, to pay a price determined now for delivery 
later (e.g in one month’s time). Such a price can be quite different from the 
price for immediate delivery (spot) in the same market. However, over lengthy 
periods (using quarterly or annual average prices) the whole term structure of 
prices tends to move closely together.7
7 See Kaufmann and Ullman (2009)
7
Conventionally oil prices are quoted in US dollars per barrel whatever the 
point of delivery. According to Fattouh (2007), the oil pricing regime is based 
on formula pricing, in which the price of certain crude is set as a differential 
to a certain reference price. He outlined three crudes that have tended to be 
the reference points, which are explained below.
I. Arab Light (API 34°)8 : This is crude produced in Saudi Arabia, 
the world’s largest producer/ exporter of crude oil. Ghanwar, is the primary 
producing field for Arab Light Crude and according to EIA (2011), Ghan­
war is the world’s largest onshore oil field with estimated remaining reserve 
of over 70 billion barrels. Since Saudi Arabia is a dominant producer, the 
price of this crude was seen as a key variable in the pricing strategy of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)9 and a representa­
tive of Middle-Eastern production. According to Fattouh (2011), Arab Light 
prices have tended to be replaced by those of the similar Dubai Light (API 
32°) since the early 1990’s as a representative crude price for Middle-Eastern 
production. In June 2005, the new OPEC reference basket was introduced. 
It is currently made up of the following: Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol 
(Angola), Oriente (Ecuador), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra 
Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es-Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nige­
ria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE) and 
Merey (Venezuela).
II. Brent Crude (API 38°): Brent crude is sourced from the North
8 API is a scale devised by the American Petroleum Institute to measure the specific 
gravity of crude oil
9 OPEC’s mission as stated in its website is to coordinate and unify petroleum policies of 
its member countries and ensure the stabilization of oil market in order to ensure an efficient, 
economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, steady income to producers and a 
fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry
8
Sea. It is used to price two-thirds of the world’s internationally traded crude 
oil supplies.10 According to Platts (2012), the current API gravity for Brent 
crude is estimated at 38 degrees and the sulphur content at 0.45%, hence it 
is classified as sweet crude. The nearness of the North Sea to major refining 
industries and large market of North West Europe, has given this crude a 
central role over the past two decades.
III. West Texas Intermediate (API 40°): This crude commonly referred 
to as WTI, serves as the reference point for the US market. WTI is light crude, 
lighter than Brent crude. According to Platts (2012), WTI contains about 
0.3% sulphur and is rated as a sweet crude. WTI is expected to command a 
higher price than Brent crude - however, starting from late 2010, WTI began 
to sell at a discount due to rapid increases in crude oil production from tight oil 
formation.11 It is further reported that Brent has become more representative 
in the marginal cost of crude oil which led to the EIA in July 2012 to begin to 
publish Brent crude spot price forecast as against the WTI it normally used.
Fattouh (2007) argued that the oil market has undergone structural trans­
formation that has placed oil prices on a new high path, which according to 
Fattouh (2007), is due to the emergence of new large consumers (such as China 
and India) and the geopolitical uncertainties in the Middle East - hence, the 
reaction of the oil market is generally in response to market fundamentals of 
supply and demand.
10 See Bacon and Tordo (2005)
11 See EIA (2012)
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1.2 O il Supply, D em an d  and P rices in  th e  L on g-term
Oil prices are influenced by a number factors, including some such as spec­
ulation, that are mainly short-term impacts. Other factors such as OPEC 
production decisions and expectation about future world demand for oil af­
fects prices in the longer term. Supply and demand in the world oil market 
are balanced through responses to price movements, and the factors underly­
ing supply and demand expectations are numerous and complex. According to 
EIA (2012), the key factors determining long-term supply, demand and prices 
for petroleum and other liquids12 can be summarized in four broad categories: 
the economics of non-OPEC supply; OPEC investment and production deci­
sions; the economics of other liquids supply; and world demand for petroleum 
and other liquids. OPEC’s role is a critical factor in determining long-term 
oil supply because oil resource is only available in limited amount within a 
particular geographical distribution, and more than 70% of proved oil reserves 
are concentrated in the OPEC countries. Table 1.1 reports proved world oil 
reserves by regions, as it stands by the end of 1990, end of 2000 and end of 
2010.
In 2010, almost 55% of global oil reserve is concentrated in the Middle 
East which makes the region quite essential, and of strategic importance for 
the future oil supply requirements of the industrialized and other emerging 
economies. Out of the 752.5 billion barrels of oil reserve available in the Middle 
East in 2010, 264.5 billion barrels (or 35%) is situated in Saudi Arabia. Other
countries with huge oil reserve in the region include Iran, Iraq and Kuwait -
12 According to the EIA (2012) report, the term ’petroleum’ refers to crude oil, conden­
sate, natural gas liquids and refinery gain while the term ’other liquids’ refers to bio-fuels, 
bitumen (oil sands), coal-to-liquids (CTL), biomass-to-liquids (BTL), gas-to-liquids (GTL) 
and oil shale.
10
all with a proved reserve of over 100 billion barrels of oil (See Appendix 1.2 
for the individual country’s oil reserve and oil consumption).
Table 1.1
Proved Oil Reserves (Thousand million barrels)
Region End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
North America 96.3 68.9 74.3
South and Gen. America 71.5 97.9 239.4
Europe and Eurasia 80.8 107.9 139.7
Middle East 659.6 696.7 752.5
Africa 58.7 93.4 132.1
Asia Pacific 36.3 40.1 45.2
W orld Total 1,003.2 1,104.9 1,383.2
OPEC 763.4 849.7 1,068.4
Non-OPEC13 176.5 168.2 188.7
Former Soviet Union 63.3 87.1 126.1
Source: BP Statistical Review 2011
South and Central America experience a huge growth in oil reserve from 
97.9 billion barrels at the end of the year 2000 to 239.4 billion barrels by 
the end of 2010, making it the second largest oil reserve region in the world. 
The growth in oil reserve within the period was driven by huge oil discovery 
in Venezuela over the period - Venezuelan oil reserve grew from 76.8 billion 
barrels in 2000 to 211.2 billion barrels by the end of 2010,14 representing a rise 
of 175%.
13 Excludes Former Soviet Union
14 According to Schenker (2011), Venezuela’s oil reserve have apparently grown by includ­
ing more of the country’s unconventional extra heavy crude, which is much more difficult 
and expensive to extract from the ground and process than oil found elsewhere.
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By the end of 2010, Europe/Eurasia and Africa have a proved reserve re­
serve of 139.7 billion barrels and 132.1 billion barrels respectively; with 55% of 
the total reserve from Europe/Eurasia held by the Russian Federation. Libya 
and Nigeria are the two countries with huge reserves from Africa, together 
accounting for almost 65% of total oil reserve from the region. North America 
and Asia Pacific holds a reserve of 74.3 billion barrels and 45.2 billion barrels 
respectively.
More than three-quarters (77.24%) of global oil reserve is concentrated in 
the OPEC countries. This, in all probability, makes OPEC’s investment and 
production decisions a critical factor in determining long-term global energy 
security.
While Asia Pacific and North America have the lowest oil reserve, the 
two regions have the highest oil consumption in 2010, accounting for 58% 
of global oil consumption. Total oil consumption for Asia Pacific and North 
America in 2010 are 27.24 mb/d and 23.42 mb/d respectively. Over the past 
two decades, Asia Pacific’s oil consumption almost doubled from 13.81 m b/d in 
1990 to 27.24 mb/d in 2010, mainly driven by economic growth in the region, 
particularly from China and India. China, with 9.057 mb/d accounts for one- 
thirds (33.25%) of total oil consumption in the region in 2010 while India’s oil 
consumption is 3.319 mb/d.
United States is by far the largest crude oil consumer with a daily oil 
consumption of 19.148 mb/d in 2010. However, oil consumption has peaked 
sometime between 2000 and 2010 as total oil consumption in 2000 (19.701 
mb/d) is slightly more than 2010 which is also the case with so many other
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advanced countries of the OECD. Multinational organisations such the Inter­
national Energy Agency (IEA) and the EIA have suggested that the decline 
in oil consumption is partly due to efficiency improvements (or in other words 
efficiency gains).15
Table 1.2
Oil Consumption (Thousand of barrels daily)
Region End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
North America 20,316 23,574 23,418
South and Cen. America 3,623 4,855 6,104
Europe and Eurasia 23,247 19,582 19,510
Middle East 3,559 5,021 7,821
Africa 1,943 2,439 3,291
Asia Pacific 13,814 21,135 27,237
W orld Total 66,503 76,605 87,382
OECD 41,667 48,128 46,438
Non-OECD 24,836 28,477 40,944
Source: BP Statistical Review 2011
Europe and Eurasia presents a very interesting trend in oil consumption 
over the past two decades. The region has the highest oil consumption (23.24 
mb/d) in 1990 before declining to 19.582 mb/d in 2000 and 19.510 mb/d in 
2010. While the slight decline between 2000 and 2010 could be attributed 
to efficiency gains, the drastic fall between 1990 and 2000 was mainly due to 
fuel switching from oil to other sources for electricity generation in the Former 
Soviet Union.
Oil consumption has doubled in the Middle East between 1990 and 2010
and almost doubled in South/Central America and Africa. The 2010 figures
15 See IEA (2012)
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stood at 6.104 mb/d, 7.821 mb/d and 3.291 mb/d for South/Central America, 
Middle east and Africa respectively. Generally, growth in oil consumption 
over the past decade is mainly supported by the developing regions as oil 
consumption declined by 3.51% in the OECD between 2000 and 2010, while 
it rose by 43.78% in the non-OECD.
1.3 O il P r ice  H istory  and  A n alysis
Oil has by far the greatest value of traded primary commodities, making it of 
interest to exporters and importers alike (Bacon 1991). It is a key primary 
energy source and it is often argued that no other fuel can compete for many 
of its uses in terms of price and convenience. The price of oil even at an annual 
average basis has experienced enormous movements in the past.
Crude oil prices behave much as any other commodity with wide price 
swings in times of shortage or oversupply. In norminal terms, oil prices ranged 
between $1.71 and $2.00 from 1950 through to the end of 1960s. When viewed 
in real terms (2011 dollar), the price of crude oil fluctuated between $11 and 
$14 during the period (BP 2011). As a whole, the price of oil was relatively 
stable during this period.
OPEC was established in 1960 with five founding members Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela. By the end of 1971, six other nations 
joined the group: Qatar, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Indonesia 
and Libya. From the formation of OPEC through to 1972, the price of oil 
experienced steady decline. However, a little over two years later, OPEC 
through the unintended consequence of war asserted its power to influence
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prices. According to Seymour (1980), the significant oil price increases of 
the 1970s convinced many observers that OPEC had become a cartel that its 
founders envisioned.
1.3.1 First Oil Price Shock 1973 - 1977
The Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt which started in October 1973 
quadrupled the price of oil from $2.48 per barrel in 1972 to over $11.58 per 
barrel16 in 1974. The United States and many countries in the Western world 
showed support for Israel. Several Arab exporting nations including Iran im­
posed an embargo on the countries supporting Israel. OPEC success showed 
at the beginning of the 70’s, as the rising oil demand exceeded production. 
Moreover, oil producing countries began to even ask for more concessions. 
Muammar-al-Gaddafi, taking over power after a military coup in Libya ob­
tained a 20% due increase and an agreement to split profits 55-45% (Yergin 
1990). During this period, production was cut by 4.3 million barrels per day 
(OPEC 2008) and the embargo contributed to economic recession during the 
period17. After the embargo, considerable efforts were made to preserve energy 
and pass from oil to alternative energy sources. According to Irawan (2012), 
the IEA was created in 1974 within the framework of the OECD in reaction 
to the oil crisis of 1973 when OPEC launched an embargo over the selling of 
their crude oil as a protest against US decision for supporting Israel in the Yon 
Kippur War.
The first oil price shock was an important economic and political event,
16 All crude oil prices quoted in this Chapter are nominal prices of Europe Brent Crude 
unless otherwise stated
17According to Jones et al. (2004), US GDP decreased by 6% in the next two years; 
Japanese economy contracted for the first time after the Second World War
which led to controversies and debates in the years and decades that followed. 
Livia (2006) identified the many point of view and theories on the first oil price 
shock into three different categories; the Traditional point of view regarding the 
oil crisis, Dependence theories regarding the oil crisis and Conspiracy theories 
regarding the oil crisis. According to Livia (2006), the traditionalists point of 
view to the crisis often refer to the oligopolistic structures of the oil companies, 
collective decision of OPEC and to the demand and supply interaction on the 
international oil market. The dependence theories considered the oil crisis as 
a form of manifestation of economic nationalism in Third World states, in 
order to gain an equality position in the relationship with industrial powers. 
The conspiracy theories however, are based on the idea according to which the 
American Government, in collaboration with the oil companies and OPEC, 
intentionally started the crisis. The argument is based on the effects the crisis 
had which were negligible for the American economy, as compared to the effects 
on European and Japanese economy.
1.3.2 Second Oil Price Shock 1978 - 1982
From 1974 -  1978, the world crude oil price was relatively flat ranging from 
$11.58 to $14.02 per barrel. In 1979 and 1980, events in Iran and Iraq led to 
another round of crude oil price increases. According to OPEC (2005), the 
Iranian revolution resulted in the loss of 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day of oil 
production between November 1978 and June 1979. In September 1980, Iran 
was invaded by Iraq. The combined production of both countries was only a 
million barrels per day compared to 7.5 million barrels per day the previous 
year. The combination of the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War caused
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crude oil prices to more than double increasing from $14 in 1978 to $35 per 
barrel in 1981 (BP 2008).
1.3.3 Price Collapse, Sideways w ith  a Spike 1983 - 1995
Higher prices also results in increased exploration and production outside of 
OPEC. From 1983 to 1986 non OPEC production increased by 10 million 
barrels per day. OPEC was faced with weakening demand and higher supply 
from outside the organisation. OPEC attempted to set production quotas low 
enough to stabilize prices but minimal success was achieved as various member 
countries produced beyond their quotas so that crude oil prices collapsed, 
reaching as low as $8 in May 1986 (WTRG 2010).18 Temporary agreements 
were reached to cut production in August, some non-OPEC members also 
pledged production cuts. There was relative stability at around $18 per barrel 
between 1987 and 1989, the price remained stable until 1990 when the price 
of oil spiked to $35/barrel due to lower production and uncertainty associated 
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. Following the 
War, oil prices entered a period of steady decline with the spot price falling to 
$14.74 per barrel in 1994. The price then turned up mainly due to a strong 
US economy and a booming Asian Pacific region. From 1990 to 1997, world 
oil consumption increased by 6.2 million barrels per day which contributed to 
a price recovery that extended into 1997.
18 WTRG Economics undertake analysis, planning, forecast and data services for energy 
producers and consumers
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1.3.4 Collapse and Recovery 1997 - 2003
The price increase came to rapid end in 1997 and 1998 when the impact of the 
economic crisis in Asia was severely underestimated by OPEC. In December 
1997, OPEC increased its quota by 2.5 million barrels per day (10 percent) with 
effect from January 1998. In 1998, Asian Pacific oil consumption declined for 
the first time since 1982. The combination of lower consumption and higher 
OPEC production send prices into a downward spiral. In response, OPEC 
cut production by 1.2 mb/d in April and another 1.33 mb/d in July.19 Price 
continued to go down through December 1998. Prices began to recover in early 
1999 as OPEC reduced production by another 1.71 mb/d in March, joined 
by non-OPEC production cut. By mid 1999, OPEC production dropped by 
about 3 million barrels per day and was sufficient to move prices above $25 
per barrel. With growing US and world economies, the price continued to rise 
throughout 2000. Between April and October 2000, three successive OPEC 
quota increases totalling 3.2 million barrels per day were not able to stem the 
oil price increases. Prices finally started falling down following another quota 
increase of 500,000 barrels effective November 2000.
Russian production increases dominated non-OPEC production growth 
from 2000 and was responsible for most of the non-OPEC increase. In 2001, the 
weakened US economy and increases in non-OPEC production put downward 
pressure on prices. In response, OPEC cut production by 3.5 million barrels 
in September, 2001. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack, crude oil
prices plummeted. Spot price of the US benchmark West Texas Intermediate
19 Details of OPEC production cut/production increase were extracted from summary 
notes on Member Country’s Crude Oil Production Allocations (1982-2007) as agreed at the 
various (Extraordinary) Meetings of the OPEC Conference, contained in the OPEC Annual 
Statistical Bulletin 2008.
18
was down 35% by the middle of November. OPEC delayed additional cuts 
until January 2002 when it reduces its quota by 1.5 million barrels per day 
and was joined by several other non-OPEC producers including Russia. Oil 
price moved up to $25 range by March, 2002. The non-OPEC members re­
stored their production cuts by mid-year but prices continued to rise while 
US inventories reached a 20 year low later in the year. Furthermore, strike in 
Venezuela caused Venezuelan production to plummet. OPEC increased quotas 
by 2.8 million barrels per day in January and February 2003.
1.3.5 Ram p-up and Price Spike 2003 - 2009
On March 19, 2003, just as some Venezuelan production was beginning to 
return, military action commenced in Iraq. Meanwhile, inventories remained 
low in the US and other OECD countries. With an improved economy, US 
demand was increasing while Asian demand was also growing rapidly. The 
loss of production capacity in Iraq and Venezuela combined with increased 
OPEC production to meet international demand led to the erosion of excess 
oil production capacity. In mid 2002, there was over 6 million barrels per 
day of excess production capacity but by mid-2003, the excess was below 2 
million barrels. The 2004 rise was caused by unexpectedly strong demand 
growth (China) and supply problems. According to EIA (2009), non-OPEC 
production also failed to grow and during much of 2004 and 2005, the spare 
capacity to produce oil was under a million barrels per day. This added a 
significant risk in a world that consumes over 80 million barrels per day and is 
largely responsible for crude oil prices in excess of $40-$50 per barrel (WTRG 
2010). Further oil price rises in 2006, but then falling back quite sharply into
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2007. OPEC took action to reduce stock overhang and market tightened again. 
There was fear of supply not keeping up with growing demand.
Oil price reached record high levels in July 2008, both in nominal and 
real terms, with the bench mark of Europe Brent crude-reaching $147/bbl. 
Oil price rose steadily from early 2004 but the 18 month period beginning 
January 2007 saw price surge of more than 150%. The situation subsequently 
changed dramatically, oil price collapsed by more than 75% by the end of the 
year, from $147/bbl in July to $36/bbl in December 2008 before rallying up 
to around $70/bbl in early June 2009 and remained so throughout the year.
By any measure, this episode qualifies as one of the biggest shocks to oil 
price on record. However, the causes were quite different from those associated 
with the other episodes above. Hamilton (2009) argued that the big story is not 
a dramatic reduction in supply but a failure of production to increase between 
2005 and 2007. Even as global supply stagnated, global demand was growing 
strongly, particularly, oil consumption growth in China. Chinese consumption 
was 870,000 barrels a day higher than just two years earlier. The underlying 
fear that supply could not keep up with growing demand, rapidly rising costs 
outside OPEC, growing concern over the end of cheap oil increased demand for 
inventory as well as the role of speculation accelerated the movements of prices 
(EIA, 2009). According to OPEC (2010), the weakening of the US dollars also 
greatly contributed to the record high prices.
It is generally believed that one of the major factors that led to the collapse 
of the oil price was the widening economic downturn which sharply erodes oil 
demand in the OECD countries as well as undermines growth in the emerging
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economies. The G-20 summit in April 2009 was instrumental in calming fi­
nancial markets and supporting the recovery of equities. Furthermore, massive 
government fiscal and monetary support on a global scale was able to stabilize 
economic output and gradually optimism began to spread on signs pointing 
to a recovery before the end of the year. Oil prices were supported by these 
resulting improvements.
1.3.6 Price R ise 2010 - 2012
On the back of improved economic growth and colder weather in the Northern 
Hemisphere, crude oil price surged from $70.7/bbl in mid-December 2009 to 
$80.29/bbl on January 7, the highest since early October 2008 (EIA, 2011). For 
most of 2010, the monthly average price fluctuates between $72 and $82/bbl, 
reaching $91.45/bbl in December. The world economy experienced significant 
recovery in 2010; growing at a monthly average of 4.32% according to World 
Bank (2010). This has been an impressive reversal from the recession in 2009 
which, to a large extent explains the increase in oil price recorded in 2010.
In 2011, oil price began with a strong surge following geo-political events in 
the MENA region. From February to December 2011, oil price fluctuated in a 
range of between $103 and $123/bbl. According to OPEC (2011b), the price of 
oil in 2011 generally moved in tandem with macro economic sentiments - rising 
positively on positive data before falling again when economic uncertaities re­
asserted themselves. For the first time ever, the annual average norminal price 
of Europe Brent crude went above $100, to stay at $111.26/bbl.
The first quarter of 2012 witnessed significant increase in the price of oil; 
with the monthly average price for the first three months of the year being
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$110.69, $119.33 and $125.45 respectively. According to OPEC (2012b), the 
upward push was driven by a number of factors including supply disruption in 
the North Sea and some countries in West and East Africa, supply fears due 
to geo-political tensions, and increasing speculative activities in the crude oil 
futures markets. In the second quarter, prices fell below $100 which, according 
to OPEC (2012b) is due to gloomy economic outlook, particularly in the Euro 
zone. The price of oil bounced back to around $110 in the third quarter. The 
annual average price for 2012 stood at $111.63/bbl, almost the same as the 
annual average price recorded in 2011.
The episodes of oil price history beginning from the first price shock in 
1973 -  1974 to the most recent shock explain why oil price changes receive 
important consideration for their presumed role on macroeconomic variables. 
As indicated earlier, several models have credited oil price shocks with affecting 
the natural rate of unemployment (Phelps 1994; Caruth et ah, 1998), affecting 
business cycle (Davis 1986), contributing to recession (Hamilton 1983). Thus, 
from a theoretical point of view, there are different reasons why an oil price 
shock should affect macroeconomic variables, some studies suggesting that this 
would be a non-linear relationship.
Market fundamentals, as explained earlier, are the major factors that affect 
oil prices in the long-term. While Chapter 2 explores (in greater detail) the 
role of price, income and population in determining long-term oil demand, it is 
important to provide a background analysis of global population and economic 
growth trends over the years.
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1.4 O verview  o f P op u la tion  and E conom ic G row th  P er­
form ance
This section provides an overview of global population and economic growth 
trends - both of which are important factors in analysing long-term economic 
performance. The analysis is conducted in the global context as well as OECD 
and non-OECD groups of countries.
1.4.1 Global Population  G row th
According to UN (2010), global population nearly doubled over the past four 
decades from 3.69 billion in 1970 to 6.90 billion in 2010 as shown in Figure 
1.1a. The annual average growth rate over the period was 1.57%. The growth 
in population was mainly driven by the non-OECD countries which grew an 
annual average rate of 1.88% while population in the OECD countries grew at 
an average rate of 0.51% per annum.
Figure 1.1a: Global Population (Billion)
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Generally, population growth has been declining in both regions as shown 
in Figure 1.1b. Population growth declined from 2.51% in 1970 to 1.31% in 
2010 for the developing region while it declined from 0.81% in 1970 to 0.38% 
in 2010 for the developed region. OECD’s share of world population fell from 
27.22% in 1970 to 19.72% in 2010 while the share of non-OECD increased from 
72.77% in 1970 to 82.08% in 2010. According to UN (2010), world population 
is expected to reach 9.3 billion in 2050 and 10.1 billion in 2100.
Figure 1.1b: Population Growth Rates
Source: UN (2010)
1.4.2 Global Economic G row th
According to World Bank (2012), global real GDP (at 2000 prices) grew from 
$12.20 trillion in 1970 to $41.40 in 2010, representing a rise of 239% over the 
period, and an average growth rate of 3.11% per year. In 2010, the share 
of OECD in global GDP was 73.49%, down from 85.24% in 1970. Emerging 
economies such as China and India have experienced unprecedented growth
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rates over the past decade which helped bridge the gap between the developed 
and developing regions. As shown in Figure 1.2a, GDP in the OECD increased 
from $10.4 trillion in 1970 to $30.40 trillion in 2010; an average increase of 
2.73% per year while GDP in the non-OECD expanded from $1.80 trillion 
in 1970 to $11 trillion in 2010, an average annual increase of 4.65% over the 
period.
Figure 1.2a: Global GDP ($Trillion)
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Source: World Bank (2012)
Global GDP growth rates has been volatile over the past three decades as 
dipicted in the charts below. Figures 1.2b and 1.2c shows the annual GDP 
growth rates for the world, and also OECD and non-OECD respectively. Due 
to the volatile nature of the growth rates, the charts are separated in order to 
provide a clearer picture.
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Figure 1.2b: World GDP Growth Rates
Source: World Bank (2012)
Figure 1.2c: OECD and Non-OECD GDP Growth Rates
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Source: World Bank (2012)
Both the OECD and non-OECD regions have experienced volatile growth 
over the period, with the OECD being slightly less volatile as depicted in Fig­
ure 1.2c. The 1970s was particularly more volatile for both regions around
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the time of the first and second oil price shocks and also, the average growth 
rate (for both the OECD and non-OECD) is very similar between 1970 and 
1999 as shown by the overlapping growth rates in Figure 1.2c during the pe­
riod. However, from 2000 to 2010, non-OECD growth rate is clearly above the 
OECD - according to Kuijs (2012), China and India dominated growth in the 
non-OECD during the period, with an average growth rate of 9% and 7.5% 
respectively. In general, even though the global economy experienced unprece­
dented growth (at levels) over the last four decades, the annual growth rates 
have been quite volatile. While GDP figures or GDP growth rates over time 
is a very useful indicator to measure economic output, Gutierrez et al. (2007) 
argued that it is not an appropriate indicator to measure standard of living 
of a country or region - but rather, per capita GDP which shows individual 
contribution or value.
Figure 1.3: Per capita GDP (USD)
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World per capita GDP increased from $3,300 in 1970 to $6,003 in 2010. As 
shown in Figure 1.3, there is a wide disparity in per capita GDP between the 
OECD and non-OECD regions - average per capita GDP for the OECD over 
the period is $17,597 while it is $1,089 for the non-OECD.
The above background of the oil market, prices and economic growth pro­
vides a back drop to the long-term analysis of oil and economic growth. As 
outlined in the introduction, the thesis seek to empirically analyse the rela­
tionship using time-series and panel data techniques. The next section briefly 
explains the composition and methodology of the analysis undertaken in each 
chapter of the thesis.
1.5 T h e T h esis
The research questions outlined earlier are addressed in three core chapters; 
hence, the thesis comprises of five chapters with Chapters 1 and 5 being In­
troduction and Conclusion accordingly.
Chapter 2 applies the Structural Time Series Modelling (STSM) technique
to investigate the relationship between aggregate oil consumption, income and
prices across six regions of the world.20 Following arguments in the energy
economics literature on how to appropriately capture the impact of technical
progress when modelling energy demand, the chapter incorporates asymmetric
price responses (APR) and the Underlying Energy Demand Trend (UEDT)
to capture endogenous and exogenous technical progress respectively. The
estimates obtained are then used to produce future forecast scenarios of oil
20 The reasons for using the STSM are explained in Chapter 2
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demand for each of the six regions up to 2030, based on different assumptions 
about future path of key variables that drive oil consumption.
Chapter 3 analyses the co-movements and causality relationship between 
oil prices and economic growth, covering 28 countries. The chapter mainly 
focuses on non-OECD countries and applies both time-series and panel esti­
mation technique. Estimating causality relationship, whether in a time-series 
or panel context involves four different stages; firstly, unit root test is applied 
to confirm the order of integration of the variables. If the variables are found 
to be integrated of the same order, the long-run cointegrating relationship is 
estimated at the second stage of the process. If cointegration is found, the 
long-run cointegrating relationship is estimated before finally testing for the 
direction of causality.
While initial researches assumes a symmetric model, contemporary time- 
series studies of oil price-GDP relationship almost always focus on studying 
both symmetric and asymmetric impacts of oil prices on the macro economy. 
Even though the main aim of the chapter is to investigate long-run impact 
of oil prices on economic growth, the study also seek to investigate whether 
the impact of oil prices on net oil exporting countries is different from net 
oil importing countries. Therefore, the panel groupings are done according to 
whether a country is a net oil exporter or a net oil importer.
Chapter 4 addresses the last research question relating to the resource curse 
hypothesis. The chapter investigates the hypothesis by applying a heteroge­
neous panel analysis to investigate the effect of natural resource abundance 
on economic growth, using oil production and oil reserve as proxies of natural 
resource abundance. As is the case in Chapter 3, the country groupings are
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done according to whether a country is a net oil exporter or net oil importer 
and the estimation process also followed the similar stages. However, for this 
chapter, only heterogeneous tests are applied at every stage. The recent het­
erogeneous error correction model based on Canning and Pedroni (2008) is 
utilized to estimate the short-run impact of resource abundance, and how fast 
it reverts to a long-run equilibrium following a shock in the system.
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1.6 A p p en d ix  to  C hap ter 1
1.6.1 A ppendix 1.1: Proved Oil Reserves by Country
In order to provide a clearer picture of the individual countries that make-up 
the regional proved oil reserve figures reported in Table 1.1, the individual 
countries’ proved oil reserve as at the end of 1990, 2000 and 2010 are reported 
in Appendix 1.1. According to BP (2012), Canada has the highest proved oil 
reserve in North America in 2010 with 32.1 billion barrels of oil followed by 
the United States and Mexico with 30.9 and 11.4 billion barrels respectively. 
According to EIA (2010), Canadian oil reserve grew tremendously due to huge 
discovery of heavy oil in the early 2000s.
Table A 1.1 
Proved Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
United States 33.8 30.4 30.9
Canada 11.2 18.3 32.1
Mexico 51.3 20.2 11.4
Total North Ame. 96.3 68.9 74.3
Argentina 1.4 3.0 2.5
Brazil 4.5 8.5 14.2
Colombia 2.0 2.0 1.9
Ecuador 1.4 4.6 6.2
Venezuela 60.1 76.8 211.2
Other S. & C. Ame. 2.0 3.1 3.4
Total S. & C. Ame. 71.5 97.9 239.4
Azerbidjan n /a 1.2 7.0
Khazakhtan n /a 25.0 39.8
Norway 8.6 11.4 6.7
Russian Fed. n /a 59.0 77.4
United Kingdom 4.0 4.7 2.8
Other Eur. & Eurasia 68.2 6.6 6.0
Total Eur. & Eurasia 80.8 107.9 139.7
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
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According to BP (2012), almost 90% of the total proved oil reserve in South 
and Central America is located in Venezuela. This is also as a result of huge 
discovery of heavy oil in the early 2000s as reported in EIA (2010). Europe 
and Eurasia’s oil reserve is mostly located in Russia and Kazakhtan which 
respectively accounts for 55.4% and 28.4% of total oil reserve in the region.
Table A 1.2 
Proved Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
Iran 92.9 99.5 137.0
Iraq 100.0 112.5 115.0
Kuwait 97.0 96.5 101.5
Oman 4.4 5.8 5.5
Qatar 3.0 16.9 25.9
Saudi Arabia 260.3 262.8 264.5
Syria 1.9 2.3 2.5
UAE 98.1 97.8 97.8
Yemen 2.0 2.4 2.7
Other Middle East 0.1 0.2 0.1
Total Middle East 659.6 696.7 752.5
Algeria 9.2 11.3 12.2
Angola 1.6 6.0 13.5
Egypt 3.5 3.6 4.5
Gabon 0.9 2.4 3.7
Libya 22.8 36.0 46.4
Nigeria 17.1 29.0 37.2
Sudan 0.3 0.6 6.7
Other Africa 3.4 2.8 7.8
Total Africa 58.7 93.4 132.1
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
The Middle East is by far the region with the highest oil reserve - the region 
has 4 countries with more than 100 billion barrels of oil reserve by the end of 
2010. According to BP (2010), Saudi Arabia accounts for 35.1% of proved oil
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reserve in the Middle East with 264.5 billion barrels. The other 3 countries 
are Iran, Iraq and Kuwait with 137, 115 and 101 billion barrels respectively.
Libya has the largest proved oil reserve in Africa with 46.4 billion barrels 
followed by Nigeria and Algeria with 37.2 and 12.2 billion barrels respectively.
Table A l.3  
Proved Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
Australia 3.2 4.9 4.1
China 16.0 15.2 14.8
India 5.6 5.3 9.0
Indonesia 5.4 5.1 4.2
Malaysia 3.6 4.5 5.8
Vietnam 0.2 2.0 4.4
Other Asia Pac. 2.4 3.0 2.8
Total Asia Pac. 36.3 40.1 45.2
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
According to BP (2012), Asia Pacific is the region with the least proved 
oil reserve with a total of 45.2 billion barrels by the end of 2010. All the oil 
abindant countries in the region have a proved reserve of less than 10 billion 
barrels except China which is reported to have 14.8 billion barrels.
1.6.2 A ppendix 1.2: Individual Country Oil Consum ption
Appendix 1.2 reports the individual countries that make-up the regional totals 
of oil consumption reported in Table 1.2. According to BP (2012), United 
States accounts for 82% (almost 20 mb/d) of total oil consumption in North
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America by the end of 2010. The breakdown for South and Central America 
shows that Brazil accounts for 43% of oil consumption in the region with 
2.60mb/d followed by Venezuela and Argentina with 0.77 mb/d and 0.56 mb/d 
respectively.
Oil consumption in the Middle East is mainly supported by two coun­
tries; Saudi Arabia and Iran - both of which accounts for around 60% of oil 
consumption in the region.
Table A1.4
Oil Consumption (thousand of barrels daily)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
United States 16,988 19,701 19,148
Canada 1,747 1,922 2,276
Mexico 1,580 1,950 1,994
Total North Ame. 20,316 23,574 23,418
Argentina 398 434 557
Brazil 1,432 2,018 2,604
Chile 141 233 314
Colombia 204 235 238
Ecuador 92 128 226
Venezuela 417 559 765
Other S. & C. Ame. 944 1,249 1,401
Total S. & C. Ame. 3,623 4,855 6,104
Iran 947 1,304 1,799
Israel 177 279 242
Kuwait 106 249 413
Qatar 43 60 220
Saudi Arabia 1,175 1,578 2,812
UAE 304 369 682
Other Middle East 808 1,155 1,653
Total Middle East 3,559 5,021 7,821
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
Seven countries within Europe and Eurasia consumes more than 1 mb/d,
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among which Russia is the largest consumer with 3.2 m b/d followed by Ger­
many with 2.4 mb/d. Others are France, UK, Italy, Spain and Netherland 
with 1.74, 1.59, 1.53, 1.51 and 1.06 m b/d respectively.
Table A 1.5
Oil Consumption (thousand of barrels daily)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
Austria 222 242 269
Belg. and Lux. 500 694 715
Finland 226 220 219
France 1,895 1,994 1,744
Germany 2,689 2,746 2,441
Greece 314 398 372
Italy 1,924 1,930 1,532
Kazakhstan 442 162 262
Netherland 748 879 1,057
Norway 200 204 239
Borland 325 426 568
Portugal 225 318 261
Russia 5,049 2,698 3,199
Spain 1,026 1,425 1,505
Sweden 364 339 305
Switzerland 271 260 242
Turkey 464 668 624
Ukraine 1,272 253 256
United Kingdom 1,754 1,704 1,590
Other Eur & Eurasia 3,336 1,971 2,110
Total Euro & Eurasia 23,247 19,582 19,510
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
Africa is the region with the least oil consumption and tliree countries 
mainly contributes to the region’s figures - Egypt, South Africa and Algeria 
with a daily oil consumption of 0.76, 0.53 and 0.32 million barrels respectively.
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Table A1.6
Oil Consumption (thousand of barrels daily)
Country End of 1990 End of 2000 End of 2010
Algeria 213 191 327
Egypt 466 552 757
South Africa 349 457 531
Other Africa 915 1,238 1,676
Total Africa 1,943 2,439 3,291
Australia 688 831 941
China 2,320 4,766 9,057
China H.K 130 201 324
India 1,213 2,261 3,319
Indonesia 644 1,143 1,304
Japan 5,234 5,530 4,451
Malaysia 269 460 556
Pakistan 217 371 410
Philippines 233 347 282
Singapore 444 645 1,185
South Korea 1,042 2,252 2,384
Taiwan 576 882 1,026
Thailand 422 835 1,128
Vietnam 60 171 338
Other Asia Pac. 322 438 534
Total Asia Pac. 13,814 21,135 27,237
Source: BP Statistical Review 2012
According to BP (2012), by the end of 2010, Asia Pacific region has the 
highest oil consumption. China is by far the largest oil consumer in the region 
with over 9 mb/d. Others are Japan (4.5 mb/d), India (3.3 mb/d), South 
Korea (2.4 mb/d), Indonesia (1.3 mb/d), Singapore (1.2 mb/d), Thailand (1.1 
mb/d) and Taiwan (1.0 mb/d).
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Chapter 221
2 M odelling and Forecasting W orld Oil D e­
m and
2.1 In trod u ction
Since the early 1970s, world crude oil prices have experienced sharp fluctua­
tions brought about by supply/ demand fluctuations due to a number of factors. 
For example, geopolitical factors related to the destabilization of the Middle 
East on one hand, and the growth in the world economy, particularly from 
the emerging economies, on the other. Nevertheless, despite considerable un­
certainty surrounding the world oil market, global oil consumption increased 
at an annual average rate of 2.86%, 0.80%, 1.42% and 1.29% for the periods 
1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 respectively (BP, 2011).
Over the whole period, 1971 to 2010, global oil consumption increased by an 
average of 1.59% per annum; however, the growth varied between regions. In 
the North America and Europe/Eurasia regions (which together accounted for 
well above 60% of world oil consumption over the period), the average annual 
growth rate in oil consumption was limited to 0.81% and 0.13% respectively. 
Whereas, the average annual growth in the other regions was somewhat higher; 
4.61% for the Middle-East, 3.70% for Africa, 3.39% for Asia Pacific, 2.61% for
South and Central America.
21 Earlier preliminary work for this chapter was presented at the 35th Annual IAEE 
International Conference, Perth, Australia. June, 2012.
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According to BP (2012), one of the major factors that constrain oil con­
sumption growth is technological advances, particularly in the advanced region 
of the OECD.22 Nevertheless, there has been a debate in the economics lit­
erature about the impact of energy efficiency improvements or technological 
progress (TP) on energy demand. Some studies, such as - Beenstock and Will- 
coks (1981; 1983) and Hunt et al. (2003a; 2003b) argue that when modelling 
energy demand the specification should allow for TP to be exogenous in nature 
and unrelated to price development. However, others, such as Kouris (1983a 
and 1983b) argue that prices induce technical change so when modelling en­
ergy demand the specification should just allow for TP to be endogenous in 
nature via price variable. Furthermore, in separate strand of the oil and en­
ergy demand literature others, such as Dagay and Gately (1995), Gately and 
Huntington (2002) and Dagay et al. (2007), support the view (albeit implic­
itly) that energy demand specification should allow for TP to be endogenous 
in nature by allowing the demand to respond asymmetrically to price rises and 
price falls.
Furthermore, when TP is exogenously included in an energy or oil demand 
specification, it has been argued by some, such as Hunt et al. (2003a, 2003b) 
and, Adeyemi and Hunt (2007 and 2013), that TP should be captured by 
allowing the trend component to be stochastic in a time series context or time 
dummies in a panel context. This being referred to as the Underlying Energy 
Demand Trend (UEDT) given it should capture technical advances as well 
as other important exogenous influences. Several studies, such as Hunt and 
Ninomiya (2003), Dimitropoulos et al. (2005), and Dilaver and Hunt (2011)
22 According to the outlook, energy efficiency will continue to improve globally at an 
accelerating rate of 2.0% per annum as against 1.2% per annum over the past 20 years.
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have applied this model with symmetrical price responses. Whereas, Adeyemi 
et al. (2010) and Adeyemi and Hunt (2013) have considered both endogenous 
and exogenous TP captured through asymmetric price responses (APR) and 
the UEDT respectively and any restrictions placed on the model (such as 
symmetric price responses and/or non-linear trends) only applied if suggested 
by data.
Against this background, the STSM is used to estimate oil demand func­
tions for the six regions of the world identified in Chapter 1, based on the 
modelling procedure suggested by Adeyemi and Hunt (2013). The aim is to 
provide robust estimates of price and income elasticities as well as the UEDT 
that explains the different oil demand relationships and illustrate how they 
differ across various regions of the world. In addition, to use these estimates 
to produce future forecast scenarios for the various regions of the world based 
on different assumptions about the future path of key variables that drive oil 
consumption.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the liter­
ature and Section 2.3 outlines the methodology applied in this study. Section 
2.4 discusses the data and reports the estimation results. Section 2.5 outlines 
details of the forecast scenarios of oil demand up to 2030 for each of the regions 
and Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2  L iterature R ev iew
2.2.1 R eview  onTechnical Progress and th e Underlying Energy D e­
mand Trend
Several studies have used different estimation techniques to arrive at estimates 
of price and income elasticities in energy demand modelling.23 While the early 
studies applied the simple OLS technique without any role for TP, most of the 
recent energy demand literature (discussed below) recognises the importance 
of capturing the impact of TP in building energy demand models whether 
endogenously and/or exogenously.
One strand of the literature argues that there is good reason to believe that 
prices provide a key motivation for the development of new technology; con­
sequently, technical change is seen as being price induced; hence it should be 
captured endogenously in the model. According to Kouris (1983a and 1983b), 
a simple deterministic trend cannot adequately capture the underlying process 
unless certain engineering data could be found to proxy technical progress. If 
not, then it is better to model endogenously through prices without allowance 
for exogenous technical progress. As introduced above, connected to this is a 
strand of literature on asymmetric price responses, which was initially analysed 
through the observed imperfect price-reversibility. Dargay and Gately (1995) 
argued that higher energy price induced investment in more energy efficient 
equipment but when prices fell, the response is not reversed symmetrically. 
Therefore, they concluded that symmetric energy demand specification would 
not provide an adequate description of an energy demand relationship, which
23 See Dahl (1993) and Atkinson and Manning (1995) for a survey of international energy 
elasticities
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may lead to misrepresentative estimates of the price and income elasticities. In 
line with the above argument, Gately and Huntington (2002), henceforth GH, 
decomposed the price variable into price-maximum, price-recovery and price- 
cut to capture TP endogenously. Several studies in the energy economics 
literature have applied similar decomposition approach.24 However, Griffin 
and Schulman (2005) argued that the price decomposition approach adopted 
by GH was only a proxy for energy saving technical progress. They suggested 
a simple symmetric price specification that accounts for technical change via 
time dummies.
As also introduced briefly above, in a parallel strand of the literature it has 
been argued that technical progress should be incorporated exogenously in 
energy demand models. Beenstock and Willcocks (1981, 1983) recognised the 
role of TP but argued that it is mainly dependent on exogenous factors which 
can be captured with a simple deterministic trend. Despite the argument by 
Kouris (1983a and 1983b) that a simple linear trend is inadequate to capture 
TP, Beenstock and Willcocks (1983) responded that using a simple time trend 
is better than ignoring the issue. Hunt et al (2003a, 2003b) went further to 
argue that a linear deterministic trend is an inadequate way to capture TP but 
there is still a need to capture other exogenous effects25 that can be achieved 
by a stochastic trend in energy demand modelling or as Hunt et al. (2003a 
and 2003b) call it the UEDT.
Developing out of the studies above is the argument that TP might be
24See for instance, Griffin and Shulman (2005), Adeyemi and Hunt (2007), Adeyemi et. 
al. (2010) and Adeyemi and Hunt (2013)
25According to Hunt et al. (2003), apart from technical progress or advancement in 
technology other exogenous effects that can be captured by the stochastic trend include 
consumer preference, habit persistence, changes in values and lifestyles, changes in economic 
structure etc.
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incorporated both exogenously and endogenously in oil and energy demand 
models. Huntington (2006) challenged Griffin and Schulman’s (2005) view 
that asymmetric price responses (APR) are just a proxy of energy saving TP 
showing statistically26 that there may be a role for both endogenous TP via 
asymmetric prices and exogenous TP via time dummies. Adeyemi and Hunt 
(2007) (for the OECD industrial energy demand) and subsequently Adeyemi 
et al. (2010) (for OECD whole economy aggregate energy demand) carried out 
a series of statistical tests on both time-series and panel data and concluded 
that in general, statistically there is role for both exogenous and endogenous 
technical progress.27 Adeyemi and Hunt (2013) integrates both exogenous and 
endogenous TP in a time-series context by applying the ‘general to specific’ 
philosophy which initially incorporates both APR and a stochastic UEDT, 
and restrictions imposed only if suggested by the data. This work therefore 
builds on this approach, by modelling world oil demand by regions using the 
structural time-series model (STSM). The technical details of this procedure 
are outlined in the methodology section.
2.2.2 R eview  of Previous Oil Dem and Studies
There have been numerous econometric studies considering the response of 
world/regional oil demand to price and income changes - some considering 
overall oil demand or oil demand by sectors, while others disaggregate by oil 
use; residual, transport and other uses. According to Pedrogal et al. (2009),
26 Huntington (2006) tested restrictions of symmetric and no time dummies in a panel data 
context and found that statistically there may be role for both asymmetric price response 
and technical progress
27A role for exogenous technical progress via stochastic trend in a time-series context 
and time-dummies in a panel context. With endogenous technical progress via asymmetric 
price response
42
the specific nature of demand functions is generally constrained by informa­
tion available or economic theory; in most studies, the specification for the 
dependent variable is consumption which is frequently considered either in 
physical units or per-capita terms while the explanatory variables28 usually 
considered are real prices, real income, technology or changes in capital ef­
ficiency, climatic differences among others. Most of the earlier studies that 
estimate energy or oil demand functions applied symmetric models using the 
simple OLS technique without accounting for the role of technical progress. 
As indicated in the previous section, later studies came to recognise the role 
of technical change and attempted to capture it endogenously via asymmetric 
price responses (and exogenously via a trend).
In estimating oil demand relationship, it is important that significant co­
efficients of price and income elasticities are obtained since, as Dahl (1993) 
indicated, models that do not include both price and income are mis-specified. 
While most studies used GDP for the income variable, decision on the price 
variable is a bit mixed. Dargay and Gately (2010), henceforth DG, maintain 
that it would be better to use real end-user prices but these are generally only 
available for a few large OECD countries; consequently, the global market can 
only be analysed using crude oil prices. DG suggest that the use of crude 
oil prices makes the model less suitable in analysing demand in individual 
countries but provides a reasonable description of how demand for group of 
countries responds to price of crude oil.
Some of the earlier studies have shown that the response of oil demand to
either prices or income differs depending on whether industrialized or develop­
28 Pedrogal et al. (2009) used the term ‘exogenous variables’ because exogeneity test has 
been conducted on the explanatory variables
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ing countries are considered. Dahl (1993) in a survey of oil demand elasticities 
for developing countries found that the demand for oil is income elastic and 
greater than 1.32, implying that with stable prices, oil demand will grow faster 
than income. Dargay and Gately (1995) compared oil demand elasticities for 
industrialized and less developed countries (LDC) and found the LDCs oil de­
mand to be more responsive to income and less responsive to prices while the 
industrialized countries are more responsive to prices.
GH estimated the effect of price and income on oil demand by considering 
imperfect price and income reversibility. Using pooled cross-section/ time se­
ries data for various groups of countries, the study conclude that oil demand 
responds more to increases in prices and income than decreases. DG used 
similar methodology and country groupings to estimate changes in prices and 
income on world oil demand and made projections to 2030. They argued that 
it would be more difficult to restrain oil demand growth in the future as factors 
that led to reduced oil demand cannot be repeated since most countries have 
switched away from the use of oil in electricity generation. Their projection 
for 2030 is around 30mb/d greater than what is projected by DOE, IEA and 
OPEC.
While all the above studies only consider price induced technical progress, 
Huntington (2009) differentiates the role of price induced and other exogenous 
TP that may affect oil demand growth. As indicated in Section 2.1, the study 
uses a simple deterministic trend to capture exogenous TP and confirms the 
influence of both exogenous and endogenous TP in oil demand growth. Asali 
(2011) also used a deterministic trend to capture exogenous TP, in a study that 
applied dynamic time-series modelling to estimate income and price elasticities
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of demand for oil in G7 and BRIG countries. Evidence of deterministic trend 
was found for some countries while it was found to be only price induced for 
others.
As shown in Table 2.1, GH and DG applied asymmetric specification on 
both price and income variable29 while Huntington (2010) applied only price 
asymmetry, allowing the income variable to be symmetric. The long-run in­
come elasticity for the various sub-groups ranges between 0.24 and 0.90 in 
GH and 0.43 and 1.03 in DG. While the former has a relatively lower income 
elasticity of 0.56 for the OECD, the latter has a higher elasticity of 0.80 for 
the same group. Furthermore, Huntington’s (2009) study which analysed only 
the OECD group shows a long-run income elasticity of 0.81. Asali (2011) 
with a symmetric model and time trend shows a much higher long-run income 
elasticity of 1.24 for the group of advanced economies.
The long-run price elasticity generally ranges between -0.06 and -0.64 across 
the various studies discussed above.30 The studies also reveal that the price 
variables are not significant for some groups such as: the group of oil exporters 
in GH; and China, the group of oil exporters, and the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) in DG consistent with Dahl (1993), which arguably means the models 
for these groups are mis-specified. On a general note, based on the studies, it 
could be argued that the notion of less advanced countries being more income 
responsive than the advanced countries, as Dahl (1993) observed, no longer
29The asymmetric income specification was rejected for some groups; OECD in GH and 
all the groups except oil exporters in DG
30 Some of the variations in long-run elasticities is likely to be due to different sample 
period used
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necessarily still holds since the more recent literature seems to suggest higher 
income elasticities for the more advanced group of countries.
It can also be concluded from the literature that most of the recent studies 
recognize the need to capture technical efficiency when modelling oil demand, 
which they attempt to capture via asymmetric prices and/or a non-linear 
time trend. However, as far as is known, the STSM (allowing for a stochastic 
UEDT along with APR) has not been applied before to model oil demand for 
the various regions of the world; hence, the research undertaken here. The 
details of this technique are therefore outlined in the next section.
2.3  M eth o d o lo g y
It is assumed that the oil demand function for each world region can generally 
be represented by:
e* =  f(yuPt, UEDTt) (2.1)
where et is the natural logarithm of per-capita oil consumption, yt is nat­
ural logarithm of real per-capita GDP, and UEDTt (the properties of this are 
explained later in this section) is the Underlying Energy Demand Trend. The 
price variable, pt , is the natural logarithm of the real oil price which is de­
composed into, Pmax.t the cumulative increases in the historical maximum of 
P t ,  Prec,t the cumulative sub maximum increase in pt , and pCut,t the cumulative 
decreases in pt . The oil demand specification outlined here, which generally 
identifies a simple long-run equilibrum relationship between oil consumption,
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economic activity and real oil prices, is similar to previous studies of energy 
and oil demand relationships and assumes that both yt and pt are exogenous, 
consistent with Pedrogal et al. (2009). According to Pesaran et al. (1998), 
this simple specification generally outperforms specifications that are more 
complex. Amarawickrama and Hunt (2008) in a related study of electricity 
demand noted that these kind of specifications can be interpreted as ‘market 
relations’ that link consumption/usage to prices and hence termed long-run 
equilibrum ‘consumption functions’ rather than ‘demand functions’. Going by 
this, the term ‘demand’ as noted by Amarawickrama and Hunt (2008) is used 
for simplicity and consistency with previous studies as it would not alter the 
analysis or conclusions of the work.
2.3.1 E stim ation  Technique
Following Adeyemi and Hunt (2013), one of four general models of asymme­
try/symmetry will be applied depending on which is best accepted by the 
data. The models are; Full Asymmetry (FA), Restricted Asymmetry I (RAI), 
Restricted Asymmetry II (RAH), and Symmetry (S). Details of these models 
are described below.31
Full A sym m etric (FA) M odel The FA model incorporates both a sto­
chastic UEDT and asymmetric price response (APR) within the ARDU model. 
The estimated model is therefore represented as follows:32
31 The general energy demand function is a log log specification in line with the majority 
of studies in the area.
32Given the length of the annual data set, an initial lag length of two years was thought 
to be adequate, leaving an appropriate number of degrees of freedom for the modelling 
exercise.
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et — U EDTt +  PoVt +  PlVt-l +  p2Vt-2 +  7oPmax,it +  YlPmax,t-l 
‘^ "72Pmax,t—2 o^PreCjt T^ lPrec,t—l 4" ' 2^Prec,t—2
~^ ~iïoPcut,t +  ôiPcutj-1 +  Ô2Pcut,t-2 +  AiCf-i +  \ 2et-2 +  £t (2.2)
where et, pmax,t, Prec,t, and pcui)t are as defined above. UEDTt is the 
underlying energy demand trend (discussed further below); t  — 1970 — 2010; 
A =  Vt-i coefficients, i =  0 , 1 , 2 ; % =  pma^ t- i  coefficients, i =  0 , 1 , 2 ; 
7Ti =  Prec,t—i coefficients, i =  0,1,2; Si =  pCut,t-i coefficients, i =  0 , 1 , 2; 
A; =  coefficients, i =  1,2.
/)* /50 +  / l^ +  02 1 • ? 1 •=  —    — =  long-run income elasticity;
1 — Ai — A2
* 7o + 7i +  72 7 . , ,.
7  ^= ------------ — = long-run price- max elasticity;
1 — Ai — A2
_ TTq +  7Ti +  7T2 , . 7 . • j7T =  —---- ------ — =  long-run pnce-rec elasticity; ana
1 — Ai — A2
5* =  2° ^"<\ 2 ~  long-run price-cut elasticity.
R estric ted  A sym m etry I (RAI) M odel When it proves difficult to find 
statistically significant coefficients and/or the estimated long-run coefficients
do not conform to the a-priori expectation that |7 *| X |7r*| y  |5* |33 from the
33 DG notes that an increase in prices that has previousely been experienced should have 
a lesser demand response than when that event occurs occurs for the first time. In other
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full asymmetric model above, then a simpler model is explored where decom- 
posittion consists of only price rises and price cuts. Therefore the restriction 
placed is that, #o =  7o =  ttq, #1 =  7i — ni and #2 =  7 2  =  ^ 2  so that the 
general ARDL(2) model in equation 2.2 becomes:
et =  U EDTt +  P^yt +  PiVt-l +  ^22/t-2 +  6oPrise,t +  0lPrise,t-l +  ^2Prise,t-2 
+^0Pcut,i +  5lPcut,t-l +  82Pcut,t-2  +  AiCt-i +  ^2^-2 +  £t (2.3)
where et , yt , pCut,t, UEDTt , Pi, Si, \ it et , t, p* and 5* are as defined above. 
Prise,t — Pmax,t +  prec,t which is the cummulative rise in the natural logarithm 
of historical real oil prises in year t. &i =  prise,t-i, i =  0,1,2; and
a* 00 +  01 +  02 7 . . , . .0* =   ---- ------ — =  long-run pmce-rise elasticity
1 — Ai — A2
R estric ted  A sym m etry  II  (RAH) M odel In a situation where the RAI 
model proves difficult to find statistically significant coefficients and/or where 
the estimated long-run coefficients do not conform to the a-priori expectation 
that 10*| >z |5*|, then a more simpler model is explored where the price de­
composition consists of price-max and price changes. The restriction placed 
therefore is that, 'ÿo =  ttq =  #o, Vh =  =  ^an d  =  7r2 =  ^2 so that the
general ARDL(2) model becomes:
words, the long-run price recovery elasticity is expected to be no greater (in absolute terms) 
than the long-run price-max elasticity. It is further assumed that the long-run price-cut 
elasticity will be no greater (in absolute terms) than the long-run price-recovery elasticity. 
Hence the a-priori expectation that |y*| b  |7r*| >z |<5*|
50
et — U E D T t  +  PoVt +  P lV t- l  +  ^2^-2 +  7oPmax,t +  7lPmax,t-l +  72Pmax,t-2 
~^ ~'tpoPchange,t "i" ÿ iPchange,t—l H- ^ 2Pchange,t—2 7* 1 7" ^2^—2 7" St (2.4)
where et , yt , pmax,t, UEDTt , f t, A*, £t , t, (3* and 7 * are as defined 
above. pchange,t =  Prec,t T- Pcut,t which is the cummulative decrease and rise in 
the natural logarithm of historical real oil prises below the previous maximum 
in year t. f t  =  pchange,t-i, i =  0 ,1,2; and
Sym m etric (S) M odel Where none of the above asymmetric specifications 
was able to find statistically significant coefficient, a more restrictive general 
symmetric price response is utilized. The price variable is therefore no longer 
decomposed, with restrictions <£0 =  7 0 =  ttq =  =  7 i =  tti =  ft and
P2 ~  7 2  — 7r2 =  ft 80 that the general ARDL(2) model becomes:
et =  L7Ei)Tt+ft)2/t+/3:L2/t-i7-ft2/t-2+(PoP*7-<i1pt-i7-<)c,2Pt-2+Aiet_i+À2et_27-£:t
where et , yt , UEDTt , ft, A;, et , t, and /3* are as defined above. pt =  
Pmax,t 7" Prec,t 7~ Pcut,ti and
I * =  ^ 0  +  7- f t
^ 1 -  Ai -  Ag
=  long-run price-change elasticity
(2.5)
_ V o + f  1 + ^ 2  
*  -  1 - A i - A j = long-run {symmetric) price elasticity
51
2.3.2 N ature of the U nderlying Energy Dem and Trend (U ED T)
The STSM which is used to estimate the relationship, allows the UEDT to 
vary stochastically over time. The UEDT depends upon level (fit) and slope 
(/3t) components with the following formulation:
Ik =  V t - i  + & - ! + % ;  Vt ~  NID(0,  <j^) 
fit — fit-i  T  ~  NID(0,  c r |)
The hyper parameters r)t and £t are mutually uncorrelated white noise 
disturbances with zero means and variances. The nature of the estimated 
UEDT therefore depends upon zero restrictions imposed on the level, slope 
and the hyper parameters. For the most restrictive case cr^  =  cr| =  0 the 
model reduces to the traditional regression model with a constant and a linear 
trend.34
Estimation of the model parameters and hyper-parameters is by maximum 
likelihood using Kalman filter. The equation residuals and auxiliary residu­
als are also estimated to evaluate the model. As indicated by Harvey and 
Koopman (1992), normality of the auxiliary residuals can be maintained by 
identifying irregular, slope and level interventions. Dilaver and Hunt (2011) 
further highlighted that these interventions give important information about 
breaks and other structural changes at certain points during the estimation
34 According to Harvey (1997), the STSM permits a more flexible approach to modelling 
the trend component and it is worth noting that this removes any concern about the sta- 
tionarity process of the data.
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period. The irregular interventions have a temporary effect on the UEDT as 
it captures unexpected events or shocks while the level and slope intervention 
has a more lasting effect on the UEDT. Where there are no interventions, the 
estimated UEDT is given by the level however where intervention are 
present, as Dilaver and Hunt (2011) demonstrate, the UEDT is given by:
UEDT =  //t +  irregular interventions +  level interventions +  slope inter­
ventions
Using a data driven general to specific approach starting from a lag of 2 (as 
shown in the equations 2.2 - 2.5), the coefficient of insignificant variables and 
hyper-parameters are eliminated ensuring that a number of diagnostic tests 
and normality tests on the auxiliary residuals are passed in order to arrive 
at the preferred specification. In searching for the preferred specification, the 
most general model (FA model with a stochastic trend) is explored first and 
the restrictive versions chosen only accepted if they are accepted by the data 
and conform to the economic theory; as explained earlier in this section. The 
software package STAMP 8.3 (Koopman et al., 2009) is used to estimate the 
model. The results obtained are reported in the next section, before then, the 
sources and other useful information about the data used for this study are 
explained.
2.4  D a ta  and E stim a tio n  R esu lts
2.4.1 D ata
The aim of this chapter is to model global oil demand along geographical 
regional classification and produce future forecast scenarios. As indicated in
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Chapter 1, the six geographical regions analysed are those as classified in BP 
(2011): ‘North America’, ‘South and Central America’, ‘Europe and Eurasia’, 
‘Middle East’, ‘Africa’, and ‘Asia Pacific’. Each region is therefore considered 
as a block thus allowing time-series estimation for each. As often argued, 
for long-term growth potential and prospects for future energy needs, it is 
essential to consider demographic trends as growth patterns will vary across 
regions. This classification is therefore adopted in order to analyse differences 
in oil demand relationships across regions and also examine the relative pattern 
of future oil consumption for regions (such as Middle East, Africa and Asia 
Pacific) that have experienced significant increase over the past decade.
Annual time-series data from 1970 to 2010 for regional oil consumption 
(in thousand barrels per day) and the international real crude oil price (in­
ternationally traded UK Brent crude price in $2010) were obtained from the 
BP (2011). Real GDP (at US$ 2000 prices) and population (in millions) were 
obtained from WDI, World Bank (available at www.esds.ac.uk).
2.4.2 Estim ation R esults
Table 2.2 presents estimates of price and income elasticities after eliminat­
ing insignificant variables and including interventions in order to maintain the 
normality of the residuals and auxiliary residuals. Statistically, the existence 
of interventions in the STSM might be a sign of structural break or instability 
over the estimation period. The preferred models for each region appear to fit 
the data well and are free from mis-specification problems, passing all diagnos­
tic tests. The FA model is the preferred specification for all the regions except 
for Africa and Asia Pacific where the RAI is the preferred specification. A
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stochastic trend is preferred for all regions except Africa, which exhibits a de­
terministic trend. Discussions on the result of the various regions are provided 
below.
Table 2.2A 
Parameter Estim ates
N. America S. & Cen. Ame. Fur. & Eurasia M iddle E ast A frica A sia P ac ific
Model FA FA FA FA R A I R A I
E stim ated C oeffic ien ts
Ai -0 .228*** 0.638*** 0.408*** 0.227** 0.426*** 0.280**
Po 1.302*** 0.316*** 0.571*** 0.157*** 0.326*** 0.650***
7o - - -0 .050*** - n /a n /a
7i -0 .0 1 5 * -0 .074*** - -0 .144*** n /a n /a
do n /a n /a n /a n /a -0 .039*** -
0i n /a n /a n /a n /a - -0 .070***
LR elasticity estim ates 
{3* (income) 1.06 0.87 0.96 0.20 0.57 0.90
7* (price — max) -0 .0 2 -0 .2 0 -0 .0 8 -0 .1 9 -0 .0 7 -0 .1 0
7T* (price — rec) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0 .0 7 -0 .1 0
5* (price — cut) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hyper-param eters and Interventions
H yper-parameters
Irregular 0.0000324 0.000179 0.0000960 0.000190 0.000132 0.0000852
Level - - - - - -
Slope 0.000161 0.0000153 0.0000687 0.0000327 - 0.000233
N ature o f  Trend
Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic D eter min is tic Stochastic
Trend Trend Trend Trend Trend Trend
I nterventions
Irr 1981 Ir r  1974 Ir r  1977 Ir r  1974 Ir r  1986 Ir r  1998
Irr 2008 Ir r  2000 Sip 1979 Ir r  1988 Sip 1982 Lvl 1974
Sip 1978 Sip 1978 Sip 1984
Note: 1. Model estimation and all tests are from the software package STAMP 8.3
2. *)**)*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
3. For Africa and Asia Pacific, the long-run p-max and p-rec elasticities are
identical given the restriction imposed
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Table 2.2B
Diagnostic Tests
N. America S. & Cen. Ame. Eur. & Eurasia M iddle E ast A frica A sia P ac ific
Goodness o f  f i t
p.e.v 0.000144 0.000222 0.000304 0.000256 0.000109 0.000481
p.e.v jm .^ 1.168 1.170 1.116 1.173 1.131 0.984
A IC -8 .3 9 9 -7 .9 7 2 -7 .7 0 6 -7 .8 2 9 -8 .7 2 8 -7 .2 4 8
B? 0.979 0.957 0.977 0.994 0.992 0.991
R l 0.707 0.755 0.664 0.780 0.833 0.656
Residual Diagnostics
Std Error 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.021
N orm ality 2.881 3.855 0.323 0.854 1.272 0.188
# ( H ) 0.861 1.129 0.809 0.408 1.066 0.428
r ( l) 0.016 -0 .1 7 7 0.157 -0 .0 4 8 -0 .2 2 8 -0 .0 3 2
r(2) -0 .0 4 4 0.050 0.037 -0 .1 2 7 -0 .0 6 6 0.159
r(3) -0 .0 2 2 0.162 -0 .3 2 8 -0 .0 3 4 -0 .0 0 9 -0 .0 2 5
D W 1.936 2.231 1.604 1.982 2.304 1.998
<9(9, 9 - p ) 7.718 6.455 9.118 2.127 2.925 3.657
A uxiliary residuals: N orm ality
Irregular 1.601 0.069 0.111 0.465 0.668 1.963
Level n /a n /a n /a n /a n /a n /a
Slope 3.370 1.216 0.565 0.784 n /a 0.371
Vv edictive tes t 2005 — 2010
Failure 5.404 6.704 4.930 1.963 9.486 4.262
Cusum  t(6) -0 .7 1 8 -0 .5 2 7 0.044 0.920 1.145 -0 .1 7 1
LR T est 28.22*** 6.09* 8.27** 9.61** - 11.94***
Note: 1. *)**)*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
2. Prediction error variance (p.e.v), prediction error mean deviation (p.e.v/m .d) and the 
coefficient of determination (i?2 and i22) are all measures of goodness of fit;
3. Normality of Bowman-Shenton test, approximately distributed as X(2) ’
4. H ( ll )  is Heteroscedasticity statistics distributed as F ( ii ,n ) ;
5. r (r ) is serial correlation at residual lags r;
6. DW is the Durbin Watson statistics;
7. Q(p,d) is the Box-Ljung statistics distributed as %2^ ;
8. LR represents likelihood ratio test after imposing restriction 
either <r2 or <r2 is equal to zero, distributed as%2^;
9. The statistical significance of the residual diagnostic tests are above 10%, hence 
the models have passed all the diagnostic tests presented.
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N orth  A m erica The preferred model for this region is the FA model with a 
stochastic trend. The model passes all diagnostic tests including the additional 
normality tests on the auxiliary residuals generated by the STSM. The esti­
mated long-run income, price-max elasticities are 1.06 and -0.02 respectively, 
whereas the estimated price-rec and price-cut elasticities are zero given both 
variables were deleted given their statistical insignificance when testing down 
from the general to the build-up to the preferred model.
Figure 2.1: UEDT for North America
The log likelihood (LR) test result indicates that the stochastic specifica­
tion of the trend is accepted by the data with fluctuations that would not 
be adequately captured by a linear trend. The UEDT is generally downward 
sloping as shown in Figure 2.1 which implies that holding price and income 
constant, aggregate oil demand for North America declined but not at a fixed 
rate as in the case of a deterministic trend. Furthermore, during this esti­
mation process, it was found that irregular interventions (1981, 2008) and a
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slope intervention (1978) were required to ensure the normality of the residu­
als was maintained. The slope intervention might be because of the 1977/78 
oil price shock while the irregular intervention of 1981 may be the resultant 
economic slowdown that followed. The irregular intervention of 2008 might 
have captured the recent financial crisis that began in August 2008.
South and C entral A m erica Similar to North America, the preferred 
model for this region is also the FA model with stochastic trend and the 
model passes all diagnostic tests. The estimated long-run income and price- 
max elasticities are 0.87 and -0.20 respectively whereas the estimated price-rec 
and price-cut elasticities are both zero given that like in North America both 
variables were deleted given their statistical insignificance.
Figure 2.2: UEDT for South and Central America
2000
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The priori expecteation that /y* / ^  / t t*/ X / ô * /  also holds and the LR 
suggests preference for a stochastic trend. The UEDT for South and Central 
America shown in Figure 2.2 is clearly non-linear, indicating periods of both
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upward and downward trend in oil demand within the sample period. It 
was also found that irregular intervention (1974, 2000) and slope intervention 
(1978) were required to ensure the normality of the residuals. The irregular 
intervention of 1974 and slope intervention of 1978 are likely to be related to 
the uncertainty around the 1970s oil price shocks that affected global economic 
activity at the period. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean reported a significant shock in economic performance of the region 
in 1999/2000 due to weakening link between domestic prices and exchange 
rate during the period. This might have been the reason for the irregular 
intervention in the year 2000.
E urope and Eurasia The preferred model for this region is again the FA 
with stochastic trend and the model passed all diagnostic tests as required. 
The long-run income and price-max elasticities are 0.96 and -0.08 respectively 
whereas the estimated price-rec and price-cut elasticities are both zero.
Figure 2.3: UEDT for Europe and Eurasia
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The LR test result supports the stochastic nature of the trend. As in the 
case for North America, the UEDT for Europe and Eurasia shown in Figure 
2.3 is generally downward sloping but with some fluctuations, implying that 
aggregate oil demand generally declined over the estimation period (holding 
income and price constant). Some interventions were required to maintain 
normality of the residuals; irregular intervention 1977 and a slope intervention 
1979. Considering Europe is a highly industrialized region, it could be argued 
that both interventions are as a result of the oil price shock in the late 1970’s, 
causing a temporary effect in 1977 and a more lasting effect from 1979.
M iddle E ast The FA model with a stochastic trend is also the preferred 
model for the Middle East. The long-run income and price-max elasticities 
are 0.20 and -0.19 respectively. As was reported for the other regions, the 
estimated price-rec and price-cut elasticities are both zero given that both 
variables were deleted given their statistical insignificance.
Figure 2.4: UEDT for Middle East
E O f,
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The a-priori expectation for the asymmetric model holds and the LR sug­
gests a preference for a stochastic trend. The UEDT for the Middle East 
shown in Figure 2.4 is generally upward sloping but the rate of increase slowed 
somewhat in the early 1980s. The stochastic element associated with the oil 
demand trend could be caused by the relative inefficiencies due to massive sub­
sidies imposed on petroleum products by the governments of most countries in 
the Middle East. As noted by Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012), energy subsidies 
in the Middle East distort price signals with serious implications on efficiency 
and optimal allocation of resources.
Again, an Irregular intervention (1974 & 1988) and slope intervention 
(1984) were required for this model to maintain normality of the residuals. 
The Yom Kippur War, which started in 1973, that led to the first oil price 
shock could have been the reason behind the irregular intervention of 1974. 
The crude oil price collapse that followed, which began in 1983 might have 
been captured by the slope intervention in 1984. On the irregular intervention 
in 1988, information obtained from World Development Indicators - World 
Bank indicates a temporary shock affected the MENA region in 1988 as the 
average annual growth rate was 0.28%, 1.57% and 0.95% for 1987, 1988 and 
1999 respectively. Another possible reason might be the spike in oil price from 
$8 in 1986 to around $18 in 1987/88.
Africa The preferred model for Africa is the RAI with a deterministic trend.35 
The long-run income, price-max and price-rec elasticities are 0.57, -0.07 and 
-0.07 respectively, while the price-cut elasticity is zero. For this region, unlike
35Although, as Figure 2.5 shows, the interventions means that the estimated UEDT is 
far from a continuous straight line as given by a conventional deterministic trend
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above, the data did not accept full asymmetric model based on statistical sig­
nificance and a-priori expectations explained in the methodology section; how­
ever, the restricted model passes all the diagnostic tests. Unlike the previous 
regions, the estimated UEDT for Africa, shown in figure 2.5, is deterministic; 
nevertheless, given the interventions explained below it is kinked in places. 
The estimated UEDT therefore increases rapidly until the early 1980s, but the 
tare of increase declines thereafter.
Figure 2.5: UEDT for Africa
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An irregular intervention in 1986 and a slope intervention in 1982 were re­
quired to maintain normality of the residuals. Since Africa’s oil consumption 
is relatively small and the region is not considered a major oil exporter during 
the first and second oil price shocks, it is therefore not surprising that no inter­
vention was required for the period. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced negative 
growth between 1982/84 before picking up quite slowly in 1985. This could 
have been the reason for the slope intervention in 1982. Structural Adjust-
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ment Programmes36 in most African countries was launched around mid-1980s 
which led to most of the countries becoming more market oriented, and a shift 
from a managed to a more flexible exchange rate regime. This marked a major 
policy shift in most African countries and could most likely be the reason for 
the irregular intervention in 1986.
A sia Pacific Like Africa, the preferred model for this region is RAI but with 
a stochastic trend. The long-run income, price-max and price-cut elasticities 
are 0.90, -0.10 and -0.10 respectively, while the price-cut elasticity is zero given 
statistical insignificance. The LR test indicates that the stochastic specifica­
tion of the trend is clearly accepted by the data since the distinct fluctuations 
would not be adequately captured by a simple linear trend. The estimated 
UEDT for Asia Pacific, shown in Figure 2.6, shows a gentle downward slope 
with regular fluctuations implying a slight exogenous decline in oil demand, 
with price and income being constant.
As found in the other models above, some interventions were required to 
maintain the normality of the residuals - Irregular (1998) and level (1974). The 
level intervention of 1974 might have captured the oil price shock of the early 
1970s while the irregular intervention of 1998 might be the resultant effect of 
the Asian financial crisis that began 1997.
30 Structural adjustment Programmes are policies created by the IMF and World Bank to 
be implemented by developing countries as conditions for getting new loans or for obtaining 
lower interest rates on existing loans
63
Figure 2.6: UEDT for Asia Pacific
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Sum m ary and Com parison of R esults Generally, the results support the 
notion that for all the regions oil demand responds asymmetrically to changing 
oil prices and the relative exogenous ‘oil using’ or ‘oil saving’ behaviour can be 
captured by an estimated stochastic UEDT, except Africa where a determinis­
tic trend is preferred, albeit kinked. The estimated UEDTs for North America, 
Europe/Eurasia and the Asia Pacific (see Figures 2.1, 2.3 and 2.6) are gener­
ally downward sloping, suggesting (exogenous) ‘oil saving’ behaviour whereby 
any technical improvement or energy efficiency improvements are outweighed 
by other exogenous behavioural factors.37 For the other regions, however, 
the estimated UEDTs are generally increasing (see Figures 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5) 
suggesting (exogenous) ‘oil using’ behaviour.38
The results also show that oil demand responds more to income in North 
America than any other region; with Asia Pacific and Europe and Eurasia also
3 T ee Hunt et al. (2003a, 2003b) and Dimititrpoulos et al. (2005) for further discussion.
38 Although for the South and Central American region most of the ‘oil using’ behaviour 
appears to have taken place early in the period, before the late 1970s.
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exhibiting a strong response to income. South and Central America, Middle 
East and Africa show a relatively much lower response, with the Middle East 
being the region with the least response. Furthermore, oil demand in the 
Middle East appears to respond more to prices than any other region, with 
the least response being in North America. While it might be expected that 
the reverse should be the case, results from recent oil demand studies points 
to a similar outcome as can be found in DG and Asali (2011).
The elasticity estimates obtained from this study therefore falls within the 
range of what has been obtained in previous literature, despite the different 
econometric technique applied. These elasticity estimates, along with the es­
timated UEDTs, are therefore used to produce future forecast scenarios for oil 
demand for the six regions up-to 2030, which is explained in the next section.
2.5 F orecasting  A ssu m p tion s and R esu lts
Three scenarios are implemented with different assumptions namely ‘low’, ‘ref­
erence’ and ‘high’ case and for each scenario different assumptions are made 
about the future path of key variables that drive oil consumption (discussed in 
detail below). For the ‘reference’ scenario, the assumptions are those seen as 
the ‘most probable’ outcome based on available information (like a ‘business- 
as-usual forecast) whereas for the ‘low’ and ‘high’ case scenarios, the assump­
tions are chosen to produce sensible lower and upper bound values on the 
future path of key variables.39
39 Although, for crude oil prices, which are available for 2011, these are used in all scenarios
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2.5.1 A ssum ptions
Prices The crude oil price is very difficult to predict since its movements do 
not only depend on economic factors but also regional politics and specula­
tive activities (at least in the short-term). Oil prices have increased in recent 
years, averaging about $80/bbl in 2010 and well above $100 in 2011. Even 
though the oil market has been prone to disruption, with major shocks to 
supply and prices, there has been continued increase in the average annual 
price of crude oil over the past eight years. According to OPEC, crude oil 
price of between $70 and $100 is required to make investment within the in­
dustry viable. OPEC holds 77% of global proved reserve and 40% share of 
current production, projected to rise to 46% by 2030.40 In all probability, this 
will allow OPEC more significant influence in the oil market. As noted by 
Fattouh (2007), many international organisations project greater reliance on 
Middle Eastern oil in the next two decades which is seen to have the effect of 
automatically increasing OPEC’s market power. OPEC’s price assumption is 
between $85 and $95/bbl for this decade reaching $135 by 2030.41 The same 
price assumption is adopted here in building the ‘reference-case’ scenario for 
the price variable. Actual data is used for 2011 and 2012 since information 
is available for the whole of 2011 and the first three-quarters of 2012. As­
sumptions made on the price variable is therefore based on an annual average 
rise of 3%, 3% and 1.5% for the remaining forecast period, for the ‘low-case’, 
‘reference-case’ and ‘high-case’ scenarios respectively.
40 See BP (2011)
41 See OPEC World Oil Outlook 2011
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Incom e The central driver of oil consumption in the mid-term is the econ­
omy, although other factors such as technology and international policies may 
have significant impact in the long-term. As noted by Finley (2012), the next 
20 years is likely to see rapid growth in low and mid-income economies as the 
World’s real income has risen by 87% over the past 20 years and is likely to rise 
by 100% over the next 20 years, mainly supported by the emerging economies.
The ‘reference-case’ assumption of the per-capita income variable is there­
fore based on the expectation that the global economy will experience a modest 
growth in line with historical data. It is expected that the developing regions 
will be the major players in supporting global economic growth, and this is 
assumed to continue to be the case over the forecast period. The ‘low-case’ 
scenario on the other hand is based on the assumption that the global economy 
will be marked by below average trend in growth due to the weak and fragile 
recovery from the global economic crisis especially in the industrialized regions 
of North America and Europe while the ‘high-case’ scenario is based on the 
assumption of a stronger than expected recovery from the current economic 
crisis. Other factors supporting the high-case scenario includes optimistic view 
on globalization as a result of rapid expansion in international trade over the 
next 20 years.
Table 2.3 shows the different scenario assumptions made about income 
growth rates for the various regions over the forecast period. For most of 
the regions analysed, reliable information on real income data for 2011 could 
not be obtained, therefore actual data was not used for 2011 as was the case 
for the price variable. The income assumptions therefore ran throughout the 
forecast period beginning from 2011. It can be observed from the table that
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the ‘low-case’ scenario assumption ranges between 1% and 2.2% for all the 
regions except Asia Pacific which is assumed to grow at more than 4% annually. 
Historical data was considered in the course of arriving at these figures - Asia 
Pacific enjoyed an average per capita growth rate of more than 5% over the 
past 10 years while other regions experienced less than 2.5%. The ‘high-case’ 
scenario assumes a growth rate of 5.5% for Asia Pacific and between 1.5% and 
2.8% for the other regions.
Table 2.3
Assumptions about Per capita Income Growth Rates
Regions Forecast Scenarios
‘Low-Case’ ‘Reference’ ‘High-Case’
North America 1.4% 1.7% 2.0%
S. S z Gen. Ame. 2.2% 2.5% 2.8%
Eur. &; Eurasia 1.1% 1.3% 1.5%
Middle East 1.6% 1.8% 2.0%
Africa 1.8% 2.0% 2.2%
Asia Pacific 4.5% 5.0% 5.5%
Source: Authors assumptions based on information from OPEC (2011), IEA (2012), World
Bank (2010) and BP (2012)
Population  Given the forecast is constructed on a per-capita basis, assump­
tions about future population growth are required in order to convert the future 
figures into million barrels per day (mb/d) -  the standard for reporting oil de­
mand. According to BP (2012), world population has increased by 1.6 billion 
over the last 20 years, and it is projected to rise by 1.4 billion over the next 
20 years. Historically, Population growth rates have been declining and this is 
set to continue - According to UN (2010), OECD population increased by an
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average of 1% per annum in the 1970s, but this had fallen to 0.6% per annum 
by 2010. In developing countries, average growth has been higher, at 2.5% 
per annum in the early 1970s, which has also declined to 1.4% per annum by 
2010. OPEC’s population growth rate assumptions for OECD and developing 
countries over the next 20 years are 0.4% and 1.05% per annum respectively.
Table 2.4
Assumptions about Future Population Growth Rates
(2011 - 2030)
Regions Forecast Scenarios
Low-Case Reference High-Case
North America 0.55% 0.6% 0.65%
S. & Cen. Ame. 0.8% 0.9% 14%
Eur. & Eurasia 0.3% 0.35% 0.4%
Middle East 1.7% 1.8% 14%
Africa 1.4% 1.5% 1.7%
Asia Pacific 0.7% 0.8% 0.9%
Source: Authors assumptions based on information from UN (2010), OPEC (2011) and
BP (2012)
In this study, assumption made about population for the various regions 
considers both historical data and information obtained from BP (2012), OPEC 
(2011) and UN (2010). The various assumptions are reported in Table 2.4. The 
‘reference-case’ scenario assumptions for the more developed regions of North 
America and Europe/Eurasia are between 0.35% and 0.6% while for the other 
regions, the assumptions made are between 0.8% and 1.5%. It can be observed 
from Table 2.4 that the assumptions made from ‘reference to high’ and from 
‘reference to low’ for all the regions are symmetric except Africa which has
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a higher ‘reference to high’ margin. This is based on the argument that the 
population growth rate for the region has a greater chance of being higher 
than projected than lower than projected.
U EDTs It is also important to make assumption about the path of the future 
of each region’s UEDT. Assumptions made for the ‘reference-case’ is based on 
an expectation that the oil demand trends will maintain similar patterns of 
movement while the ‘low’ and ‘high’ case scenarios are based on expected 
increase or decrease in technological advancement geared towards curtailing 
future oil demand.
2.5.2 Forecasting R esults
Using the coefficients obtained from the parameter estimates reported in Table
2.1 and applying the various scenario assumptions, per capita oil demand 
projections for each of the regions are produced. Under the ‘reference-case’ 
scenario, per capita oil demand in North America is projected to decline from 
18.72 barrels in 2010 down to 17.15 barrels in 2030 as shown in Figure 2.7.42
Figure 2.7: Per capita oil demand projections for North America
42Under the ‘low-case’ and ‘high-case’ scenario assumptions, per capita oil demand is 
projected to be 14.78 and 18.85 barrels respectively.
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Under the ‘reference-case’ assumption, projections for South and Central 
America shows a slight rise in per capita oil consumption from 9.26 barrels 
in 2010 to 9.71 barrels in 2030. It is projected that per capita oil demand 
will peak in 2023 as shown in Figure 2.8. Under the ‘low-case’ and ‘high-case’ 
scenario assumptions, per capita oil demand in 2030 is projected to be 8.07 
and 11.17 barrels respectively.
Figure 2.8: Per capita oil demand projections for South and Central America
'H igh'
The ‘reference-case’ scenario projection for Europe and Eurasia also reveals 
a slight increase in per capita oil demand from 8.52 barrels in 2010 to 8.73 bar­
rels in 2030. The increase will most likely be driven by rise in oil consumption 
in the Former Soviet Union and other South-Eastern European countries. It is 
projected that per capita oil demand for the region will peak in 2026 as shown 
in Figure 2.9. Under the ‘low-case’ and ‘high-case’ scenario assumptions, per 
capita oil demand for the region is projected to be 7.81 barrels and 9.79 barrels 
respectively.43
43It can be observed from Figure 2.9 that per-capta oil demand in Europe and Eurasia 
experienced a steep decline between 1977 and 1994. The reason for the decline could be 
connected to significant reduction in the use of oil for electricity generation during the 
period. According to IEA (2012), in 1974, oil’s share of electricity generation in Europe was 
24.7% which dropped to less than 10% by early 1990s. The increase in oil consumption in 
the region from mid 1990s is likely to be driven by the Russian Federation.
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The ‘reference-case’ projection for the Middle East shows a rise in per 
capita oil demand from 13.47 barrels in 2010 to 20.90 barrels in 2030. It 
is expected that per capita oil demand for the region will continue to rise 
throughout the forecast period as shown in Figure 2.10. Under the ‘low-case’ 
and ‘high-case’ scenario assumptions, per capita oil demand is expected to rise 
to 19.16 and 22.09 barrels respectively.
The ‘reference-case’ scenario projection for Africa also shows a rise in per 
capita oil demand from 1.13 barrels in 2010 to 1.45 barrels in 2030. Per capita 
oil demand is also expected to continue to rise, although at a much slower pace 
than the Middle East. Figure 2.11 shows per capita oil demand projections 
for the region based on the different forecast scenario assumptions. Under the 
‘low-case’ and ‘high-case’ assumptions, per capita oil demand is expected to 
rise to 1.38 and 1.56 barrels respectively.
Figure 2.9: Per capita oil demand projections for Europe and Eurasia
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Figure 2.10: Per capita oil demand projections for Middle East
The ‘reference-case’ scenario projection for Asia Pacific shows a slight rise 
in per capita oil demand, from 2.80 to 2.98 barrels over the forecast period. 
It is expected that per capita oil demand for the region will peak in 2024 as 
shown in Figure 2.12.44 Under the ‘low-case’ scenario assumption, per capita 
oil demand peaked in 2010 at 2.80 barrels and will fall to 2.40 barrels by 2030 
while the ‘high-case’ scenario shows that it will rise to 4.32 barrels by 2030.
Figure 2.11: Per capita oil demand projections for Africa
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44While the ‘reference case’ projection for Asia Pacific reveals a turning point in 2024, 
Middle East and Africa reveals no turning point throughout forecast period. This implies 
that the transition from oil using to oil saving is happening more in Asia Pacific that the 
other two regions.
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Figure 2.12: Per capita oil demand projections for Asia Pacific
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On a general note, Figure 2.7 shows that North American per capita oil 
consumption has already peaked, before the forecast period (according to all 
three scenarios). For South/Central America, Asia Pacific, Europe/Eurasia 
the ‘reference-case’ scenario suggest that for these regions, per capita oil con­
sumption will peak in 2023, 2024 and 2026 respectively (shown in Figures 2.8, 
2.9 and 2.12).45 However, according to the ‘reference-case’ scenario per capita 
oil consumption in the Middle East and Africa is not expected to peak before 
the end of the projections in 2030 for any of the three scenarios (shown in 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11).46 Furthermore, by 2030, Middle East will have the 
highest per capita oil consumption (20.90 barrels) followed by North America 
(17.15 barrels), then South/Central America (9.71 barrels), Europe/Eurasia 
(8.73 barrels), Asia Pacific (2.9 barrels) and finally Africa (1.45 barrels).
4u As pointed out earlier, the UEDT charts for North America, Europe and Eurasia, South 
and Central America and Asia Pacific suggest ‘oil saving’ behaviour (see Figures 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, and 2.6). This is likely the reason why per capita oil demand in these regions (according 
to the ‘referece-case’ scenario) have peaked or is expected to peak before 2030.
46 Note, however that the ‘high-case’ scenario suggests that per capita oil demand in all 
regions (other than North America) will continue to rise over the forecast period (see Figures 
2.8 - 2.11). Whereas, according to the ‘low-case’ scenario, per capita oil demand is peaking 
about now or very soon for South and Central America and Asia Pacific (Figures 2.8 and 
2.12) but has already peaked in Europe and Eurasia (Figure 2.9).
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Table 2.5 presents the forecast scenarios for oil demand for all regions after 
applying the assumptions for future population growth for the three scenarios. 
This shows that for the ‘reference’ case scenario, global oil demand is projected 
to rise by about 26% to 110mb/d in 2030. However, the ‘low’ and ‘high’ case 
scenarios suggest a rise of about 10% (to 96mb/d) and about 50% (130mb/d) 
in 2030 respectively.
The forecast reveals that growth in oil consumption will mainly be sup­
ported by the developing regions; by 2030, oil consumption is projected to 
more than double in the Middle East (121%)47 and more than two-thirds in 
Africa (72%), while South and Central America and Asia Pacific are projected 
to rise by 25.50% and 24.86% respectively.
Table 2.5 
Oil Demand Projections (mb/d)
Regions 2010 2020 Projections 2030 Projections
Low Ref. High Low Ref. High
N. America 23.418 23.02 23.77 25.60 21.56 24.18 27.18
S. & Cen Ame. 6.104 6.37 7.08 7.44 6.72 7.66 9.74
Eur. & Eurasia 19.51 19.68 20.63 22.02 19.17 21.43 24.58
Middle-East 7.821 11.20 11.5 12.07 15.94 17.33 19.21
Africa 3.291 4.17 4.24 4.5 5.36 5.66 6.26
Asia Pacific 27.237 28.51 31.86 36.47 27.71 34.01 43.60
W orld 87.381 91.95 99.08 108.1 96.46 110.27 130.57
47 All analysis are based on the reference-case scenario unless otherwise stated
75
North America’s oil consumption is projected to grow by 3.25%48 over the 
forecast period while Europe/Eurasia is projected to grow by 9.84%. Asia 
Pacific will constitute 30.84% of global oil demand by the year 2030. This 
by far makes it the highest region, followed by North America with 21.92%. 
Europe & Eurasia, Middle East, South & Central America and Africa will 
constitute 19.43%, 15.71%,49 6.94% and 5.13% respectively.
2.6  C onclusions
Oil demand is arguably the most important factor that determines oil prices, 
thus modelling the demand for oil remains a significant element in projecting 
the future movement of the oil market. Over the years, oil consumption has 
declined in the most advanced regions of the world while on the other hand it 
has been rising in the non-OECD regions. As economies grow, they consume 
more energy and the unprecedented growth experienced in emerging economies 
(particularly China and India) over the past decade has significantly increased 
global oil demand.
One of the major factors that constrain oil consumption in the advanced 
regions is often linked to technological advancement and several studies in the 
literature have indicated the importance of capturing the impact of technolog­
ical progress when modelling oil demand. The focus of this chapter therefore is 
to find robust estimates of price and income elasticities by applying the STSM 
methodology, which can capture exogenous efficiency effects and other factors
48 According to the low-case scenario assumption, by 2030, oil demand in North America 
and Europe/Eurasia will fall by 7.90% and 1.74% respectively while South/Central America 
will grow by 2.06%.
49In 2010, Middle-East’s share of global oil consumption was just around 9%.
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when estimating oil demand functions. It is argued that using the STSM and 
the UEDT concept provides a sounder basis for producing future demand fore­
cast than other methodologies. Hence, using the estimates obtained from the 
STSM and the forecast that followed, global oil demand is projected to rise 
from 87 mb/d in 2010 to 110 mb/d in 2030.
It is of interest to compare the ‘reference’ scenario projections with other 
forecasts.50 The world reference case oil demand projection of 110 mb/d for 
2030 is somewhat less than the 134 mb/d projected by DG but slightly more 
than that projected by BP, IEA and OPEC, since their projections fall between 
103 mb/d and 106 mb/d (see Figure 2.13 for a comparison). DG noted that 
some of the projections made by BP, IEA and OPEC for some groups of 
developing countries have per-capita demand growing by less than half its 
historical rate which they argue is unlikely given the trend in oil demand is 
expected to be upward in almost every part of the developing world. The 
assumptions made by these agencies, particularly the IEA, could be seen as 
being optimistic in relation to improvements in energy efficiency, as well as 
continued growth in the use of wind and solar technologies and global spread 
of unconventional gas production. This is despite all of these aspects still 
being very challenging especially in the developing regions of the world that 
account for most of the growth in oil demand. It is interesting therefore to 
note that the projections from the analysis in this chapter, although higher, are 
somewhat closer to those emanating from BP, the IEA, and OPEC than the 
DG projections. One possible explanation might be the models used; although 
DG employ a similar price decomposition to that used here, their models do
50The ‘reference’ scenario projection is only considered here in order to compare with the 
other forecasts.
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not have any role for an exogenous UEDT.51 Thus the projected ‘energy saving’ 
from the UEDT for North America, South and Central America, Europe and 
Eurasia, and Asia Pacific are likely to partly explain the difference between the 
projections here and those by DG -  being more in line with the assumptions 
made by the IEA and OPEC for energy efficiency.
Figure 2.13: Oil Demand Projections
140
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
H  B P O P E C  III IEA «  T h is  P a p e r  3 D G
Note: ‘D C’, ‘IEA’, ‘BP’ and ‘OPEC’ relates to oil demand projections in 
Dagay and Gately (2010), IEA (2012), BP (2012) and OPEC (2012) 
respectively. ‘This Paper’ refers to the projections in this chapter.
The regional breakdown of the projections made in this study shows that 
growth in oil demand will mainly be supported by non-advanced regions as oil 
demand will more than double in the Middle East, a rise of more than two-
thirds in Africa and a rise of more than one-quarter in Asia Pacific and South
01 In an appendix, DG do explore the use of time dummies in their panel data  models, 
which according to Adeyemi and Hunt (2007), can also be thought of as a UEDT. However, 
when the time dummies are included by DG, none of the coefficients for price are statistically 
significant any longer - whether it be the single un-decornposed price or the decomposed 
prices and hence are rejected by DG. They argue that the time dummy “coefficients tell us 
nothing about the determinants of demand changes, in either the past or the future” given 
they “are highly correlated with pmax” (Dargay and Gately, 2010, p. 6277).
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and Central America. In North America and Europe/Eurasia, oil demand 
is projected to grow by 3% and 9% respectively. In fact under the ‘low case’ 
scenario assumption, it is projected to fall in the two regions. While oil demand 
growth in Asia is mainly supported by high population and rapid economic 
growth, the Middle East may be linked to high oil prices over the years which 
brought a huge influx of cash and makes these countries tend to increase their 
oil consumption as they become wealthier. North American and European oil 
demand was curbed due to successful policies of promoting alternative energy 
for oil as well as energy conservation/efficiency techniques to constrain oil 
consumption.
Looking ahead, it is likely that growth in global oil demand will be main­
tained by the emerging regions, most importantly Asia Pacific, Middle East 
and Africa which, according to the reference scenario here, as a group will in­
crease from 38 mb/d in 2010 to 57 mb/d in 2030. Thus, despite the expected 
fall/slight increase in oil demand in the other regions, total world oil consump­
tion (according to the ‘reference case’ scenario) is expected to grow significantly 
(from 87 mb/d in 2010 to 110 mb/d in 2030). This suggest that oil producers 
will be required to make substantial investment to increase capacity and out­
put. Already, BP (2012) has indicated that very large investment is needed 
merely to offset decline rates. Considering 77% of current global proved oil re­
serves is held by the OPEC countries, OPEC’s investment decision is therefore 
critical towards meeting future world oil demand requirements.
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C H A PTER  352
3 C o-m ovem ents and C ausality  R elationsh ip
betw een  Oil P rices and Econom ic G row th
3.1 In trod u ction
There is an extensive empirical literature on the oil price-GDP relationship, 
covering the last three decades. Derby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) were among 
the early studies and they conclude that many economic recessions were pre­
ceded by a sharp rise in the price of oil. This notion over the years weakened 
as later empirical studies that use data which extends beyond the 1980s shows 
oil prices having much lesser influence on economic output.53
Since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983), oil prices have been found to 
Granger-cause economic output on the US economy.54 Similar results were also 
found for Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom 
by Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004). While all the afore-mentioned 
studies focused on short-term interactions, few studies have considered the 
long-term relationship between the two; Hooker (2002), however, in an analysis 
on the US economy estimated a long-run cointegrating relationship between 
oil prices, unemployment and interest rate while Lordic and Mignon (2006)
52 Earlier preliminary work for this chapter was presented at the 30th USAEE/IAEE 
North American Conference, Washington DC, USA. October, 2011.
53 See Hooker (1996) for a detailed explanation on the weakening role of oil prices on 
economic output
54See Jones et al. (2004)
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showed evidence of cointegration between oil prices and GDP in the US and 
other European countries.
Another part of the oil price-GDP literature considered the role of asym­
metric response to oil price changes arguing that the influence of oil prices 
on economic output depends on whether a symmetric or asymmetric model 
specification is applied. Symmetry in response to oil prices implies that the 
response of output to a fall in oil prices will be the exact mirror image of the 
response of a rise in oil prices of the same magnitude; whereas, asymmetry as 
the name suggests, implies that the response of output to a rise in oil prices 
differs to that of a fall in oil price of the same magnitude. Both specifications 
have been widely applied in investigating the direction of causality between oil 
prices and economic output in a time-series context. However due to numer­
ous challenges,55 no study has applied the asymmetric specification in a panel 
context to the oil price and GDP relationship.
A considerable body of economic literature has shown that the effect of oil 
prices on the economy of the US and other OECD countries, however there 
have been relatively fewer empirical studies on the non-OECD countries. And 
what has been undertaken in this area generally analysed the relationship in 
a time-series context - Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) is the only study that 
analysed the oil price-GDP relationship using a panel approach. Recently, 
panel data analysis has been enhanced since the technique can take heteroge­
neous country effect into account.
Against this background, this chapter aims to add to the literature by em­
55According to Arellano and Hahn (2007), non-linear panel models creates bias and 
inconsistent estimates.
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ploying both time-series and panel based causality technique56 to investigate 
the long term relationship between oil prices and economic growth across two 
panels of developing countries - grouped according to whether a country is a 
net-exporter or a net-importer of crude oil. According to Jimenez-Rodriguez 
and Sanchez (2004), the consequence of oil price fluctuations should be dif­
ferent in oil exporting and oil importing countries as an increase should be 
considered a good news in the former and a bad news in the latter. It is there­
fore a-priori expected that an increase in oil price will have a positive effect on 
the net oil exporting countries and a negative effect on the net oil importing 
countries.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the 
causality literature on the oil price-GDP relationship and the role of asym­
metry in the response of oil prices. Section 3.3 outlines the methodology of 
the two estimation techniques (time-series and panel), Section 3.4 describes 
the data while Section 3.5 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 3.6 
concludes.
3.2  L iterature Survey
3.2.1 A n Overview on the Concept of Causality
The concept of causality as proposed by Granger (1969) hereafter known as 
‘Granger causality’ has gained wide acceptance and widely used by economists 
for over three decades. Granger causality implies causality in the prediction 
(forecast) sense rather than in a structural sense. According to Granger (1969),
56 An overview on the concept of causality is provided in the next sub-section
82
if one considers two variables X and Y, X causes Y if the current value of Y can 
be better predicted by using past values of X. The concept has been widely 
used in time-series analysis and also recently in a panel data context. The 
causality concept is applied in this chapter to measure the influence/ impact 
of oil prices on economic output of groups of non-OECD countries.
3.2.2 Causality R elationship betw een Oil Prices and Econom ic O ut­
put
The causality testing framework has been mainly based on the Granger-causality 
concept. Most of the earlier studies assumed a symmetric specification and 
generally found causality running from oil prices to GDP. The asymmetric 
specification which are mostly based on Mork’s (1989) oil price increase and 
decrease and also Hamilton’s (1996) net oil price increase specifications signif­
icantly improved model specification of the oil price-economic output relation­
ship as elaborated in the studies that follow.
Hooker (1996) identified the changes in the causality relationship between 
oil prices and GDP while searching for a statistically stable specification. The 
works of Hooker (1996) and Hamilton (1996) has played a very important role 
in establishing a stable statistical relationship between oil price changes and 
GDP. Generally, the interaction of the oil price-GDP relationship with the 
models of transmission channels has improved the understanding on how oil 
prices might influence a macroeconomic aggregate such as GDP.
Hamilton (1983) was the first to report the weakening statistical relation­
ship between oil prices and GDP. Hamilton’s (1983) specification was the log
83
change of the norminal oil price, which allowed for symmetric effect. Mork 
(1989) established the basis for both positive and negative GDP reponsive 
to oil price changes, being the first asymmetric specification of the oil price- 
GDP relationship using seperate variables for price increases and decreases. 
This specification strengthened the oil price-GDP relationship during the mid 
1980s.
Hooker (1996a, 1996b) demonstrates that none of the two specifications 
(the symmetric and Mork’s asymmetric specification) preserved a stable oil 
price GDP relationship beyond the early 1980s. Hamilton (1996a) responded 
with the Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI) specification of the oil price variable, 
defined as the difference betweeen the percent increase in the current period 
and the highest percent increase in the previous four quarters, if positive, and 
zero otherwise. Hamilton (1996b) extended his original NOPI from a one year 
peak to a three year peak. According to Hamilton (1996b), this specification 
captures the surprise element in the oil price change as it eliminates price 
increases that simply corrects recent decreases. Hooker (1996c) found that the 
NOPI specification Granger-caused GDP using data samples that extends to 
late-1990s.
According to Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), these specifications im­
proved the statistical fit of regressions, but did not entirely settle the question 
of whether a stable, long-term relationship between oil prices and other macro- 
economic variables existed. They further argued that the concept of ‘how much 
effect’ still attract interest to those responsible for policy formulation. Rotem­
berg and Woodford (1996) estimate that "a 10% increase in the price of oil is
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predicted to contract output by 2.5%, 5 or 6 quarters later".57 Finn’s (2000) 
specification of a similar aggregate model reveals that an oil price shock causes 
sharp, simultaneous decreases in energy use and capital utilisation.
Using bivariate and multivariate VAR specifications, Hooker (1999) exam­
ined the stability of the oil price GDP relationship over the period 1954-1995. 
He identified that oil prices directly affected output in the pre-1980 period, and 
appear to have operated through other indirect channels after 1980. Backus 
and Crucini (2000) in a study of US economy found that terms of trade volatil­
ity is significantly related to increased oil price volatility, as opposed to fluc­
tuations in exchange rates.
Bercement et al. (2009) examine how oil prices affect the output growth 
of selected MENA countries that are considered either net-exporters or net- 
importers of oil using time-series technique. The result suggest that oil price 
increase have a statistically significant and positive impact on the output of 
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria and the UAE. However, 
oil prices do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the output 
of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
Aliyu (2009) analysed the effect of oil prices on real macroeconomic activity 
in Nigeria employing both linear and non-linear specifications. The paper finds 
evidence of both linear and non-linear impacts of oil price shocks on real GDP. 
In particular, asymmetric oil price increases are found to have greater impact 
on real GDP growth than asymmetric oil price decreases adversely affects real
GDP.
57 See page 549
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Most of the studies mentioned above used GDP as a measure of economic 
output. Cunado and Gracia (2003, 2005) in an analysis of 14 European coun­
tries and 6 Asian countries are among the few studies that used the industrial 
production index (IPI) as a measure of economic output. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
provide a summary of some major empirical studies of the OECD and non- 
OECD countries respectively, on the causal relationship between oil prices and 
economic output. The tabular approach helps to provide a snap-shot of the 
major studies obtained in the literature.
The studies summarised in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 reveal evidence of both uni­
directional and bi-directional causality between oil prices and economic output. 
While most causality studies have been interested in investigating whether oil 
prices Granger-cause GDP (uni-directional causality), Jimenez-Rodriguez & 
Sanchez (2004) investigates the existence of bi-directional causality. The re­
sult shows evidence of a bi-directional relationship in five out of the eight 
OECD countries analysed. Furthermore, the result reveals different outcome 
for some countries depending on whether a symmetric or asymmetric speci­
fication is considered as is found for Italy in Jimenez-Rodriguez & Sanchez 
(2004); Germany, Ireland, Denmark and Greece in Cunado and Perez de Gra­
cia (2003); Japan in Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2005); and China in Du 
and Wei (2010).
As far as is known, there is only one study, Lescaroux and Mignon (2008), 
that analysed the oil price -  GDP relationship from a panel approach. Using 
annual data from 36 countries, they split the countries into oil exporting and
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oil importing countries.58 The result shows that oil prices Granger-cause GDP 
for the group of oil importing countries and OPEC member countries while it 
fails to Granger-cause GDP for the group of other oil exporting countries.59
The above literature review mostly focuses on a single country as outlined 
earlier. While this study has come across only one panel study investigating 
the oil price -  GDP relationship, quite a number of studies have applied panel 
approach to investigate other areas within the energy economics literature 
such as the causal link between energy consumption and economic growth and 
estimating energy demand functions. The panel causality approach normally 
requires prior testing on the properties of the data, using techniques that are 
often developed on the ideas of the time-series tests. The basic structure and 
literature behind both time-series and panel data testing are discussed in the 
next sub-sections.
3.2.3 Testing for Causality - Tim e-series Approach
The causality testing framework has been mainly based on the Granger-causality 
concept. Before undertaking causality testing, advances in econometrics sug­
gests that the unit-root and cointegration test should be applied. For a long­
time, econometricians did not realize that some basic assumptions made by 
the classical economic theory about the data generating process (DGP) of the 
variables are not satisfied by many macro time-series variables. In classical 
econometrics, it is assumed that all the variables have constant mean and con­
stant variance which is not always the case. Variables of this type are known
58 The list of oil exporting/ importing countries considered includes both OECD and non- 
OECD countries.
59 Represents other oil exporting countries that are not members of OPEC
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as non-stationary variables.60 Furthermore, it has been shown that regressions 
on non-stationary variables give spurious results (Phillips and Ouliaris, 1990). 
Moreover, the variables are expected to be integrated of the same order before 
cointegration test can be applied. As noted by Granger (1988), a series is said 
to be integrated of order one, denoted by 1(1) if its changes are 1(0). In order 
to be sure that the variables in the model are stationary, unit root tests to 
examine the stationarity properties of the variables will have to be employed. 
There are different types of unit root tests however the frequently used ones 
in the literature are Augmented Dickey Fuller (1981) test and Phillips Perron 
(1988) test, details of which are discussed in the methodology section.
The concept of cointegration in a time-series approach was originally intro­
duced by Engle and Granger (1987) as a useful statistical tool to test for the 
long-run equilibrum relationship between non-stationary time-series. Cointe­
gration as defined by Yoo (2006) is the systematic co-movement among two or 
more economic variables over the long-run. According to Engle and Granger 
(1987), X and Y are defined as being cointegrated if the linear combination 
of X and Y is stationary but each of the variable is not. Engle and Granger 
(1987) further outline that if a pair of 1(1) series are cointegrated, there must 
be causation in at least one direction. The series is then generated by an error 
correction model to identify the direction of causation.61
One of the limitations of Engle and Granger method is that it cannot deal
60 Patterson (2000) stated that if the series is non-stationary, then it can be differenced 
to achieve stationarity. It is said to be integrated of order d, 1(d), with d unit-roots, where 
d is an integer indicating how many differences need to be taken before the series become 
stationary.
61 The causality test based on an error correction model possesses two or even three 
avenues through which causal effect can emerge. The panel causality test in the next sub­
section is more detailed.
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with a situation where more than one cointegrating relationship is possible. 
Johansen (1988) developed a system approach to cointegration that allows 
for up to ’r ’ linearly cointegrated vectors. Johansen (1988, 1991) pointed 
out if cointegration exist, a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) may be 
estimated. One important issue to note when performing cointegration test is 
the sensible lag structure to be determined. The most common creteria used in 
the literature are Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC) or Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC).
Gregory et al. (2004) observe mixed signals, that is, a relatively high 
test statistic for one test and a relatively low test statistic for another, in 
time series cointegration test. According to them, this effect is particularly 
strong when comparing residual (such as Engle and Granger test) and system 
based tests (such as Johansen test). Decision on which of the test result to 
be relied upon lies with the researcher given that there is rarely a compelling 
theoretical reason to prefer one test over another in practice. Gregory et al. 
(2004) suggest that if interest is concentrated on a particular relationship or 
variable, the residual tests are more appropriate. However, for a multivariate 
settings, the system approach is likely to be adopted.
3.2.4 Testing for Causality - Panel A pproach
Over the last two decades, time-series cointegration technique have been widely 
used in empirical analysis. However, Quah (1994) argued that the low power 
of the DF (Dickey Fuller) and ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) unit root 
test led researchers to develop unit root and cointegration tests for panel data. 
Following the extension of time-series unit root test to the panel data by Quah
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(1994), Levin et. al (2002) and Im et al. (2003), the application of panel 
cointegration tests has attracted wide interest in empirical literature, part of 
the reason being that the technique can take into account heterogeneity across 
countries and the efficiency gains associated with more data. One of the major 
challenges faced by researchers in time-series estimation, particularly when 
dealing with non-OECD countries is the difficulty in finding long enough data 
span required for an efficient estimation process. Nicholas and Payne (2009) 
pointed that “estimation is usually difficult for many developing countries 
because of a short data span, different level of economic development/ economic 
condition and the presence of structural breaks which lowers the power of unit 
roots and cointegration tests in time-series data analysis. To circumvent the 
reduction in power and size properties, panel unit-root and panel cointegration 
tests should be utilized” (p.5).
As pointed out by Jun (2004), there are mainly two different approaches 
to panel cointegration tests - residual and system-based. The residual-based 
panel cointegration test statistics were introduced by Pedroni (1997, 1999, 
2002) and Kao (1999) while the system-based panel cointegration statistics 
were introduced by Larsson and Lyhagen (1999) and Maddala and Wu (1999). 
Researchers often find conflicting result when applying different panel cointe­
gration tests; Hanck (2006) studied the extent to which different widely used 
panel cointegration tests yield the same decision for a given sample and found 
that “the consensus in test decisions among panel data cointegration tests gen­
erally does not seem to be higher than among time series cointegration tests. 
Thus, it seems all but unlikely that a researcher will find conflicting evidence 
when applying some pairs of panel cointegration test to a given data set” (p.8).
92
A possible explanation to this could be that the complexities inherent to panel 
data such as treatment of cross-sectional heterogeneity.62
Most of the previous literature that estimated causality in a panel context 
adopted the panel based error correction model to account for the long-run 
relationship using the two step procedure from Engle & Granger (1987). The 
error correction based causality method allows for the inclusion of the lagged 
error correction term derived from the cointegration equation. According to 
Narayan and Smith (2008), by including the lagged error correction term, the 
long-run information that is lost through differencing is re-introduced in a sta­
tistically acceptable way. Acarachi and Ozturk (2010) pointed out by using 
error correction based causality models, Granger causality can be examined in 
three ways; short-run causality, long-run causality and strong Granger causal­
ity (jointly testing the significance of both long-run and short-run causality). 
The various stages involved in time-series and panel causality testing and all 
the technical details within each stage are outlined in the next section.
3 .3  M eth o d o lo g y
3.3.1 Tim e-series A pproach
The following tests are employed to estimate causality relationship in a time- 
series context; firstly, unit-root tests are undertaken based on Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test (ADF) and Phillips Perron test (PP) - the two most com­
monly used unit-root test in the literature. Secondly, if the series are found to
62 The technical aspect of the panel unit root and panel cointegration tests will be ex­
plained in the next section
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integrated of order 1(1), cointegration tests developed by Engle and Granger 
(1987) and Johansen (1988) are applied before finally testing for causality rela­
tionship using the error-correction model based causality tests. The technical 
details of the various tests are specified below:
U nit R oot Test
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is an augmented version of the 
Dickey Fuller (DF) test. The DF tests assume the error term is not auto­
correlated or serially correlated with the explanatory variable. Consider a 
simple AR(1) model, thus:
yt =  pyt-i +  ut (3.1)
where yt is the variable of interest (in the case of this research log of oil 
prices and log of GDP), p is a coefficient and ut is the error term. A unit root 
is present if p =  1, in which case the model would be non-stationary.
The regression model to test for a unit root with intercept and time trend 
can be written as:
Ayt =  o: +  At +  pyt-i +  Ut (3.2)
where A is the first lag operator, a  is a constant, and A is the coefficient 
of time trend.63 The model is estimated and testing for a unit root is done by 
testing p =  0.
63 Since unit-root test will be undertaken on all the variables, y  represents LRGDP in one 
test and LROP in another. Similar approach will be taken when presenting panel unit-root 
test.
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The testing procedure for the ADF is the same with the DF only that the 
ADF adds lag of the dependent variable in the model.
Ayt =  o; +  At +  pyt-i +  +  ôpA yt-p +  ut
where A is the first lag operator, a  is a constant, and A is the coefficient 
of time trend and p is the lag order of the autoregressive process. The unit 
root test is undertaken under the null hypothesis p =  0 against the alternative 
hypothesis p < 0.
The Phillips Perron test builds on the Dickey-Fuller test of the null hy­
pothesis 5 =  0 in
At/f =  ôyt—i T Uf (3.3)
where A is the first lag operator. Like the ADF test, the Phillips and 
Perron (1988) addresses the issue of autocorrelation that is associated with 
the DF test. Whilst the ADF test addresses this issue by introducing lags of 
A yt , the Phillips-Perron (PP) test makes a non-parametric correction to the 
t-test statistics. One of the major advantages of the PP test over the ADF is 
that it is more robust in dealing with serial-correlation and heteroskedasticity 
in the error term.
C ointegration Test
Following the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration procedure, a long- 
run relationship between oil prices and GDP is estimated at the first stage 
using the following simple specification:
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L R G D P  — o^ o +  <y.\LROP +  012T  +  Ut (3.4)
where LRGDP and LROP are natural log of real GDP and real oil prices, 
repectively and T is the time trend. The trend is included to capture other 
exogenous factors that affect the model.
To determine if the real GDP and real oil prices are cointegrated, the 
residual of the first stage regression should be stationary, which is tested using 
the ADF test. The null hypothesis is that the variables are cointegrated, that 
is the residuals are 1(0).
Johansen (1988) cointegration technique takes its starting point in the 
vector autoregression (VAR) of order p given by
Vt — f t p  A iy t- i  +  ... +  Apyt-p +  £t (3.5)
where yt is an nxl vector of variables64 that are integrated of order one. 
Equation 3.5 can be re-written as
p - i
Ayt = ft + IL/t_i + 'y~'jTiAyt-i + Et 
2 = 1
where
p p
II =  ^   ^Ai — I  and P^  =  — ^   ^ A j .
i = l  j = i + l
Johansen proposes two different likelihood ration test - the trace test and
maximum likelihood test, shown in the following equations respectively.
64Since Johansen test can be used to test multivariate cointegration test, y t here repre­
sents all the variables in the equation.
n
Jtrace =  ~ T  I n { l  — A*)
i=r+l
^max — ~ T  In(l — Ar+i)
As explained in Johansen (1988), the trace test tests the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of n cointegrating vec­
tors while the maximum eigenvalue tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
vectors against the alternative hypothesis of r+1 cointegrating vectors. The 
asymptotic critical values is reported in Johansen (1990).05
Causality Test
The initial formulation of Granger model used variables at levels (as shown 
in the previous section) but with later advances in econometrics that requires 
pre-testing on time-series macro-economic variable, the models are replaced 
by:
A L R G D P t  — Qiij +  ''y  ^a n k A L R G D P t^ k  T ^   ^Q i2 k A L R O P t-k  +  u n  (3.6)
k=l fc=l
A L R O P t  — ot2j + y   ^o t2 ik ^ L R O P t-k  +  y   ^a 2 2 k A L R G D P t_ic +  (3.7)
k=l k=l
where A is the first lag operator, m is the lag length. In the output equation
60 The critical values are given by most econometric packages. The package used for this 
study is EViews 7
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(3.6), short-run causality from real oil price to real GDP is tested based on 
Hq : a i2ik =  0. In the real oil price equation (3.7), short-run causality from 
real GDP to real oil price is tested based on Hq : a 2iik =  0.
If, however, it is found that the two integrated variables cointegrate, then 
the equation can be augmented as follows:
m m
ALRGDPt =  o^ ij +  ^  ] ank^ L R G D Pt-k  +  ^  ^ wk^LROPt-k
k—\ k=l
P^ikDCTGt-k  +  Uit (3.8)
ALROPt — ot2j +  ^  ] <X2ikALROPt-k +  'y  ^a 22k^LRGDPt-k
fc=i i
P ^ k E C T P t-k  +  u2t (3.9)
where ECTG is the error correction term from the estimate of the long-run 
relationship with LRGDP being the dependent variable (equation 3.4) while 
ECTP is the error correction term from the long-run relationship with LROP 
being the dependent variable. The null hypothesis of no long-run causality is 
tested by examining the significance for the coefficient of the error correction 
terms Xik and X2k respectively. The optimum lag length is selected automati­
cally based on Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC).
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Figure 3.1: Time-series Causality Testing Framework
ADF (1981) 
PP(!988)
Stage 1: Umt Root Test
LRGDP and LROP not
Stage2:Coint^ration
Test
Engleâ Granger (1983) 
Johansen (1989)
Step 3 A: Causality Test
Estimate Short-run 
Causality using Standard 
VAR
Step 38: Causality Exists 
(at least 1 direction)
Estimate Short and Long- 
run Causality using Error 
Correction Model
Figure 3.1 provides a summary of the time-series methodology adopted in 
this chapter.66 The methodology involves the following stages:
Stage 1: Unit-root test on the variables (LRGDP and LROP) for each coun­
try is tested using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test. The number of lags is determined by using Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SIC). If both variables are found to be 1(1), then proceed to stage 2. 
If on the other-hand the variables are found to be 1(0), then proceed to stage 
3A.
Stage 2: At this stage, cointegration between LRGDP and LROP is tested
using Engle & Granger (1988) and Johansen (1989) cointegration techniques.
tiU Presentation of the causality testing framework is similar to what was done in Chon- 
tanawat et al. (2008)
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The specification for both tests allows for linear trend and constant. If cointe­
gration is not found, proceed to stage 3A, but if cointegration is found, proceed 
to stage 3B.
Stage 3A: If cointegration is not found, short-run causality is tested using 
the conventional Granger (1969) methodology.67
Stage 3B: Existence of a long-run relationship signifies causality at least in 
one direction. Direction of causality is determined using the error correction 
model based causality test. However, if the estimated coefficient of the error 
correction term is positive then causality is re-estimated using the conventional 
approach (stage 3A).
3.3.2 A sym m etric Specification
As discussed in the litegrature review, there is the perception that the impact 
of oil price changes on macro-economic variables is asymmetric. According 
to Mork (1989), Hamilton (1996) and Hooker (1999), there is evidence that 
oil prices have asymmetric and non-linear effects on economic activity. The 
baseline VAR specification in the previous section assumes the impact of oil 
price changes is linear and direct. In order to test for asymmetries, two leading 
non-linear transformations of oil prices are considered. The first type of trans­
formation was developed by Mork (1989). Based on this method, asymmetric 
response of oil price changes can be captured by specifying oil price increase 
and decrease as seperate variables. This can be defined thus:
67Chontanawat et al. (2008) and Gries et al. (2009) have used the basic Hsiao-Granger 
causality to test for short-run causality where cointegration does not exist. Even though 
the long-run causality relationship is what is of key interest, short-run relationship can have 
some useful economic interpretation as shown by Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2003).
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0 + =  r ° t  i f  O t > 0
* 0 otherwise
0  {Ot i / O ( < 0
0 otherwise
where Ot the rate of change in the price of oil while O f  and 0 f-  are positive 
and negative rates of changes in oil prices respectively. The second transforma­
tion is the one suggested by Hamilton (1996) which considers the net increase 
in oil prices over a period of three years. The net oil price increase (NOPI) 
specification is defined as follows:
N O P It =  max{0, Ot -  max(Ot_i)Ot_2, Ot_3)}
if the value of the current year exceeds the previous three years maximum, 
the percentage change over the period is calculated. If the price of oil at time t 
is lower than it had been during the previous three years, the series is defined 
to be zero for time t.68
Asymmetric relationship is tested based on the two specification outlined 
above using time series data. Unit root tests are conducted in order to confirm 
the order of integration of the decomposed oil price variables before testing 
for the short-run asymmetric effects of oil price changes on economic output 
in line with the works of Kilian and Park (2009), Du et al. (2010) and Chuku 
et al. (2010). Thus, the following short-run equations will be used to test
whether oil price increase, oil price decrease or net oil price increase Granger-
68 Studies of the oil-price GDP relationship that applied the asymmetric specification 
used the zero threshold following Mork (1989) and Hamilton (1996). This study, therefore 
also applies the zero threshold.
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cause GDP.
ALRG D Pt =  a , +  ^  a ikA LR G D Pt- k +  XïALROP+_k
k—\ k=l
m
+  ^  ] Xj ALR O Pt_k +  Ut (3.10)
k=l
m  m
A L R G D Pt =  a j +  Y ,  ^ikA L R G D Pt- k +  ^  At AiVOP/t_fc +  ut (3.11)
k—l k=l
where A is the first lag operator, m is the lag length and u is the serially 
uncorrelated error term. A L R O P + represent oil price increases, A LR O P~  
represent oil price decreases and the NOPI is the net oil price increase. Asym­
metric relationship is tested based on the coefficients of the decomposed oil 
price variables, At and X j . Thus, the specifications are used to test whether 
oil price increases, oil price decreases or net oil price increases Granger-causes 
GDP.
3.3.3 Panel Approach
Panel causality tests also involves different stages; firstly, panel unit root tests 
is undertaken for the series and if the series is found to be integrated of order 
one 1(1), panel cointegration tests is employed being the second stage of the 
estimation process. If cointegration is accepted, the long-run cointegrating 
vector is estimated using Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) developed by Pedroni
(2000). A long-run relationship implies the existence of causality at least in one
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direction. Finally, a panel error correction model is established by generating 
an error correction term from the long-run estimator to examine the direction 
of causality. However if cointegration is not found, panel causality will still be 
tested in a standard VAR model to estimate short-run causality relationship.
Panel U nit R oot Test
Three different panel unit-root tests are applied to check the order of inte­
gration; Levin et al. (2002)69, Im et al. (2003) and The Fisher ADF test -  Choi
(2001). Following the methodology used in similar literature, this work test 
for both trend and mean stationarity for the two variables - log of real GDP 
(LRGDP) and log of real oil price (LROP). Consequently, the panel unit roots 
test will be undertaken based on two different models; model with constant 
and no time trend (model 1) and model with constant and time trend (model 
2).The number of lagged first differences is based on automatic selection of 
Schwartz Information Criterion.
The technical details of the three panel unit root tests are therefore pre­
sented below:
Levin et al. (2002) (LLC thereafter) Using pooled t-statistic of the esti­
mator, LLC developed a procedure to evaluate the hypothesis that each time 
series contains a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that each time 
series is stationary. Hence, LLC assume homogeneous autoregressive coeffi­
cient between individual, that is, pi =  p for all i and test the null hypothesis 
Hq : Pi =  p =  0 against the alternative Ha : p{ =  p <  0 îor all i.
69 Levin and Lin (1992) first proposed the test in 1992. In 1993 they generalized the 
analysis allowing for Heteroscedastity and autocorrelation. Their paper in 2002 Levin, Lin 
and Chu (2002) collect major result from their researches
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The structure of the LLC may be specified as follows:
— PiVit-l +  #0% +  G lit +  Uu (3.12)
where i =  1...., N  for each country in the panel, t  =  for the time
period. A time trend (an t) as well as individual effects (o%) are incorporated.
According to Westerlund (2006), there should be some caution on the use 
of the LLC test. Firstly, the test depends on the independent assumption 
across individuals, and therefore not applicable if cross sectional correlation 
exist. Secondly, the autoregressive parameters are considered being identical 
across the panel. These limitations have been overcome by Im Pesaran & Shin 
(2003) and Choi (2001) test which proposed a panel unit root test without the 
assumption of identical first order correlation.
Im et al. (2003) (IPS thereafter) IPS panel unit root test takes the average 
of ADF unit root test applied on each of the cross-sections while allowing 
for different orders of serial correlation. The IPS unit root test renders the 
following expression:
Where i =  1..., N  for each country in the panel; t  =  1...., T  refers to the 
time period; Xu represents the exogenous variables including fixed effects or 
individual time trend; p{ are the autoregressive coefficients, pi represents the 
number of lags in the ADF regression; and e# are the stationary error terms. 
If <  1, yu is considered weakly trend stationary where as if p{ =  1, then y a 
contains unit root. As was the case in LLC, the null hypothesis is that each
(3.13)
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series in the panel contains a unit root while the alternative hypothesis is that 
at least one of the individual series in the panel is stationary. IPS specifies 
a t-bar statistic which is normally distributed under the null hypothesis with 
the critical values provided by IPS (2003).
The Fisher’s ADF Test Choi (2001) suggest the use of non parametric test 
which uses a combination of the p-values of the test statistics for a unit root 
in each cross-sectional unit. One advantage of the Fisher test over LLC is that 
it relaxes the restrictive assumption that is the same under the alternative.
Barbieri (2006) noted, previous tests (LLC and IPS) suffer from some com­
mon inflexibilities which can restrict their use in applications; (i) they all re­
quire an infinite number of groups (ii) all the groups are assumed to have the 
same type of non-stochastic component (iii) T is assumed to be the same for 
all the cross-section units and to consider the case of unbalanced panel further 
simulations is required (iv) finally, the critical value are sensitive to the choice 
of lag lengths in the ADF regressions.
Choi (2001) has overcome these limitations by proposing a test based on 
the combination of p-values from a unit root test applied to each cross-section 
of the panel data. Accordingly, Choi (2001) considers the model:
Vu =  da T %it (3.14)
where
d i t  =  +  . . .  +  C X im tm
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Xü =  P iX i ( t - l )  + Uit
Note that yu in equation 3.14 is composed of non-stochastic process da 
and a stochastic process xu . Each yu can have different sample size and 
different specification of non-stochastic and stochastic component depending 
on i. According to Choi (2001), the null hypothesis is given as:
Hq : p{ =  1 for all i which implies that all the time series non-stationary 
while the alternative hypothesis is given as:
Ha : pi <  1 for at least one i for finite N (that is some time series are 
non-stationary while the others are not) or Ha : p{ <  1 for some i’s for infinite 
N (that all the time series are stationary, as it is considered in LLC).
Barbieri (2006) identified some important advantages of the Fisher test 
being that it does not require a balanced panel, it can be carried out for any 
unit root test derived and that it is possible to use different lag lengths in the 
individual ADF regression.
Despite the limitations of the LLC and IPS tests, they remain the most 
widely applied unit root tests in panel data analysis. All three tests are applied 
to re-confirm the order of integration and after defining the order of integration 
prompted by the existence of unit-roots in the series, the long-run cointegrating 
relationship is estimated using three different panel cointegration test.
Panel Cointegration Tests
If the series (LRGDP and LROP) are found to be integrated of the same
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order, a long-run cointegrating relationship between them is estimated at the 
second step of the estimation process. Three different panel cointegration tests 
developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), Kao (1999) and Maddala and Wu (1999) 
are applied. Details of the tests provided below
Pedroni (1999, 2004) heterogeneous panel cointegration test, which allows 
for cross section interdependence with different individual effects, is specified 
as follows:
LRGDPu =  Ota +  8 it  + finLROPit + e# (3.15)
where i =  1...., N  for each country in the panel and t  =  1...., T refers to the 
time period. LRGDP is the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product 
while LROP is the natural logarithm of real oil price. The parameters a# and 
8i allows for the possibility of country specific fixed effects and deterministic 
trend, respectively. e*t is the estimated residuals representing deviations from 
the long run relationship. To test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, 
Pi =  1, the following unit root test is conducted on the residuals as follows:
eit — Pieit-1 +  Wit (3.16)
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes seven residual-based tests under the null of 
no cointegration. Out of the seven tests proposed, four are based on pool­
ing the residuals for the within group estimation (which includes panel v- 
statistic, panel p-statistic, panel PP-statistic, and panel ADF-statistic) while 
the other three are based on pooling the residuals for the between group estima­
tion (which includes group p-statistic, group PP-statistics, and group ADF-
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statistics). According to Pedroni (2001), one of the key advantages of the 
between group estimators is that the point estimate has a more useful inter­
pretation in the event that the true cointegrating vectors are heterogenous. 
Following Pedroni (1999, 2004), the heterogeneous panel and heterogeneous 
group mean panel cointegration statistics are calculated as follows:
Panel v-statistic:
Panel p-statistic:
- 1 N  T
y i  y i  Luiieu-iAeu — A*)
i=l t=l
Panel PP-statistic:
- 1/2 jv T
Y ,  Y ,  Liiiicit-iAeu — Aj)
i=l t=l
Panel ADF-statistic:
1/2 N  T
i=l t=l
Group p-statistic:
Group PP-statistic:
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Group ADF-statistic:
N  /  T  \  “ 1/2 T
t  = E ( E %. E(%-i - %)
i=l \  i=l /  t=l
Here, êü is the estimated residual from equation (3.4) and L m  is the es­
timated long-run covariance matrix for Ae#. Of the seven tests proposed by 
Pedroni (1999, 2004), the panel v-statistic reject the null hypothesis of no coin­
tegration with large positive values where as the remaining test statistics reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration with large negative values. The criti­
cal values are provided in Pedroni (1999) and also given by some econometric 
software packages.
Kao (1999), which is another residual based panel cointegration test fol­
lows the same basic approach as the Pedroni test but specifies cross-section 
specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on the first-stage regressors. 
The bivariate case described in Kao (1999) is provided below:
LRGDPu =  crj -f- PLROPu +  e# (3.17)
for
LRGDPu — LR G D Pit-i +  Ui} t 
LROPu =  LRO Pit-i +  t
Kao then runs an augmented pooled auxiliary regression,
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p
6it — p e n - i  +  S k jA e it- j  +  Vit 
3 - 1
(3.18)
Under the null of no cointegration, Kao derives the following statistics,
Where, p is the estimate of the residuals from the fixed effects panel re­
gression and tp is the associated t-statistic. The test is standard normal under 
the null hypothesis and reject for large negative values.
Maddala and Wu (1999) developed the Johansen-type panel cointegration 
test. Maddala and Wu (1999) used Fisher’s result to propose an alternative 
test for cointegration based on a method for combining test from individual 
cross-sections to obtain a test statistic for the full panel. The Johansen type 
Fisher tests from trace and maximum eigen-value are developed.
Assuming denotes the p-value from an individual cointegration test of 
cross-section i of the Johansen statistic, then under the null hypothesis of the 
panel we have the result:
The test is quite easy to compute and does not assume homogeneity of 
coefficients in different countries. In other words, it takes into account the 
heterogeneous country effect that might arise from the data. Evidence of 
cointegration is obtained if the null hypothesis of none (r =  0) cointegrating
A D F  =
tp +  V  6 Ng v/(2 a 0v)
N
2]>]log(%) -+X&v
variables is rejected and the null of at most 1 (r <  1) cointegrating variable is 
accepted. In other word, it would confirm the existence of unique cointegrating
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vector for the estimated model.
The first two panel cointegration test discussed above (Pedroni 1999 and 
Kao 1999) are residual based test while the Maddala and Wu (1999) test is 
a system based test. All three panel cointegration methods were adopted to 
test whether the existence or absences of long-run relationship between the 
variables. If cointegration is fond on either the residual or system based test, 
the long-run cointegrating vector will be estimated to form the error correction 
term which will be used to estimate the dynamic error correction model. On 
the other hand if cointegration is not found, a standard causality equation will 
be estimated to obtain the short-run relationship between the variables.
Estim ating Long-run Cointegrating R elationship
If a long-run cointegrating relationship is found to exist between LRGDP 
and LROP, the long-run cointegrating vector is estimated using a fully modified 
OLS (FMOLS) for heterogeneous cointegrated panels developed by Pedroni 
(2000). This method is based on the between dimension estimator which 
takes into account heterogeneity across countries. This is chosen because the 
mode in which the data is pooled allows for greater flexibility in the presence 
of heterogeneity of cointegrating vectors. According to Pedroni (2000), the 
point estimate for the between dimension estimator can be interpreted as the 
mean value of the cointegrating vector. Thus, consider the regression:
LRGDPu =  oti~\- PiLROPn +  ua (3.19)
where LRGDPu and LROPu are cointegrated with slopes f t  which may 
or may not be homogeneous across i. As outlined in Pedroni (2001), the
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expression for the between-dimension, group-mean panel FMOLS estimator is 
given as:
N
P gFM — N  @FM,i
i=l
where (3FM,ii 1S the time-series FMOLS estimator, which is applied to 
each country member of the panel. The associated t-statistic for the between 
dimension-estimator is given as:
tPoFM = N ~1/2Y l tPFM,i
i=l
where t(3FM  ^ is the associated t-value from the individual FMOLS esti­
mates.
Panel Causality Tests
Having estimated the long-run cointegrating vector, the causality relation­
ship is obtained by incorporating residuals from equation (3.17) as an error 
correction term (EOT) in a dynamic error correction model. The equation 
being:
m  m
ALRGDPn =  a ij +  5 3  (^iiikALRGDPn-k +  5  ] Qti2ikALROPit-k
k=l k—l
-\-\uE C Tit-i +  Unt (3.20)
This allows for the testing of whether LROP Granger-causes LRGDP which
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is the main focus of this work; however, the following equation is also consid­
ered in order to test whether LRGDP Granger causes LROP.
m  m
ALROPit =  oi2j +  ^  ] a2iikALRGDPit_jc +  ^   ^Où22ik^LROPit-k
fc=l k—l
+ \2 iE C T it-\ +  U2H (3.21)
where A is the first lag operator, m is the lag length; EOT is the lagged error 
correction term derived from the long-run cointegrating relationship; A; is an 
adjustment coefficient and uu is a disturbance term. In the real GDP equation
(3.20), short-run causality from real oil price to real GDP is tested based on 
H0 : a±2ik — 0. In the real oil price equation (3.21), short-run causality 
from real GDP to real oil price is tested based on H0 : o^ Hfc =  0. The null 
hypothesis of no long-run causality in each of equation (3.20) and (3.21), is 
tested by examining the significance of the t-statistic for the coefficient on the 
respective error correction term (EOT) represented by A^ and A^ accordingly. 
The coefficient of ECT’s represents how fast deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium are eliminated following changes in each variable. The significance 
of the parameter indicates a long-run relationship of cointegrating process and 
thus movement along the path can be considered permanent.
It is also appropriate to check whether the two sources of causation are 
jointly significant. This can be done by testing the joint hypothesis H0:ai2ik =  
0 and Xu =  0 in equation (3.20) or H0:a2iik =  0 and A2i — O in equation
(3.21). This is referred to as a strong Granger causality test. As noted by 
Asafu-Adjaye (2000) the joint test indicates which variable(s) bear the burden
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of short-run adjustment to re-establish long-run equilibrium following a shock 
to the system. If there is no causality, then the neutrality hypothesis holds. 
As indicated earlier, if cointegration is not found, Ah and A^ are set to zero in 
Equations (3.20) and (3.21) giving the standard Granger causality equations 
used to test only the short-run impact between LRGDP and LROP; again by 
testing Ho’.amk =  0 and Ho:a2iik =  0.
The methodology adopted for the panel causality test can be summarised 
using the figure below:
Figure 3.2: Panel Causality Testing Framework
F ind  Uoit Root 
Test
X x  V ,
1(1)
I
1 LRGDP œ d  LROP not ( 1(1)ui)
$ug t2 :P incl
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Short and Long-run Causality nsing 
Dynamic Error Correction Modd
Stage 1 : Panel unit root test will be undertaken to check the order of 
integration of the variables based on three different test; Levin et al. (2002), 
Im et al. (2003) and Fisher ADF, Choi (2001). The tests conducted on the 
variables both at level and first difference will be based on three different
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model specifications; model 1 includes only a constant term, model 2 includes 
constant and time trend while model 3 includes neither constant nor time 
trend. If it is found that the variables are integrated of the same order, then 
proceed to stage 2.
Stage 2: This stage involves investigating the long-run relationship between 
the variables using three different panel cointegration techniques developed by 
Pedroni (1999, 2004), Kao (1999) and Maddala Sz Wu (1999). If evidence 
of cointegration is found based on any of the cointegration technique, then 
proceed to stage 3. However, if cointegration is not found, proceed to stage 
4a.
Stage 3: If cointegration exists, the long-run cointegrating vector will be 
estimated using FMOLS developed by Pedroni (2000) before proceeding to 
stage 4b.
Stage 4a: If cointegration is not found, short-run causality on the variables 
will estimated using the standard Granger procedure.
Stage 4b: Panel causality test will be conducted using dynamic error cor­
rection model to jointly test for both short-run and long-run causality on the 
variables.
The methodology outlined above explains the technical details of the vari­
ous tests involved in the estimation process. The empirical result section will 
report the results of all the analysis undertaken as described above. Before 
then, the data is discussed in the next section.
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3.4 D ata
The analysis is undertaken on 20 non-OECD contries using annual data over 
the period 1971 - 2007. The countries are divided into two categories, detailed 
as follows:
• C ategory A (net oil exporting countries) consist of non-OECD coun­
tries with substantial export of crude oil. The group consist of OPEC 
member countries: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Venezuela. The OPEC member 
countries accounts for two-thirds of world’s oil reserves and almost 40% 
of the world’s oil production. Also, most of the OPEC countries export 
more than a million barrels of oil per day. Thus, making it a suitable 
group to analyse net oil exporting countries.
• C ategory B (net oil importing countries) is a group of non-OECD coun­
tries whose economy has not reached First World status but have at­
tained some level of industrialization. One important indicator of this 
group of countries is their rapid industrial development as result of a 
switch from agricultural to industrial economies, especially in the manu­
facturing sector which makes them among the big consumers of crude oil. 
This group are net oil importers and include the countries: Brazil, China, 
India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and South Africa.70
70The World Bank refer to these countries as the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC). 
The World Bank’s list of NIC 2010 also includes Mexico which is omitted in this work 
because the country is a net oil exporter. Brazil and Malaysia are major oil producers but 
remain net oil importers over the period covered by this research based on the information 
obtained from CIA World Fact Book 2010.
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The variables considered are LRGDP (real GDP), being the measure of 
economic output and LROP (real price of internationally traded UK Brent 
crude) all expressed in natural logs. The real GDP data for all the countries 
is obtained from the energy information administration data bank while the 
real oil price data is obtained from BP (2011).
3.5  E m pirical R esu lts
3.5.1 Tim e-series Estim ation R esults
U nit R oot R esult
The first-step in the estimation process is to ascertain the order of inte­
gration of the variables. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 presents the results derived from 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron unit root tests respec­
tively. The choice of the lag length required for the test is based of Scwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC). Based on the ADF test, the null hypothesis of 
unit-roots for most of the countries cannot be rejected at levels but strongly 
rejected at first difference for most of the countries except Brazil and Nigeria, 
where surprisingly, the GDP series is still not rejected at first difference. This 
is rather unusual as most GDP series are known to be integrated of order one
[ i( i)].71
The Phillips-Perron test however strongly rejects the null hypothesis of 
unit-roots (for both series) at first difference for all the countries. It is therefore
71 See Ozturk and Huseyn (2007)
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concluded that real GDP and real oil prices are 1(1).72
Table 3.3 
ADF Unit Root Test Results
Country L R G D P L R O P A L R G D P A L R O P
Algeria -1.811 -2.305 -7.550*** -5.599***
Angola -0.174 -2.305 -3.747** -5.599***
Ecuador -2.523 -2.305 -4.490*** -5.599***
Iran -0.653 -2.305 -6.275*** -5.599***
Iraq -1.917 -2.305 -5.133*** -5.599***
Kuwait -1.790 -2.305 -6.098*** -5.599***
Libya -1.646 -2.305 -4.177** -5.599***
Nigeria -2.747 -2.305 -2.694 -5.599***
Qatar -0.210 -2.305 -6.768*** -5.599***
Saudi Arabia -2.133 -2.305 -3.133*** -5.599***
UAE -2.316 -2.305 -4.323*** -5.599***
Venezuela -2.873 -2.305 -4.634*** -5.599***
Brazil -0.974 -2.305 -2.797 -5.599***
China -2.846 -2.305 -3.791** -5.599***
India -1.264 -2.305 -7.229*** -5.599***
Malaysia -1.862 -2.305 -5.012*** -5.599***
Phillipines -2.512 -2.305 -3.607** -5.599***
Thailand -1.718 -2.305 -3.481** -5.599***
Turkey -2.726 -2.305 -6.069*** -5.599***
South Africa -0.436 -2.305 -3.828** -5.599***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
72 As outlined earlier, Phillips Perron test is considered better than ADF because it is 
more robust in dealing with serial-correlation and heteroskedasticity.
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Table 3.4
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results
Country L R G D P L R O P A L R G D P A L R O P
Algeria -4.220** -2.330 -6.854*** -5.599***
Angola 0.553 -2.330 -3685** -5.599***
Ecuador -2.249 -2.330 -4.523*** -5.599***
Iran -1.140 -2.330 -4.228** -5.599***
Iraq -2.027 -2.330 -5.137*** -5.599***
Kuwait -1.519 -2.330 -9.467*** -5.599***
Libya -1.883 -2.330 -5.497*** -5.599***
Nigeria -1.104 -2.330 -5.706*** -5.599***
Qatar 0.117 -2.330 -7.071*** -5.599***
Saudi Arabia -4.092 -2.330 -3.229** -5.599***
UAE -2.638* -2.330 -4.310*** -5.599***
Venezuela -1.876 -2.330 -4.549*** -5.599***
Brazil -3.011* -2.330 -4.034*** -5.599***
China -3.001 -2.330 -4.251*** -5.599***
India -1.264 -2.330 -7.422*** -5.599***
Malaysia -2.101 -2.330 -5.015*** -5.599***
Phillipines -0.463 -2.330 -2.900** -5.599***
Thailand -1.165 -2.330 -3.499** -5.599***
Turkey -2.825 -2.330 -6.068*** -5.599***
South Africa -0.854 -2.330 -3.709** -5.599***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Cointegration R esult
Tables 3.5 to 3.8 present results of Engle & Granger and Johansen coin­
tegration tests, being the second stage in the estimation process. Both tests 
include trend in the model and the optimal lag length selection is based on 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The non-OECD countries are grouped 
according to the two categories outlined earlier.
Table 3.5 reports the result of the ADF test conducted on the residuals 
of the long-run relationship (shown in equation 3.4) as required in testing for
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cointegration based on the Engle Sz Granger procedure. If the residuals are 
staionary at levels, then a long-run relationship (cointegration) is said to exist 
between GDP and oil prices. It can be observed from the table that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is strongly rejected at 1% significance level for 
almost all the oil exporting countries except Kuwait where it is rejected at 10% 
significance level. Angola and Qatar fails to reject the null hypothesis even at 
10% significance level. Thus, cointegration appears to exist between oil prices 
and GDP for all the oil exporting countries except Angola and Qatar.
Table 3.5
Engle & Granger Cointegration Test Result
Country0 A D F  Country6 A D F
Algeria -3.100*** Brazil -3.050***
Angola -1.208 China -1.831*
Ecuador -3.408*** India -1.158
Iran -2.910*** Malaysia -2.205**
Iraq -2.644*** Philippines -3.455***
Kuwait -1.874* South Africa -2.311**
Libya -3.788*** Thailand -2.248**
Nigeria -3.027*** Turkey -2.829***
Qatar -0.935
Saudi Arabia -3.673***
UAE -4.332***
Venezuela -3.006***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
“ OPEC member coutries and 
b newly industrialised countries.
For the net oil importing countries, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected, at least at 10% significance level for all the countries except India
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where it fails to reject the null hypothesis. In summary, the Engle and Granger 
cointegration test fails to show evidence of long-run equilibrum relationship in 
3 out of the 20 countries considered in this chapter. Hence, the error correction 
model test is not undertaken for these countries - rather, the conventional or 
standard Granger test is applied as explained in the methodology section.
Johansen Cointegratioi
Table 3.6
a Test Result (Net Oil Exporting Countries)
Country Lags Hypothesis Trace Stat. Max-Eigen Stat. Summary
Algeria 1 r =  0 
r <  1
22.030**
5.164
16.866**
5.164
Evidence of Cointegration
Angola 2 r =  0 25.870** 23.140** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 2.730 2.730
Ecuador 1 r =  0 21.726** 16.796** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 4.930 4.930
Iran 3 r =  0 28.278** 20.442** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 7.836 7.836
Iraq 1 r — 0 12.221 10.443 No Cointegration
r <  1 1.777 1.777
Kuwait 1 r =  0 32.234*** 27.134*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 5.099 5.099
Libya 1 r =  0 42.183*** 39.823*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 2.360 2.360
Nigeria 2 r =  0 15.193 11.731 No Cointegration
r <  1 3.462 3.462
Qatar 1 r  — 0 39.309*** 27.383*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 11.925 11.925
Saudi Arabia 2 r =  0 15.444 13.578 No Cointegration
r <  1 1.866 1.866
UAE 1 r =  0 22.888** 19.351** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 3.536 3.536
Venezuela 1
oII 11.009 7.770 No Cointegration
r <  1 3.239 3.239
Note: * ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 reports the result of Johansen cointegration test for the
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net oil exporting and oil importing countries respectively. The Johansen coin­
tegration test for the oil exporting countries (Table 3.6) reveals that in 8 of 
the 12 countries, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating variables (r =  0) is re­
jected at least at 10% significance level for both the trace and maximum-eigen 
value statistics. The four countries that fail to show evidence of cointegration 
are Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
Table 3.7, which reports the result for the net oil importing countries re­
veals that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship could not be 
rejected for Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey as shown in Table 3.8 while 
it was rejected, at least at 5% significance level for China, India, Malaysia, 
Philippines and South Africa.
Table 3.7
Johansen Cointegration Test Result (Net Oil Importing Countries)
Country Lags Hypothesis Trace Stat. Max-Eigen Stat. Summary
Brazil 1 r — 0 
r <  1
20.970
4.317
16.652
4.317
No Cointegration
China 2 r =  0 24.471** 21.432*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 3.039 3.039
India 1 r =  0 33.223*** 24.753*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 8.470 8.470
Malaysia 3 r =  0 21.648** 13.238 Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 8.410 8.410
Philippines 1 r =  0 25.688*** 510.623*** Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 5.064 5.064
Thailand 1 r =  0 17.272 10.264 No Cointegration
r <  1 7.008 7.008
Turkey 2 r =  0 19.455 12.345 No Cointegration
r <  1 7.110 7.110
South Africa 1 r =  0 21.297** 14.940* Evidence of Cointegration
r <  1 6.356 60356
Note: * ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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In general, out of a total of 20 countries, the Johansen cointegration test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship in 8 coun­
tries while it was rejected in the remaining 12 countries, thus concluding that a 
long-run relationship exist in the later countries. Usually, for countries where 
cointegration exist, vector error correction model based causality test is em­
ployed to identify the direction of both short-run and long-run causality while 
the standard Granger causality test is applied for countries where cointegration 
is not found to test for the short-run relationship as discussed earlier.
Causality R esult
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the causality test result for the two categories. 
The error correction model based test which tests for both short-run and long- 
run causality is applied for the countries where cointegration is found. As 
indicated in the methodology, strong Granger causality is also tested by jointly 
testing the significance of short and long-run causality. There can be four 
possible outcomes from the causality tests;
• Oil prices Granger-causes GDP
• GDP Granger-causes Oil prices
• Oil prices Granger-caused GDP and GDP Granger-causes Oil prices
• No Granger causality exist.
The first two are cases of uni-directional (one way) causality while the third 
is a case of bi-directional (both ways) causality. Causality test has often been 
mis-interpreted as impact/effect test even though it has clearly been stated
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by Granger (1969) that the test is not a cause or effect test but rather used 
for prediction purposes as outlined in the literature review section. The fully 
modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) is emplyed to estimate the long- 
run effect as the technique has proved to be efficient in estimating long-run 
relationships. The technique applies a semi-parametric correction to eliminate 
the problems caused by long-run correlation between regressors, thus making it 
asymptotically un-biased and effecient. The FMOLS results for the individual 
countries and the Group-FMOLS results are reported in the next sub-section.
Table 3.8 reports the F-test results of the individual causality tests for the 
group of oil exporting countries. As shown from the table, the F-stat value 
of oil prices and ECT are statistically significant in the real GDP equation 
for Angola, Iran, UAE and Venezuela which indicates the existence of both 
short and long-run causality running from oil prices to GDP. Hence, oil prices 
strongly Granger-causes GDP for these countries. In the real oil price equation, 
only the F-stat value of the ECT is significant for Angola and Iran which 
implies GDP also Granger-cause oil prices in the long-run for the two countries. 
Thus a bi-directional long-run causality exist for Angola and Iran while a uni­
directional long-run causality running from oil prices to GDP exist for UAE 
and Venezuela.
The results for Ecuador, Iraq, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia shows no evidence 
of short-run causality as only the F-stat value of the ECT is significant indi­
cating the existence of a long-run causality. Apart from Ecuador that shows a 
uni-directional long-run causality (which runs from oil prices to GDP), all the 
other three countries reveals a case of bi-directional long-run causality.
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Table 3.8
Causality Tests Result (Net Oil Exporting Countries)
Country Depend. Var. Source of Causation (Independent)
Short -run Long-run Joint
ALRGDP ALROP ECT SR /L R
Algeria ALRGDP - 0.732 - -
ALROP 0.950 - - -
Angola ALRGDP - 3.746** 4.253*** 3.992**
ALROP 0.569 - 2.689* 1.553
Ecuador ALRGDP - 0.020 4.724*** 1.443
ALROP 1.673 - 1.151 1.322
Iran ALRGDP - 5.097*** 5.737*** 5.233***
ALROP 1.121 - 3.234** 1.944
Iraq ALRGDP - 0.167 3.368** 1.431
ALROP 1.097 - 3.279** 1.722
Kuwait ALRGDP - 2.167* 2.440* 2.233*
ALROP 0.237 - 1.125 0.242
Libya ALRGDP - 0.017 5.318*** 1.765
ALROP 2.819* - 3.299** 3.142**
Nigeria ALRGDP - 1.006 3.180** 1.582
ALROP 0.892 - 3.442** 1.023
Qatar ALRGDP - 1.267 - -
ALROP 2.529** - - -
Saudi Arabia ALRGDP - 1.002 2.215* 1.521
ALROP 0.306 - 2.568* 1.078
UAE ALRGDP - 2.137* 5.740*** 3.855**
ALROP 0.265 - 1.182 0.842
Venezuela ALRGDP - 2.042* 4.428*** 3.545**
ALROP 0.592 - 1.136 0.877
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
As for Libya, the F-stat value of ECT and GDP are significant in the real 
oil price equation which indicates the existence of both long-run and short- 
run causality running from GDP to oil prices. The ECT F-stat value is also 
significant in the real GDP equation, thus, revealing a bi-directional long-run 
causality. Since cointegration does not exist for Algeria and Qatar, only the
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short-run causality is estimated with causality running from GDP to oil prices 
for Qatar while no Granger causality exist for Algeria.
Table 3.9 reports the F-test result for the group of net oil importing coun­
tries. The result shows evidence of strong Granger causality running from oil 
prices to GDP for China and Thailand as both the F-stat value of LROP and 
ECT are significant, at least at 10% level. As for Brazil, Philippines, Turkey 
and South Africa, only the F-stat value of ECT is significant in the GDP equa­
tion, suggesting a uni-directional long-run causality relationship running from 
oil prices to GDP while Malaysia reveals evidence of long-run bi-directional 
causality as the ECT in both equations are significant.
Table 3.9
Causality Tests Result (Net Oil Importing Countries)
Country Depend. Var. Source of Causation (Independent)
Short-run Long-run Joint
ALRGDP ALROP ECT SR /LR
Brazil ALRGDP
ALROP 1.021
1.018 3.270**
1.104
1.752
1.054
China ALRGDP - 2.132* 3.371** 2.545*
ALROP 1.763 - 1.129 1.341
India ALRGDP - 1.028 - -
ALROP 1.947 - - -
Malaysia ALRGDP - 1.031 2.251* 1.533
ALROP 1.378 . - 2.406* 1.635
Philippines ALRGDP - 1.017 3.435** 1.547
ALROP 2.422* - 1.306 1.322
Thailand ALRGDP - 2.132* 3.138** 2.714*
ALROP 1.735 - 1.383 1.492
Turkey ALRGDP - 1.096 3.425** 1.332
ALROP 0.449 - 0.128 0.311
South Africa ALRGDP - 1.014 2.270* 1.768
ALROP 2.145* - 0.342 1.288
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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In summary, the result shows evidence of stong Granger-causality in 8 out 
of the 20 countries analysed (as shown in Table 3.10) with the direction of 
causality running from oil prices to GDP in 7 of the countries; Angola, Iran, 
Kuwait, UAE, Venezuela, China and Thailand. The result implies that oil 
prices have a stong influence, both in the short and long-run, on the economic 
output of these countries.73 As poited out earlier, Acarachi and Ozturk (2010) 
noted that one of the advantages of using the ECM based causality test is 
that Granger causality can be tested in three ways; short-run, long-run and 
strong (jointly testing the significance of both short-run and long-run) Granger 
causality.
3.5.2 R esults from A sym m etric Specification
As outlined in the previous section, two methods of non-linear transformation 
of oil prices; Mork (1989) and Hamilton (1996) are utilized. As a preliminary 
procedure, unit root tests on the transformed series are under taken and the 
results are reported in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11
Unit root Test for Asymmetric Specification
Variable ADF PP Conclusion
Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.
O P+ -5.569*** - -5.557*** 1(0)
OP- -6.544*** - -6.526*** 1(0)
NOPI -6.624*** - -7.638*** 1(0)
73It can be observed from Table 3.10 that for countries where the short-run coefficients 
are not significant, no strong Granger causality exist. See, for instance, Ecuador, Nigeria 
and India among others.
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The result reveals that the decomposed oil prices are 1(0),74 hence, the 
model is estimated at levels. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 presents the result of the 
asymmetric specification which shows whether oil price increase, oil price de­
crease or net oil price increase Granger-causes GDP.
Table 3.12
Asymmetric Effects (Net Oil Exporting Countries)
A G D P  
O P + OP- NOPI
Algeria 1.046 1.029 2.190*
Angola 3.429** 0.714 2.028*
Ecuador 1.069 4.734*** 1.021
Iran 3.479** 0.186 1.123
Iraq 1.211 1.254 0.220
Kuwait 1.339 0.736 1.072
Libya 3.128** 1.301 3.119**
Nigeria 2.080* 2.182* 1.056
Qatar 0.621 1.001 2.035*
Saudi Arabia 1.161 2.244** 1.140
UAE 1.036 0.735 1.039
Venezuela 2.272* 1.095 3.306**
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
The results for the group of oil exporting countries which is reported in 
Table 3.12 shows the F-stat value of oil price increase is significant (at least 
at 10% level) for Angola, Iran Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela, indicating oil 
price increase Granger-cause GDP in those counries. The result implies that 
positive changes in current GDP is better explained by past oil price increases 
than oil price decreases. As for Nigeria, the value of oil price decrease is also 
significant indicating both rise and fall in oil prices exerts strong influence
74Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2003) also conducted unit-root test on the decomposed 
oil price variables and found the series to be 1(0)
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on current GDP. The results for Ecuador and Saudi Arabia reveals that only 
oil price decrease variable is significant indicating changes in GDP is more 
influenced by a fall in oil prices.
It is often argued that the net oil price increase (NOPI) is the most re­
liable asymmetric specification based on the argument that output responds 
only to increases larger than its maximum recent history. As shown in Table 
3.12, NOPI Granger-causes GDP for Algeria, Angola, Libya and Qatar and 
Venezuela - indicating a strong influence of past oil price increases on current 
GDP.
Results for the group of net oil importing countries, reported in Table 3.13 
reveals that both oil price increase and oil price decrease Granger-causes GDP 
for China, India, Malaysia and Thailand while for Brazil, only the oil price in­
crease Granger cause GDP. The NOPI specification also Granger-causes GDP 
for Brazil, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.
Table 3.13
Asymmetric Effects (Net Oil Importing Countries)
A G D P
O P + OP- NOPI
Brazil 3.221** 1.207 3.012**
China 2.883* 3.874** 0.752
India 3.828** 2.260* 0.982
Malaysia 5.310*** 2.134* 1.347
Philippines 3.262** 0.076 2.227*
South Africa 0.003 -0.059 2.162*
Thailand 3.680** 3.393** 5.743***
Turkey 1.003 1.059 2.162*
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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In summary, the asymmetric specification reveals oil price increase having 
more influence on changes in GDP than oil price decrease in both the groups of 
net oil exporting and net oil importing countries. The next sub-section reports 
result from the panel technique.
3.5.3 Panel Estim ation R esult
Panel U nit R oot R esult
As indicated in the methodology, the panel unit root tests are applied 
based on two different models. Model 1 which includes only constant and no 
time trend provides mixed/ inconsistent results in both series at level terms 
especially for the real oil price variable. The various tests shows the series are 
stationary at levels at least at 10% significance level. Model 2 (which includes 
both constant and time trend) on the other hand, shows the series are non- 
stationary at levels but achieved stationarity after taking the first difference 
at 1% significance level. Table 3.14 presents the results derived from the panel 
unit root tests conducted.
Since all the panel unit root test assume the null hypothesis of each individ­
ual series is non-stationary, results obtained reveals that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for both series at levels but is strongly rejected (at 1% 
significance level) at their first difference. It is therefore concluded that both 
series are 1(1) and as such can proceed to test for cointegration.
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Table 3.14 
Panel Unit Root Test Result
Variables Panel A Panel B
LLC IPS Choi LLC IPS Choi
Model 1 
LRGDP -2.38** 2.22 2.09 0.71 3.77 3.42
LROP -2.35** -3.94*** -4.14*** '-1.58* -2.64** -2.78**
ALRGDP -14.14*** -14.87*** -13.13*** -9.30*** -9.06*** -8.32***
ALROP -24.17*** -20.93*** -17.69*** -16.21*** -14.04*** -11.87***
Model 2 
LRGDP 0.81 -1.16 -0.79 -0.38 -0.41 -0.41
LROP -0.57 -0.73 -0.89 -0.38 -0.49 -0.60
ALRGDP -13.31*** -14.26*** -12.19*** -8.94*** -8.05*** -7.03***
ALROP -22.23*** -18.87*** -15.37*** -14.91*** -12.54*** -10.31***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Panel Cointegration R esult
Table 3.15 shows the results of the Pedroni panel cointegration tests, as 
outlined in the methodology section, for both panels. Under the null hypoth­
esis of no cointegration, the test statistic of Panel p, Panel PP, Panel ADF, 
Group p, Group PP and Group ADF cannot be rejected even at 10% signifi­
cance level for both panels. The only test statistic that is significant is Panel v 
-  statistic which is significant at 5% for panel A and at 1% for panel B. Thus, 
the Pedroni test statistics suggest that there is no cointegration between the 
variables.
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Table 3.15 
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test Result
Statistics Panel A Panel B
Panel v-statistic 1.685** 46.768***
Panel p-statistic 0.608 0.667
Panel P P -statistic -0.168 0.083
Panel A D F-statistic -0.222 0.164
Group p-statistic 1.632 1.324
Group P P -statistic 0.198 0.515
Group A D F-statistic 0.049 0.799
Note: ** and *** indicate significance level at 5% and 1%, respectively
Table 3.16 reports the results of the Kao cointegration test, which is also a 
residual-based cointegration technique. Based on the results, the null hypoth­
esis of no cointegration could not be rejected for Panel A but was rejected at 
5% significance level for Panel B. Therefore, the Kao cointegration test could 
only support evidence of long-run equilibrium relationship in Panel B which 
is the group of net oil importing countries.
Table 3.16 
Kao Cointegration Test Result
A D F Statistics 
Panel A 0.411
Panel B 1.657**
Note: ** indicate significance level at 5%
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The results of the Johansen Fisher panel cointegration test developed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999), reported in Table 3.17, are fairly conclusive. Results 
from both Fisher’s trace and max-eigen test statistics support the presence of 
cointegrated relation between the two variables for both panels.
Table 3.17
Johansen Fisher Cointegration Test Result
H ypothesized
No. of CE(s) Fisher Statistics
Trace Test M ax-Eigen Test
Panel A
None 60.1* 69.99***
At most 1 14.05 14.05
Panel B
None 28.02* 33.22**
At most 1 8.76 8.76
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
In summary, the Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests suggest that there is no cointe­
gration between LRGDP and LROP for both Panel A and Panel B. The Kao 
(1999) test suggests that there is no cointegration for Panel A but does find 
cointegration between LRGDP and LROP for Panel B. Whereas, the Johansen 
Fisher panel cointegration test suggest that a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between LRGDP and LROP does exist for both Panel A and Panel B. The 
results are therefore split, so it is assumed that there is potentially a long run 
relationship between the two variables, thus allowing for the testing of short 
and long run causality between the natural log of real oil prices and real GDP.
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Estim ating Long-run Cointegrating R elationship — FM OLS R e­
sults
Tables 3.18 - 3.19 report the estimated long-run coefficients of the individ­
ual and panel FMOLS. The panel estimators are shown at the bottom of each 
table. The coefficients of oil prices in both panels are statistically significant 
at 1% level, and the effect is positive. This implies oil prices have a long-term 
positive effect on GDP for both the group of net oil exporting and net oil 
importing countries. While the results for Panels A is in line with a-priori ex­
pected results (positive effect for oil exporting countries), the result for Panel 
B is not. It was expected that positive shocks should have a negative effect on 
the group of oil importing countries. Perhaps the influence of countries like 
Brazil and Malaysia that have recently become net oil exporters despite their 
high consumption level might be the reason for the positive effect. According 
to CIA World Fact Book 2010, Brazil and Malaysia became net oil exporters 
in 2009. Another possible explanation could be linked to what is often argued 
in the literature that oil prices do not have any serious effect on economic 
output especially when the data runs beyond the 1980s.75 The positive effect 
for Panel B may be seen as a justification to this argument.
On a per country basis, it can be observed from Table 3.18 that oil prices 
have a positive impact on GDP of all the OPEC member countries, though 
the coefficient is not significant for Angola, Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela. The 
FMOLS estimates of the coefficient of oil prices with respect to GDP ranges 
from 0.101 (Ecuador) to 0.604 (Iraq). In essence, the coefficient of oil prices is 
positive and statistically significant in eight out of the twelve OPEC member
75 See Hooker (1996)
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countries; indicating an increase in oil prices tends to promote GDP. The panel 
estimate for the group reveals that oil prices have a strong positive effect on 
output.
Table 3.18
FMOLS Estimates (Net Oil Exporting Countries)
Country Coefficient of LROP t-statistics
Algeria 0.131 4.248***
Angola 0.138 1.472
Ecuador 0.101 4.553***
Iran 0.075 1.226
Iraq 0.604 3.604***
Kuwait 0.046 0.462
Libya 0.202 4.871***
Nigeria 0.053 1.226
Qatar 0.159 1.488
Saudi Arabia 0.209 4.498***
UAE 0.372 7.696***
Venezuela 0.036 1.027
Panel 0.177 10.51***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Similarly, in the group of net oil importing countries (Table 3.19), the oil 
price coefficient is significant in four of the eight countries. While the coef­
ficients for Brazil, Philippines and South Africa are positive and statistically 
significant, that of China is negative (-0.082) indicating on the average, 1 per­
cent increase in oil prices reduces the GDP of the Chinese economy by 0.082 
percent. The panel estimate however shows a weak positive effect for the whole 
group.
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Table 3.19
FMOLS Estimates (Net Oil Importing Countries)
Country Coefficient of LROP t-statistics
Brazil 0.081 2.748***
China -0.082 -3.653***
India 0.005 0.225
Malaysia -0.081 -0.527
Philippines 0.128 7.396***
South Africa 0.082 5.464***
Thailand -0.089 -1.510
Turkey -0.009 -0.380
Panel 0.012 3.452***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Significant coefficients obtained from the Group-FMOLS estimates are a 
confirmation that real oil prices and real GDP are cointegrated and the long- 
run relationship is positive. This means on average an increase in oil prices 
has a long-term positive effect on economic output of both the groups of oil 
exporting and the net oil importing countries. A long-run relationship between 
the variables is an indication there is causality at least in one direction. The 
panel causality results (reported in the next sub-section) will show whether 
the direction of causality is from oil prices to GDP or otherwise.
Panel Causality R esult
As indicated in the methodology section, a panel based error correction 
model is employed to account for the long and short-run causality relationship. 
Table 3.20 shows the F-test results of the panel causality tests.
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Table 3.20 
Panel Causality Result
Depend. Var. Source of Causation (Independent)
Short-run Long-run Joint
ALRGDP ALROP ECT SR/LR
Panel A ALRGDP - 3.660** 2.482* 3.200**
ALROP 1.197 - 0.332 1.021
Panel B ALRGDP - 0.516 0.889 0.628
ALROP 1.614 - 2.394* 1.660
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
As is apparent from the table, the F-stat value of oil prices and ECT 
are significant in the GDP equation of Panel A, however the GDP and ECT 
values in the oil price equation are not significant. This indicates that there is 
uni-directional Granger causality running from oil prices to GDP in both the 
short-run and long-run. Therefore, oil prices strongly Granger-causes GDP 
for the group of oil exporting countries. This implies that oil prices have 
a strong influence on economic output and whenever a shock occurs in the 
system, output (GDP) would make short-run adjustment to restore long-run 
equilibrium. It also implies that it is possible to use oil price as an economic 
tool to control output.
As for Panel B, only the ECT in the oil price equation is significant indi­
cating a uni-directional long-run causality running from GDP to oil prices. As 
indicated earlier, most similar studies are more interested in whether oil prices 
Granger-causes GDP which is obtained from the GDP equation and neither 
the oil prices nor ECT value are significant. This implies oil prices have a 
neutral effect on GDP for the net oil importing countries.
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Table 3.21 
Summary of Panel Causality Result
Short-run Long-run Joint
Panel A O P—>GDP O P—>GDP O P—>GDP
Panel B O P ^ G D P OP<— GDP OP</>GDP
Note: O P—>GDP — oil prices Granger-caused GDP; OP<— GDP =  GDP Granger-causes oil prices; 
OP</»GDP =  no causality in either direction.
In essence, oil prices Granger-causes GDP for the group of oil export­
ing countries (Panel A) but fail to Granger-cause GDP for the group net oil 
importing countries (Panel B) as shown in Table 3.21. In comparison with 
previous study, Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) found that oil prices Granger- 
causes GDP in both the group of oil exporting and oil importing countries. 
The result from this study therefore is consistent with what they found for 
the oil exporting countries but contradict their findings for the oil importing 
countries.76
3.6  Sum m ary and C onclu sion
This chapter employs time-series and panel causality technique to investigate 
the oil price-GDP relationship for 20 non-OECD countries from 1971 to 2007. 
Empirical studies using time-series data on US and other advanced countries 
have shown that oil prices fail to Granger-cause GDP when the data is ex­
tended beyond the 1980s, and there were also indication that the effect of oil 
prices on oil exporting countries is different from that of oil importing coun­
tries. While it is believed that oil price increase have a positive effect on
76 It is however important to note that Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) considered both 
OECD and non-OECD countries in their analysis.
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output for oil exporting countries, the reverse was expected for oil import­
ing countries. In line with the above argument, this chapter seeks to add to 
the literature by investigating the effect of oil prices on economic growth of 
non-OECD countries and also investigate the causal link between them from a 
time-series and panel context. The non-OECD countries are categorized into 
two sub-groups; group of net oil exporting countries, which comprise of OPEC 
member countries, and the group of net oil importing countries, which is a 
group of emerging economies.
The main results may be summarised as follows: oil prices Granger-causes 
GDP for the group of net oil exporting countries while it fails to Granger-cause 
GDP for the net oil importing countries. For the net oil exporting countries, 
it implies that changes in crude oil prices have a significant influence on their 
economic activity, thus oil prices remains an important factor in determining 
future performance of those countries. As for the net oil importing countries, 
oil prices have little or no influence in predicting their economic output despite 
their high consumption level.
The group FMOLS results provides evidence that there are fairly strong 
positive long-run relationships between the variables as the coefficient of oil 
prices are significant and positive in both panels, indicating an increase in 
oil prices has a positive effect on the GDP of both the oil exporting and 
oil importing countries. The panel estimate result shows that on average, a 
1% rise in oil prices increases GDP by 0.174% for the group of oil exporting 
countries and 0.012% for the group of oil importing countries.
On a per country basis (based on individual country time-series FMOLS 
estimate), the coefficient of oil prices is significant in 6 out of the 12 oil ex­
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porting countries. The relationship is positive as expected indicating a rise 
in oil prices leads to an increase GDP. The result suggests that on average, a 
1% rise in oil prices leads to an increase of 0.609%, 0.209%, 0.372%, 0.131%, 
0.101% and 0.202% for Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Algeria, Ecuador and Libya 
respectively.
In the group of net oil importing countries, the coefficient of oil prices is 
significant for Brazil, China, Philippines and South Africa - with the coefficient 
being positive for all the countries except China. The result suggests that 
on average, a 1% rise in oil prices reduces GDP by 0.082% in China,77 and 
increases GDP by 0.081%, 0.128% and 0.082% in Brazil, Philippines and South 
Africa respectively.
The result for China is in line with the a-priori expectation - according to 
El A (2010), China is the largest consumer of oil behind the US and also the 
second largest importer in 2009. Even though Brazil is among the major oil 
producers in the world, the country’s high consumption level makes it a net 
importer until recently. One could argue that since Brazil has the capacity to 
meet its domestic demand, the positive relationship can therefore be justified. 
The case for South Africa and Philippines clearly contradicts our a-priori ex­
pectation. According to El A, South Africa and Philippines imports 64.53% 
and 91.52% of their total crude oil consumption respectively.
The results from this work are quite essential for governments of both the oil 
exporting/importing countries. Reliable estimates on the impact of oil prices
on the economy are important information for governments when formulating
77 While the result for China suggest a negative effect of oil prices on GDP, the panel 
estimate for the overall group of net oil importing countries suggest a positive effect on GDP 
as explained a little earlier.
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medium and long-term policies. Due to the fact that oil is an exhaustible 
resource, the results further re-confirm the need for oil exporting countries to 
diversify their economy and reduce the over-dependence on oil revenue.
On a final note, it is important to mention that the rise in GDP as a 
result of favourable oil prices in most oil exporting countries have not been 
reflected in tangible economic development. The question of why oil abundant 
countries experience poor growth performance still remains an important issue 
in the literature. In the next chapter, this thesis investigates the issue by 
applying a heterogenous panel technique to analyse the effect of oil abundance 
on economic output, as seen in the level of income per capita.
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3 .7  A p p en d ix  to  C hap ter 3
3.7.1 A ppendix 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Table A3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the data used in the analysis 
of Chapter 3. The statistics used are mean, median, maximum, minimum, 
std deviation, skewness and kurtosis and are reported for the groups of net 
oil exporting and net oil importing countries. The descriptive statistics shows 
that both the real GDP and real oil price data are satisfactory and fairly evenly 
distributed around the mean.
Table A3.1
Descriptive Statistics (Group of all Countries)
Net Exporters Net Importers
RGDP ROP RGDP ROP
Mean 97.70 43.11 830.80 43.11
Median 56.51 35.38 439.18 35.38
Maximum 554.02 97.46 9911.78 97.46
Minimum 7.79 12.04 28.69 12.04
Std. deviation 93.89 22.31 1248.19 22.31
Skewness 1.79 0.83 4.01 0.83
Kurtosis 6.52 2.87 22.41 2.87
3.7.2 A ppendix 3.2: D iagnostic Tests
Tables A3.2 and A3.3 reports the diagnostic test conducted on the time-series 
causality results. The results have passed most diagostic test and hence may 
be considered robust.
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T ab le  A 3.2
D iag n o s tic  T est (G ro u p  of O il E x p o r t in g  C o u n trie s )
C o u n try E q u a tio n S eria l C o rre la tio n H ete ro sca d  as tic ity a lity
F -S ta t P ro b a b il ity F -S ta t P ro b a b il ity J a q . b e ra P ro b a b il i ty
A lgeria L R G D P 1.04 0.26 0.41 0.84 0.69 0.71
L R O P 3.15 0.04 0.62 0.68 1.30 0.52
A ngola L R G D P 1.23 0.29 1.21 0.31 1.29 0.52
L R O P 1.76 0.21 0.57 0.68 1.33 0.50
E c u ad o r L R G D P 0.67 0.55 0.71 0.55 0.57 0.68
L R O P 0.86 0.49 1.22 0.30 1.93 0.41
L R G D P 0.97 0.42 0.57 0.72 1.29 0.52
L R O P 0.63 0.60 1.33 0.28 2.71 0.39
Iraq L R G D P 0.57 0.61 1.05 0.38 2.50 0.41
L R O P 0.44 0.69 0.94 0.47 1.64 0.46
K uw ait L R G D P 1.03 0.30 1.03 0.35 3.44 0.28
L R O P 4.01 0.04 0.74 0.59 1.45 0.47
Libya L R G D P 1.55 0.31 0.95 0.44 2.05 0.42
L R O P 0.86 0.49 1.08 0.39 1.93 0.57
N igeria L R G D P 4.46 0.01 0.99 0.44 0.49 0.78
L R O P 0.65 0.52 0.03 0.99 1.30 0.53
Q a ta r L R G D P 4.73 0.03 0.42 0.65 1.33 0.49
L R O P 1.36 0.34 0.46 0.68 0.59 0.75
S aud i A rab ia L R G D P 0.63 0.67 1.05 0.41 1.44 0.48
L R O P 0.98 0.51 0.93 0.57 1.06 0.54
U AE L R G D P 1.77 0.31 0.49 0.68 2.01 0.43
L R O P 4.17 0.03 0.77 0.61 1.60 0.49
V enezuela L R G D P 1.43 0.42 0.28 0.91 1.83 0.39
L R O P 2.31 0.52 0.24 0.94 4.71 0.13
T ab le  A 3.3
D iag n o s tic  T est (G ro u p  of O il Im p o r t in g  C o u n trie s )
C o u n try E q u a tio n S eria l C o rre la tio n H e te ro sc a d a s tic ity N orm a lity
F -S ta t P ro b a b il ity F -S ta t P ro b a b il ity J a q . b e ra P ro b a b il i ty
L R G D P 0.31 0.73 0.87 0.51 3.92 0.14
LR O P 4.01 0.03 1.55 0.20 0.38 0.83
C h in a L R G D P 0.69 0.50 1.66 0.17 2.81 0.24
L R O P 8.07 0.01 1.47 0.22 3.05 0.21
In d ia L R G D P 0.47 0.67 0.81 0.57 1.57 0.48
L R O P 0.86 0.49 1.52 0.26 1.90 0.46
M alaysia L R G D P 1.97 0.41 0.47 0.82 0.79 0.67
L R O P 0.93 0.62 1.33 0.28 1.71 0.47
M exico L R G D P 0.47 0.69 0.95 0.45 2.45 0.21
L R O P 3.35 0.50 0.24 0.94 0.40 0.81
P h illip in e s L R G D P 4.03 0.04 1.13 0.32 2.35 0.49
L R O P 0.81 0.48 0.55 0.53 1.26 0.57
S o u th  A frica L R G D P 1.59 0.32 1.95 0.17 1.05 0.56
L R O P 0.96 0.41 0.85 0.42 0.93 0.78
T h a ila n d L R G D P 5.41 0.01 0.99 0.44 1.42 0.49
L R O P 0.68 0.51 1.03 0.39 1.03 0.57
T urkey L R G D P 1.73 0.23 0.49 0.60 2.13 0.35
L R O P 1.36 0.34 1.36 0.28 1.51 0.55
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Chapter 4^
4 Oil A bundance and Econom ic G row th
4 .1  In trod u ction
Before the late 1980s, the general belief was that natural resource abundance is 
a major advantage for a country attempting to achieve rapid economic devel­
opment. Prominent development enonomists79 argued that natural resource 
endowments would enable countries to make the transition from underdevelop­
ment to industrial ‘take-off’, as it had done for some of the advanced countries 
such as the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. Similarly, 
Krueger (1980) argued that natural resources would facilitate a country’s in­
dustrial development by providing invest able funds and domestic market.
However, over the past three decades, the apparent notion that natural 
resource abundance leads to lower growth performance has attracted much 
attention. Several studies80 from the fields of economics and political science 
have pointed to the particularly strong negative economic and political im­
pacts of natural resource abundance, especially oil. Most of the empirical 
literature on the resource curse paradox followed the influential work of Sachs 
and Warner (1995). According to this paradox, abundance of natural resources 
increases the likelihood that countries will experience negative economic, so­
cial and political outcomes including poor economic performance, low levels
78 Earlier preliminary work for this chapter was presented at the 9th BIEE Academic 
Conference, Oxford, UK. September, 2012.
79 See, for instance, Rostow (1961)
80 See for instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2005), Hodler (2006) and Ross (2001)
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of democracy, and civil war - hence, resource abundance is a curse and not a 
blessing.81
According to Cavalcanti et al. (2011), there are a number of grounds on 
which the econometric evidence of the resource curse paradox (which is mostly 
based on Sachs and Warner (1995) cross-sectional specification) may be ques­
tioned. Firstly, the resource curse hypothesis literature primarily relies on the 
cross-sectional approach which does not take into account the time-dimension 
of the data and is also subject to an endogeneity problem. Secondly, most 
of these studies measure resource dependence rather than abundance - for in­
stance, Sachs and Warner (1995) use the ratio of primary export to GDP in the 
initial period as a measure of resource abundance which they argue measures 
resource dependence rather than abundance.82 Thirdly, most of the studies 
focus on the effects of resource abundance on the rate of economic growth, 
even though most traditional growth models like Solow and Ramsey suggest 
that the effects on growth is temporary and could be permanent for the level 
of per capita income. Finally, most studies that apply panel data techniques 
use homogeneous approaches, such as the traditional fixed and random effects 
estimators, and the generalized methods of movements (GMM) estimators, 
which impose a high degree of homogeneity across the countries and according 
to Koedijk el al. (2011), homogeneous estimates exhibit potentially large bi­
ases which can lead to mis-leading inferences - they highlight the importance 
of allowing for heterogeneous estimation techniques.
81 In some studies, the resource curse paradox is tagged as Dutch disease syndrome. 
As Davis (1995) points out, the first symptom associated with the resource curse was an 
overvalued currency in the Netherlands following the discovery of natural gas deposits in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s - hence the term Dutch disease syndrome.
82 Earlier, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) made similar argument on the variable being 
more of a measure of resource dependence rather than resource abundance,
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In addition to these critiques, Cavalcanti et al. (2011) developed a the­
oretical model that requires the use of natural resources as an input in the 
production process. The Cavalcanti et al. (2011) theoretical model suggests a 
long-run relationship between per capita income, the investment rate and the 
real value of oil production per capita, an approach used in this chapter as 
the basis for empirical investigation. To further enhance the empirical model 
used here, an institutional quality variable is included in response to a rec- 
commendation made by van der Ploeg (2011) that future empirical work on 
the resource curse hypothesis should apply panel data technique and take into 
account the changing role of institutions. Apart from using the real value of 
oil production per-capita as a proxy of natural resource, this study also uses 
the real value of oil reserve per-capita to investigate the resource curse hy­
pothesis. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) suggested the use of hydocarbon deposit 
per capita and/or oil production per capita as the most appropriate measures 
of oil resource abundance and also stressed that it should not be expressed 
as a share of GDP. According to Alexeev and Conrad (2009), if the share of 
oil output in GDP is used as an indicator of resource dependence, then, given 
some output of oil, a country that for whatever reason has a low growth rate 
or low GDP would have a higher oil:GDP ratio and this would bias the results, 
artificially creating a negative effect of oil on GDP.
In testing the resource curse hypothesis, this study recognizes that within 
the resource abundant countries, there may be a substantial degree of het­
erogeneity in their growth experience - hence, a heterogeneous panel data 
approach is employed. As indicated in the previous chapter, this economet­
ric approach provides additional power in combining cross-sectional and time
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series data while allowing for heterogeneity across countries. Nevertheless, in 
order to build upon and compare with previous work in this area, initially the 
work follows Sachs and Warner (1995) by employing a standard cross-sectional 
estimation technique to investigate the growth effect of resource abundance. 
Since most studies in the literature applied the cross-sectional approach using 
different measure of resource abundance, it would be interesting to compare 
results from this study and what is obtained in the literature despite the short­
comings of the cross-sectional approach.83
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains the 
growth experience of the oil rich non-OECD countries considered in this chap­
ter, Section 4.3 reviews the empirical literature on the resource curse paradox 
while Section 4.4 explains the methodology behind both the cross-sectional 
and panel estimation technique. Section 4.5 reports the empirical results and 
finally Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2  G row th  E xp erien ce  o f  O il A b u n d an t E conom ies: S om e  
S ty lized  Facts
Many oil rich counties have experienced large windfall gains as a result of a 
rise in international oil prices. These accumulated gains are often associated 
with potential macroeconomic volatility that reliance on oil can introduce into 
the economy. Furthermore, many oil exporting countries are relatively poor in 
terms of social development indicators and economic welfare. In a study of five
83 The cross-sectional estimation result in this study is compared with those obtained from 
Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Cavalcanti et al. (2001). Section 4.6.1 
provides detailed comparison of the regression results from these studies and also measures 
of resource abundance adopted.
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oil exporting countries (Algeria, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria and Venezuela) in the 
midst of two oil booms in the 1970s, Karl (1997) argued that oil rich countries 
created awkward centralized bureaucracies, geared towards generating more oil 
profits which allowed established interest groups, such as investors and state 
officials to acquire additional influence and fight to retain it, creating enormous 
barriers to change. He further argued that during this period, policy makers 
put aside any plans for nurturing long-term sustainable growth, and when oil 
prices began their drastic plunge, the results were economic failure, double 
digit inflation and decline in the efficiency of their public enterprises. Further­
more, Auty (2004) and Manzano and Rigobon (2001) shows that oil abundant 
economies present lower growth rates and experience higher volatility due to 
fluctuating commodity prices combined with un-diversified revenue and export 
bases. According to Deacon (2012), the resource curse problem affects most 
of the oil exporting countries, however, Sub-Saharan African countries seem 
to be more vulnerable than others.
This section therefore provides background analyses of the average growth 
performance and growth volatility of oil abundant countries over the past four 
decades beginning from 1970.84 The first period 1970 - 1979 captures the first 
and the beginning of the second oil price shocks. The economic situation in the 
early 1970s was characterized by different factors; according to World Bank 
(2010), the world economy grew at around 5% on average from the end of the 
1960s to the beginning of the 1970s - the growth rate rose from 3.7% in the 
late 1960s to 6.9% in 1972. Worldwide growth suffered a severe setback during
84 Even though the background analysis on the growth performance of these developing 
countries begins from 1970, the data used for the empirical analysis of this chapter begins 
from 1984 as explained in Section 4.4.
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the first oil shock. While the world economy still grew at 6.9% in 1973, the 
growth rate fell to 2.1% in 1974 and to 1.4% in 1975 (WTO, 2005). It was 
only in 1976 that growth picked up to its normal rate.
As indicated by Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), the overall economic 
situation in the mid-seventies was determined by the after-shocks of the first 
oil price shock as economies were just recovering from the slump while the 
political environment was still characterized by tension in the Middle-East, 
particularly the revolution in Iran which led to the second oil price shock in 
the late 1970s. According to World Bank (2010), worldwide economic growth 
slightly decreased from 4.7% in 1978 to 4% in 1979, reaching its lowest point 
in 1982 at 0.8%.
Oil rich countries experienced increased revenue due to high oil prices over 
the period which was reflected in their growth performance. As depicted in 
Table 4.1, GDP per capita grew at an annual average rate of 7.2%, 9.28%, 
7.44% and 5.8%85 for the oil producing countries in South-East Asia (SE Asia), 
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin 
America respectively. The impressive growth rate of the oil producing coun­
tries over the period was associated with a very high growth volatility, partic­
ularly in SSA, 11.31% and MENA, 8.21% while SE Asia and Latin America 
performed relatively well with a growth volatility of 2.28% and 3.06% respec­
tively.
85 Note that the data used to compute the growth rate and growth volatility figures 
(reported in Table 4.1) are obtained from World Bank (2010)
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The second period between 1980 -1989 was a period of oil price collapse and 
the beginning of structural reforms to address perceived negative consequences 
of resource dependence which negatively affected the growth performance of 
these countries. According to World Bank (2010), during the period GDP 
per capita grew at an average of less than 2% per anum in MENA and Latin 
America while SSA and SE Asia recorded a growth rate of 3.4% and 5.21% per 
anum respectively. Apart from the low economic performance experienced by 
oil rich countries during the period, growth volatility was also high, particularly 
within MENA and SSA. This episode marked a period of poor performance 
both interms of GDP growth and volatility.
The third period between 1990 - 1999 witnessed the Asian financial crisis 
when the region’s growth volatility increased to its highest level. Another 
major event that affected the global oil market was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990. According to Foad (2009), The Gulf War led the market to 
react with panic, leading to a 100% inccrease in the price of oil within two 
months. As reported in Table 4.1, the high oil prices is again reflected in 
the growth performance of the MENA countries as the annual average growth 
rate rose from of 1.88% in the 1980s to 6.81% in the 1990s. Oil producing 
countries in SSA recorded a very low growth performance over the period with 
an average annual growth rate for the region at 1.83%.86 This outcome87 is 
in line with the empirical findings in the previous chapter which reveals oil 
prices having a short-term impact on economic output of selected MENA and 
SSA countries (see Table 3.8) and a long-term positive effect on most MENA
86 Latin America recorded a modest average growth rate of 2.79%
87 Although is based on past information over short to medium term, it would be intresting 
to see how it connects with the findings in Chapter 3.
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countries while the long-term coefficients for SSA countries are not significant. 
Hence, the long-term effect of oil prices on SSA countries is insignificant (see 
Table 3.18).
The fourth period witnessed an improvement in both growth performance 
and volatility across most of the regions. According to World Bank (2010), SSA 
witnessed its lowest growth volatility rate and a considerable rise in average per 
capita growth rate from the previous decade. The other regions also performed 
quite well with an average growth rate of more than 5% except Latin America 
which grew at 3.51% with an associated growth volatility of more than 4%.
The growth experiences over the whole period showed that oil producing 
countries of MENA and SSA have witnessed more volatile growth compared to 
those of SE Asia and Latin America and their growth performance is strongly 
influenced by activities in the oil market. While oil prices may seem to have 
a positive relationship with economic output of oil producing countries in 
the short-term, empirical studies of the long-term effect of natural resource 
abundance on economic performance of oil producing countries have pointed 
to a negative relationship, hence the resource curse paradox, hence, the key 
literature associated with this is discussed in the next section.
4.3  L iterature R ev iew
Several studies in the literature have explained the resource curse paradox from 
a different context - according to van Wijnberger (1984), resource curse occurs 
where an increase in revenue from natural resources makes a nations’s currency 
stronger, thus making the manufacturing sector less competitive. Gylfason
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(2001) explained the resourse curse paradox from the context of how the price 
of raw materials fluctuates in world markets. According to Gylfason (2001), 
the resulting fluctuations in export earnings trigger exchange rate volatility 
which creates uncertainty that can be harmful to exports and other trade, 
including foreign investment. Economic growth is then adversely affected by 
the resulting re-allocation of resources from the manufacturing and service sec­
tors to the natural resource sector. Torvik (2002) explained the resource curse 
paradox from a rent-seeking theory and argued that natural resource abun­
dance generates an incentive for economic agents to engage in non-productive 
activities which lead to lower welfare. According to Torvik (2002), a greater 
amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged 
in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive 
firms; as a result, the drop in income from productive firms is higher than the 
increase in income from natural resource.
Evidence from political theories have linked natural resources to political 
instability armed conflict and violence. According to Rosser (2006), oil, gas 
and other valuable resources are strongly associated with the onset of civil 
wars as well as their duration - Rosser (2006) identifies three channels through 
which this link operates; (i) natural resource makes the state a more valuable 
target for take-over, (ii) regional concentration of resource wealth increase 
the possibility of conflicts, and (iii) resource abundance can weaken the state, 
rendering it less able to resolve conflict and manage its economy, and thereby 
foster conditions in which conflict is likely to erupt. Mehlum et al. (2006) have 
attempted to show that the extent to which growth winners and growth losers 
differ systematically depends on the level of their institutional arrangements.
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According to Mehlum et al. (2006), natural resources drive aggregate income 
down when institutions are ‘grabber friendly’, while more resources increase 
income, when institutions are ‘producer friendly’. While it is not the goal of 
this research to discuss these political theories in detail, it is important to note 
that they provide interesting channels through which natural resourse affect 
economic growth. A more detailed survey of the resource curse theories can 
be found in Gylfason et al. (1999), Casseli and Cunningham (2009) and van 
der Ploeg and Venables (2011).
As explained in Section 4.1, most empirical evidence of the resource curse 
paradox tend to follow Sachs and Warner (1995) cross-sectional study which 
shows that resourse rich countries indeed grew on average about one percent­
age point less during the 1970 - 1989 period even after controlling for initial 
income, investment, rule of law and openess. The study is the cornerstone 
of many discussion of the resource curse but can be criticized on econometric 
ground as highlighted earlier in this chapter. Following the Sachs and Warner 
(1995) cross-sectional technique, Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Glyfason et 
al. (1999) found natural resource abundance to be negatively correlated with 
economic growth.88 Aghion et al. (2009), also using cross-sectional specifi­
cation, suggest that market volatility can have a negative effect on long-term 
productivity growth, particularly in countries with low level of financial del- 
opment.
Several studies from the field of political economy have applied cross­
country regression analysis to show that the natural resource curse is stronger
in a particular system of governance while others show resource windfall in­
88 All emprical studies reviewed in this section uses ratio of primary exports to GDP or 
GNP as a measure of resource abundance/ dependence unless otherwise stated.
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crease corruption, especially in non-democratic regimes. Anderson and Aslak- 
sen (2008) using a cross-country sample of ninety countries suggests that the 
resource curse occurs more in presidential democracies stressing that the pres­
idential systems are less accountable and less representative when compared 
with the parliamentary system, thus making the presidential system offer more 
scope for resource rent extraction. Ades and Telia (1999), also using cross­
country regression, suggest that natural resource rent encorage corruption, 
crowds out social capital, erodes the legal system and also induce armed con­
flicts and civil wars.
Some of the critique of the cross-country approach have pointed to the fact 
that it does not consider the time dimension of the data and faces the problem 
of omitted variable bias. As noted by Parente and Prescott (1994), cross- 
sectional regressions suffer from the problem of omitted variable bias arising, 
mainly from correlation between initial income and the initial level of produc­
tivity, hence, it is important to adopt the panel data estimation as against 
the cross-country regression.89 Manzano and Rigabon (2001) in a panel study 
reveals that the impact of natural resource on growth found in cross-country 
regression disappears once one allows for fixed effects. Ross (2001) in another 
panel study that investigates the link between natural resources, institutional 
development and growth in resource rich countries found that point-source 
type natural resource retard democratic and institutional development which 
stunts growth. Ross (2001) used oil export as a ratio of GDP to measure nat­
ural resource abundance. Furthermore, Bhattacharyya and Holder (2010) in
89 Parente and Prescott (1994)’s study attempts to explain a wide disparity in per capita 
income across countries based on a theory of economic development in which technology 
adoption and barriers to such adoptions are the focus.
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a panel of ninety-nine countries covering 1980 - 2004 suggest that natural re­
source encorages corruption in countries that practice non-democratic regime 
for more than half of the years since 1956.
van der Ploeg (2011) in an extensive survey of empirical works within the 
resource curse literature recommended that "future empirical works should 
move from cross-sections to panel data regressions to over come the problem 
of ommitted variable bias and should also allow for changing quality of insti­
tutions" (pp 408). While there are a few studies that apply the panel data 
technique, most of them use homogeneous approaches, such as traditional fixed 
and random estimation or the generalized method movements (GMM) estima­
tors which impose high degree of homogeneity across countries. Cavalcanti 
et al. (2011) applied a heterogeneous technique but did not account for the 
role of institutions in building their empirical model. As indicated earlier, this 
chapter investigates the resource curse hypothesis by applying a heterogeneous 
panel analysis using a model that captures the role of institution as recom­
mended by van der Ploeg (2011). The technical details of this technique is 
explained in the next section.
4 .4  M eth o d o lo g y
4.4.1 Cross-sectional Estim ation
As stated above, before estimating the panel model, this work begins by ap­
plying the commonly used estimation technique in the literature which is the 
standard cross-sectional technique to investigate the growth effects of resource 
abundance. Even though this technique has a lot of limitations as indicated
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in section 4.1, applying it will provide a good basis for comparison with pre­
vious results since most of these studies applied this technique, although us­
ing different measures of resource abundance. Three studies that applied the 
cross-sectional technique (Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum et al. (2006) and 
Cavalcanti et al. (2011)) are selected and the results from these studies are 
compared with what is obtained here. As mentioned several times, Sachs and 
Warner (1995) is the pioneer study in the empirical literature of the resource 
curse paradox, and hence its inclusion among the selected studies. Mehlum 
et al. (2006) captured the role of institution in their model but used a dif­
ferent measure of resource abundance from what is used in this study while 
Cavalcanti et al. (2011) used the same measure of resource abundance but 
did not account for the role of institutions in their model. Section 4.6.1 pro­
vide details of the variables used and results obtained from these studies. The 
cross-sectional specification adopted here is therefore outlined as follows:
Vi =  ai +  +  P zl/Y i +  +  PiOprdi +  e* (4.1)
where is the average of the logarithm of GDP per-capita between 198490 
and 2009 for country i =  1....7V, and y ^ i  is the logarithm of the initial GDP 
per-capita (in 1984). I / Y i is the average of the logarithm of investment share 
of GDP, oprdi is the average of the logarithm of the real value of oil production 
and iqi is the average of the index of institutional quality. Oil reserve is another 
important variable that can be used to measure oil abundance as indicated by 
Alexeev and Conrad (2009). Therefore, the above equation is also estimated 
by replacing oprdi with the average value of oil reserve per-capita, orsvi. Most
90Institutional quality data (obtained from ICRG) used in this study is only available 
from 1984, hence the reason for the start date of 1984.
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growth related studies that used cross-sectional estimation technique have al­
ways included initial income variable in the regression model. According to 
Cannon and Duck (2000), it is important to be able to distinguish between 
initial conditions when estimating growth models in cross-country regressions 
as they imply the existence of convergence. Also, van der Ploeg (2011) noted 
that the coefficient of initial income in cross-country regression is used to draw 
inferences about the speed of convergence - however, he cautioned that one 
should be careful about drawing such inferences when intermediate variables 
such as war and institutional quality are included in the model. The cross- 
sectional specification presented above therefore includes the initial income 
variable in line with what is obtained in the literature.
4.4.2 Panel Estim ation
Panel estimates provide higher degrees of freedom, are more informative and 
biases are substantially smaller than cross-sectional estimates. One of the 
biggest challenges faced in panel data estimation as indicated in the previous 
chapter is how to face heterogeneity characteristics in the data set applica­
tions. Barbieri (2006) noted that the development of heterogenous panel unit 
root and panel cointegration tests have greatly enhanced empirical analysis 
using panel data. The research reported in this chapter therefore investigates 
the resource curse paradox by applying some of the recent panel estimation 
techniques.
The panel estimation tests applied in this chapter are similar to those 
carried out in Chapter 3 only that the panel error correction model in this 
chapter is also heterogenous based on a recent technique by Canning and
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Pedroni (2008). As was the case in Chapter 3, the estimation approach involves 
four different stages: Firstly, panel unit-root test is estimated based on Im 
et al. (2003)91 and Fisher ADF test, Choi (2001) to ensure the variables 
are integrated of the same order. Secondly, panel cointegration technique 
based on Pedroni (1999)92 and Maddala and Wu (1999) are applied to check 
whether there is a long-run cointegrating relationship between the variables. 
Specifically, the research is interested in the group-statistics which takes into 
account heterogeneity. If cointegration is found, the long-run cointegrating 
relationship is estimated using the group fully modified OLS (GFMOLS) based 
on Pedroni (2000). Finally a heterogenous panel error correction model based 
on Canning and Pedroni (2008) is estimated to determine the short-run effect 
and how fast the system reverts to a long-run equilibrum following a shock. 
Each of these tests are explained in the sub-sections that follow.
4.4.3 Panel U nit-R oot Test
The technical details of the two panel unit root techniques applied to test the 
stationarity of each of the five variables in this chapter are outlined in Section
3.3.3. If the variables are found to be integrated of the same order, the long-run 
cointegrating relationship is estimated using the between dimension approach 
(group-mean panel statistics) of Pedroni panel cointegration test (1999, 2004).
91 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) has been found to have superior test power by researchers 
in analysing panel data. The test is based on the ADF statistics averaged accross groups, 
thus making it a heterogeneous test.
92 As indicated in the previous chapter, Pedroni (1999) proposes two sets of statistics, 
the first is based on pooling the residuals along the within dimension of the panel while 
the second set is based on between dimension of the panel. The second set allows for 
heterogeneity across members.
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4.4.4 Panel Cointegration Test
The cointegrating relationship estimated is as follows:
Vu — &it +  8 it +  /31( //y ) it  +  0 2 %  + P3oprdit +  eu (4.2)
where i =  1...., N  for each country in the panel and t  =  1...., T  refers to 
the time period, y a is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, ( I / Y ) it is 
the logarithm of investment share of GDP, iqit is the logarithm of institutional 
quality while opr da is the logarithm of real value of oil production. The 
cointegrating relationship is also estimated by replacing opr da with orsvu 
as was done in the cross-sectional test. The parameters an and 5i allows 
for the possibility of country specific fixed effects and deterministic trend,
respectively, e# is the estimated residuals representing deviations from the
long run relationship. To test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, p* =  1, 
the following unit root test is conducted on the residuals as follows:
Oit — "t" 'Ma (4.3)
As indicated in the previous chapter, Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes two
sets of tests for cointegration; these are the panel and group tests for coin­
tegration. Expressions for the various test statistics can be found in Section
3.3.3.
The cointegration equation above is also tested using the Johansen Fisher 
panel cointegration test which is based on Maddala and Wu (1999). Again, 
details of the test can be found in Section 3.3.3.
162
4.4.5 Estim ating the Long-run Relationship
If a long-run relationship is established between real GDP per capita, share of 
investment in real GDP, real value of oil production per capita (as well as real 
value of oil reserve per capita), the long-run cointegrating relationship using 
group fully modified OLS (GFMOLS) based on Pedroni (2000) is estimated. 
The expression of the between dimention group-mean panel FMOLS estima­
tion and the associated t-statistic can also be found in Section 3.3.3. While 
the FMOLS allows for estimation of the long-term effect of oil abundance on 
levels of per capita output, it is important to estimate the short-term effect, 
and how fast it reverts to a long-run equilibrum following a shock in the system 
which can be achieved using the panel error correction model.
4.4.6 Panel Error Correction M odel
The residual from the estimated long-run cointegrating relationship is incor­
porated as an error correction term in a dynamic error correction model as 
follows:
m  m m
^ V i t  — OLj +  ^  +  ^ 2  O t 2 i k A ( I / Y ) i t - k  +  ^  O ^Sik^Q it-k
k—1 k=l k—1
m
+  a^kAoprdit-k +  +  ua (4.4)
fc=i
The variable e# (error correction term) represents how far the variables are 
from the equilibrum relationship and the error correction mechanism estimates 
how this disequilibrum causes the variable to adjust towards equilibrum in 
order to keep the long-run relationship intact. The above equation is estimated
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for each of the individual country in the panel. Following Canning and Pedroni 
(2008), the lamba-Person test to compute the significance of the panel test is 
applied. The lamba-Person test, as explained in Canning and Pedroni (2008) 
uses the p-values associated with each of the individual country test to compute 
the accumulated marginal significance. Specifically, the lambda-Person test for 
the coefficient of long-run effect take the form
N
Px =  - 2 j 2 l n P x  (4.5)
2 = 1
where In P \ is the log of p-value associated with individual country i’s F 
test for the null hypothesis A = 0. The P \ is distributed as X 2 with 2N degrees 
of freedom under the null hypothesis no long-run effect for the panel.
The short-run effect of the variables on GDP per capita is computed follow­
ing the same approach using the probability values associated with the individ­
ual country i’s F-test values for the null hypothesis of =  0, =  0, and
=  0 for investment, institutional quality and oil production respectively.
4.5  D a ta
The analysis is undertaken on 25 non-OECD countries using annual data over 
the period 1984 to 2009.93 The criteria for country selection is based on all 
oil producing non-OECD countries that are among the top 50 as contained 
in the World Fact Book 2010 of the US Central Intellegence Agency. Due to 
incomplete information, the following countries were not included; Azerbidjan,
93 The reason for the start date of 1984 is due to availability of data - the ICRG database 
which provides detailed information on institutional quality data is only available from 1984.
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Kazakhtan, Sudan, Vietnam, Iraq and Angola. The list of countries used for 
this chapter is shown in Appendix 4.1.
In the course of the analysis, the countries are divided into different sub­
groups/panels so as to investigate whether the impact of oil abundance on net 
oil exporting countries is different from that of net oil importing countries. The 
various panels are therefore detailed as follows: Panel A represents a group 
of OPEC member countries; Panel B represents a group of other net oil 
exporting countries, Panel C represents group of net oil importing countries, 
and Panel D represents a group consisting of all countries.
As indicated earlier, the variables used for the study are GDP per capita, 
investment as a share of GDP, institutional quality, oil production per capita 
and oil reserve per capita.94 GDP data for all countries is obtained from 
WDI database provided by the World Bank (accessed via ESDS database at 
www.esds.ac.uk) while the investment data for all countries is obtained from 
IPS database provided by International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data for oil 
production and oil reserve are obtained from Energy Information Administra­
tion (2010) while the institutional quality data is obtained from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database (2010). Descriptive statistics on the 
data for the various sub-groups are shown in Appendix 4.2.
The institutional quality data, obtained from the ICRG database is based 
on a number of political risk component factors which includes; government 
stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, exter­
nal conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order,
94 Oil production and oil reserve data are measured in barrels of oil while the investment 
data is based on gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP.
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ethnie tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. Each com­
ponent is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk points), with the highest 
number points indicating the lowest potential risk for that component and the 
lowest number indicating the highest potential risk.
4.6  E m pirical R esu lts
4.6.1 Cross-sectional E stim ation  Result
The cross-sectional estimation results are reported in Table 4.2.95 The coef­
ficients of institutional quality in both specifications are significantly positive 
implying institutions play a key role in determining economic performance of 
the oil rich countries considered in this study. However, the coefficients of 
investment share of GDP are not significant and negative.
Table 4.2a 
Cross-sectional Estimation Result
(a) (b)
In ys4 (Initial income) 0.521*** 0.467***
In I / Y i  (Investment) -0.281 -0.227
In iqi (Institutional quality) 1.509** 1.595**
In oprdi (Oil production) -0.111* -
In orsvi  (Oil reserve) - -0.045
No. of countries 25 25
0.97 0.97
Note: *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5% and 1% significance values respectively
(a) =  Model using oil production as a measure of resource abundance
(b) =  Model using oil reserve as a measure of resource abundance
95The cross-sectional estimation is only undertaken on the entire sample (as against the 
panel estimation which is also undertaken on various sub-groups) because of the limited 
number of countries involved.
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The estimated value of the measure of resource abundance using oil pro­
duction variable is statistically significant and negative, thus suggesting that 
the resource curse is present for the countries in the sample. The coefficient 
of the other measure of resource abundance (oil reserve) is also negative but 
not significant even at 10% significance level.
Table 4.2b
Cross-sectional Regressions from Previous Studies
Annual Growth in 
real GDP
Sachs & Warner Mehlum et al. Cavalcanti et al. 
(1995) (2006) (2011)
Initial Income -1.76** -1.26** -0.07
Resource dep./abun. -10.57** -14.34** -0.18**
Rule of law 0.36* - -
Institutional quality - -1.3 -
Investments 1.02* 0.16*** 0.23***
No. of countries 71 87 53
Adj R2 0.72 0.71 0.34
Note: *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5% and 1% significance values respectively
The cross-sectional estimation results from Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum 
et al. (2006) and Cavalcanti et al. (2011) all reveal evidence of resource curse 
as shown in Table 4.2b. While Sachs and Warner (1995) and Mehlum et al. 
(2006) uses share of resources in GDP (resource dependence) as a measure 
of resource curse, Cavalcanti et ah (2011) uses real value of oil production 
(resource abundance) - all three studies however point to the same outcome 
which is also in line with the cross-sectional estimation result obtained in this 
study.
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As outlined earlier, these cross-sectional estimates are arguably subject to 
a number of problems which the panel estimate attempt to address. The next 
sub-section therefore reports result from the panel estimates.
4.6.2 Panel Estim ation R esults
Panel U nit R esult
As outlined earlier, the first stage in the panel esimation process is to 
consider the unit root properties of the variables in the model. Table 4.3 
reports the unit root result derived from the two tests conducted.
The results indicate that all the series are non-stationary at levels but 
achieved stationatity after taking the first difference, all at 1% significance 
level. It is therefore concluded that all the series are integrated of order one 
and as such can proceed to test for cointegration.
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Table 4.4 
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Result
Pedroni test on residuals of MG estimators
G ro u p  p -s ta t . G ro u p  P P - s ta t .  G ro u p  A D F -s ta t .
Panel A
(a) 1.056 -3.770*** -3.698***
(b) 1.079 -4.331*** -3.179***
Panel B
(a) 2.627 -2.247** -0.962
(b) 2.295 -2.349*** -1.833**
Panel C
(a) 2.235 -2.011** -0.083
(b) 2.607 0.016 -1.945**
Panel D
(a) 3.339 -3.698*** -3.163***
(b) 3.337 -4.141*** -4.064***
Note: *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5% and 1% significance values respectively
(a) =  Model using oil production as a measure of resource abundance
(b) =  Model using oil reserve as a measure of resource abundance
Panel Cointegration Test R esults
The three panel cointegration test statistics based on the group-mean ap­
proach of Pedroni (1999, 2004) are reported in Table 4.4. Under the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration, the test statistics of Group PP and/or Group 
ADF are rejected at least at the 5% significance level using either the oil pro­
duction or the oil reserve specification for all panels while the Group p statistic 
cannot be rejected even at 10% significance level for all panels.
The results of the Johansen Fisher panel cointegration test96 reported in 
Table 4.5 clearly supports the presence of cointegrating relationship among 
the variables in all panels using both specifications.
96 The test is based on Maddala and Wu (1999)
170
üTt C
gM CS
II
00 CN
t ïoq q o i> oo ce
CN CO
Ci rf
co ci
o
* * 00 Tf
O 00
r H
CN ^  
CN C i 
C0 00
%
171
Since the results from Pedroni’s Group PP and Group ADF test statistics 
as well as results from Fisher’s trace and max-eigen test supports the presence 
of cointegration, it can be concluded that there is a long-run cointegrating 
relationship among the variables, thus allowing for the estimation of the long- 
run relationship
Estim ated Long-run R elationship - GFMOLS R esults
The FMOLS group mean estimates and the corresponding t-values are 
reported in Table 4.6. The significant estimate of the coeffcient of investment 
and institutional quality indicates that they are both important variables in 
explaining the long-term effect of resource abundance on the levels of per capita 
output. The estimated coefficient of the measure of resource abundance using 
oil production variable is statistically significant and negative for the group 
of OPEC countries (Panel A) and the group of other oil exporting countries 
(Panel B) while the coefficient is significatly positive for the group of net 
oil exporting countries (Panel C). The results therefore suggest evidence of 
resource curse for the net oil exporting countries using oil production as proxy 
resource abundance while no evidence of resource curse is found for the net oil 
importing countries.
The second specification estimated using oil reserve as a measure of re­
source abundance only shows evidence of resource curse in Panel B where the 
coefficient is significatly negative while that of Panel A is significantly positive. 
The coefficient of oil reserve in Panel C is not significant.
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Table 4.6 
FMOLS Estimation Result
In ( I / Y ) i t In iq u In o p rd it In o r s v u
Panel A
(a) 0.63 (5.74)*** 0.34 (1.92)* -0.02 (2.56)** -
(b) 0.41 (3.53)*** -0.17 (1.23) - 0.22 (1.62)*
Panel B
(a) 0.53 (1.04) 3.13 (15.08)*** -0.07 (-8.93)*** -
(b) 0.35 (1.86)* 1.56 (9.40)*** - -0.62 (-7.49)***
Panel C
(a) 1.53 (12.05)*** 0.94 (1.88)* 1.52 (9.39)*** -
(b) 1.63 (13.77)*** 0.07 (1.55) - -0.59 (-1.58)
Panel D
(a) 0.89 (10.14)*** 1.47 (11.17)*** 0.48 (2.16)* -
(b) 0.80 (10.93)*** 0.49 (7.12)*** - -0.33 (-4.32)***
Note: *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5% and 1% significance values respectively
(a) =  Model using oil production as a measure of resource abundance
(b) =  Model using oil reserve as a measure of resource abundance
(c) =  t-values in parenthesis
For the overall sample (Panel D), the result suggest evidence of resource 
curse using the oil reserve specification while it is not found using the oil pro­
duction specification as the coefficient oil production variable is significantly 
positive (although only at 10% significance level). The results therefore sug­
gest that the long-term effect of resource abundance depends on the measure 
of natural resource and also whether or not the country/group of countries 
is a net oil exporter or net oil importer. While both oil production and oil 
reserve are important measures of resource abundance as explained earlier in 
this chapter, it is the view of this research that oil reserve better represent 
abundance of natural resource since it reports the total amount of technically 
and economically recoverable oil. The group of major oil exporting countries 
(Panel A) shows a positive long-term effect of oil reserve on per-capita output.
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Having estimated the long-term effect, the next sub-section reports result 
from panel error correction model which estimate the short-run effect and 
whether or not the model reverts to a long-run relationship following a shock.
Panel Error Correction M odel R esults
Table 4.7 reports the panel error correction model results. It can be ob­
served from the table that each result has two entries; the top entry reports the 
group mean F-stat values while the bottom entry reports the panel lambda- 
Person result obtained from the probability values of the individual F-test 
results. In all specifications and accross all panels, the F-stat value of the 
error correction term (reported in column 5 of the table) are statistically sig­
nificant indicating that the model reverts to long-run equilibrum following a 
shock in the system. On the short-term effect of oil abundance on per capita 
output, the result reveals that real value of oil production have a short-term 
growth enhancing effect on per capita output for the group of other oil export­
ing countries (Panel B) and the group of net oil importing countries (Panel C) 
whereas it does not have a short-term effect on per capita output for the group 
of OPEC countries. This can be viewed as a further evidence of resource curse 
on the OPEC countries using the oil production measure of resource abun­
dance.
Furthermore, results obtained using the oil reserve specification shows that 
real value of oil reserve have a short-term growth enhancing effect on per capita 
output for the group of OPEC countries whereas it does not show evidence 
of short-term effect for the other two sub-groups. Panel D, which covers the
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whole sample shows evidence of both long and short-run impact on GDP based 
on both specifications.
In conclusion, the results obtained from the long-run estimates using group 
FMOLS and short-run estimates using panel ECM seem to suggest the pres­
ence of resource curse for the oil exporting countries using oil production as a 
proxy of natural resource while no evidence of resource curse is found using oil 
reserve. As for the net oil importing countries, no evidence of resource curse is 
found (both in the short and long-run) using oil production and the coefficient 
of oil reserve is not significant in both estimates.
4 .7  Sum m ary and  C onclusion
Economic failure among resource rich countries has been attributed to abun­
dance of natural resources, and is often tagged in the literature as the ‘Dutch 
disease’ or ‘resource curse’ - implying natural resource is more of a curse than a 
blessing. The empirical literature of the resource curse paradox is mostly built 
on Sachs and Warner’s (1995) cross-sectional approach which recent studies 
have criticized due to problems of omitted variable bias and the fact that it 
does not take into account the time dimension of the data - thus, suggesting 
the use of panel estimation technique which allows for the role of institutional 
quality in the model.97 Also, most of these studies uses the share of resources 
in GDP which actually measures resource dependence not abundance.
In line with the above, this chapter investigates the resource curse paradox 
by using the real value of oil production and the real value of oil reserve as
97 See van der Ploeg (2011)
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measures of resource abundance. The analysis begins by applying the com­
monly used cross-sectional estimât at ion technique in order to provide a basis 
for comparison with previous empirical literature - it particularly seeks to in­
vestigate whether a cross-sectional model that uses the resource abundance 
variable and accounts for the role of institutions would lead to a different out­
come from what is mostly obtained in the literature. Since the cross-sectional 
estimation technique has a lot of shortcomings, the study also applies a het­
erogenous panel model to empirically investigate the relationship using both 
measures of resource abundance.
The cross-sectional estimation result suggest evidence of resource curse for 
the entire sample using the real value of oil production as a measure of resource 
abundance. Even though different measure of resource dependence/abundance 
is used, the cross-sectional estimation result is in line with what was obtained 
in Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Cavalcanti et al. (2011) 
among others.
The results from the panel estimate on the other hand show a slightly dif­
ferent outcome; the panel estimate results for the entire sample suggest that 
the effect of oil abundance is significantly positive using the real value of oil 
production but significantly negative using the real value of the oil reserve. 
This implies that from the panel estimate of the entire sample, evidence of 
resource curse could only be found using oil reserve as a measure for resource 
abundance and not oil production. When the various sub-groups are consid­
ered, it is found that oil production has a negative long-run effect on per capita 
output of OPEC countries while oil reserve has a positive effect for the same 
group of countries. As for the net oil importing countries, the result reveals
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a positive relationship between oil production and per capita output. The 
panel estimates generally suggests evidence of resource curse on the major oil 
exporting countries using oil production as a proxy of natural resource while 
no evidence of resource curse is found using oil reserve. The group of net oil 
importing countries also reveals no evidence of resource curse.
To determine the short-run growth enhancing effects of oil abundance, a 
panel error correction model is estimated. The results for the whole sample 
from both specifications indicates that oil abundance have a short-run growth 
enhancing effect on per capita output. Again when the various sub-groups are 
considered, it shows different results depending on the measure of oil abun­
dance. The result reveals that oil production does not have a short-run growth 
enhancing effect on per capita GDP of OPEC countries while it has for the 
net oil importing countries and oil reserve have a growth enhancing effect for 
the OPEC group while it does not have for the net oil importing countries.
Since the resource curse paradox is mostly linked to resource rich exporting 
countries, a close look at the results obtained from the oil exporting countries 
is essential. The results from the group of OPEC countries (Panel A) shows 
evidence of resource curse using oil production while no evidence of resource 
curse is found using oil reserve. This implies that stock of natural resource, 
in this case oil reserve, does not hinder economic performance in the oil rich 
exporting countries - however, the flow process of production does, as indicated 
by the oil production variable. It is therefore concluded that oil abundance is 
not a curse on these countries and the negative effect of oil production might 
have been caused by poor macro economic policies and other factors assotiated 
with oil production process such as negative consequence of oil price volatility
178
or perhaps poor fiscal regime framework which in most cases has an adverse 
effect on exploration activities in the petroleum industry. Furthermore, most 
oil rich exporting countries are characterized by weak democratic structures, 
and in some cases non-democratic regimes. This can have adverse effect on 
macro-economic performance as the governments tend to be unaccountable to 
the people and usually lack the capacity to effectively manage huge oil rents 
accruing to it.
While the study concludes that oil abundance is not always a curse as 
against most studies in the literature, it is important to state that oil rich 
countries could benefit more from their natural wealth by adopting growth and 
welfare enhancing policies and the presence of strong and vibrant institutions. 
Natural resource rents should be channelled into reproducible asset such as 
good infrastructure to facilitate growth of the real sector. More importantly, 
natural resource revenue should be managed in such a way that promotes 
sustainable growth, alleviates poverty and avoids conflicts.
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4 .8  A p p en d ix  to  C hap ter 4
4.8.1 A ppendix 4.1: List o f Countries
Appendix 4.1 shows the list of all countries included in the analysis of Chapter 
4. The selection is based on all oil producing developing countries that are 
among the top 50 as contained in World Factbook 2010. As reported in Table 
A4.1, each country is listed under one of three broad categories; OPEC, other 
oil exporters and net oil importers. These categories make-up the various 
sub-groups applied in the panel data analysis section.
Table A4.1 
List of Countries
OPEC Countries Other Oil Exporters Net Oil Importers
Algeria Argentina Brazil
Ecuador Colombia China
Iran Egypt India
Kuwait Indonesia Peru
Libya Malaysia Romania
Nigeria Mexico Thailand
Qatar Oman
Saudi Arabia Syria
UAE Trinidad
Venezuela
4.8.2 A ppendix 4.2: Descriptive S tatistics
Appendix 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the data used in the analysis 
of Chapter 4. The statistics are reported for each of the categories applied in
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the panel data analysis section - hence, Tables A4.2 - A4.5 reports the statistics 
for the group of OPEC countries, group of other oil exporters, group of net 
oil importers and group of all countries respectively. The descriptive statistics 
reveals that the data is generally satisfactory and evenly distributed except 
for the institutional quality variable which is slightly skewed.
Table A4.2 
Descriptive Statistics (OPEC Countries)
V it ( f /1 % i q u o p r d u o r s v u
Mean 9953.98 20.36 50.37 138.72 12643.24
Median 5394.74 20.23 59.72 53.52 4960.02
Maximum 86435.82 39.34 79.33 489.65 65048.23
Minimum 203.21 5.30 28.50 4.86 126.11
Std. deviation 12845.63 6.81 11.07 146.96 16729.54
Skewness 2.78 0.07 -0.30 0.84 1.39
Kurtosis 12.66 2.93 2.45 2.22 3.68
Table A4.3
Descriptive Statistics (Other Oil Exporting Countries)
V it ( i / n * i q u o p r d u o r s v u
Mean 4005.96 21.50 62.89 25.19 433.07
Median 3012.04 20.76 64.16 10.09 141.60
Maximum 21648.57 43.58 79.41 147.12 2671.80
Minimum 450.66 11.93 31.66 1.57 16.48
Std. deviation 3537.81 5.58 9.79 38.70 704.01
Skewness 1.83 1.19 -0.60 2.18 2.18
Kurtosis 7.61 5.54 2.75 6.43 6.33
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Table A4.4
Descriptive Statistics (Net Oil Importing Countries)
2/if a / n * iQ it o p r d u o r s v u
Mean 2063.64 24.96 61.48 1.46 24.13
Median 1650.64 22.74 63.68 1.42 16.05
Maximum 9299.73 45.61 76.16 3.82 66.76
Minimum 248.29 14.38 34.75 0.17 1.12
Std. deviation 1764.54 7.27 8.81 0.97 19.24
Skewness 1.74 0.86 -1.11 0.60 0.68
Kurtosis 6.54 2.80 3.64 2.54 2.24
Table A4.5
Descriptive Statistics (Group of all Countries)
V it ( i / r ) " o p r d u o r s v u
Mean 5919.01 21.87 60.74 64.91 5218.99
Median 2793.87 20.92 62.58 11.50 204.59
Maximum 86435.82 45.61 79.41 489.65 65048.23
Minimum 203.21 5.31 28.50 0.17 1.12
Std. deviation 9083.13 6.75 10.29 113.75 12194.15
Skewness 4.20 0.60 -0.58 2.07 2.85
Kurtosis 26.76 3.90 2.75 6.20 10.43
4.8.3 A ppendix 4.3: Individual FM OLS R esults
The Group Fully Modified OLS requirs one to estimate the individual FMOLS 
before computing the group estimate. The individual FMOLS results are 
therefore reported in Appendix 4.3 in Tables A4.6, A4.7 and A4.8 for the 
various sub-groups. The group estimate is indicated at the bottom of the 
table.
182
T a b l e  A 4 .6
I n d i v i d u a l  F M O L S  R e s u l t s  ( O P E C  G r o u p )
In In iqu In oprdit In o r s v u
A lgeria (a) 0.427 (1.185) 0.897 (2.610)** 2.464 (3.889)*** -
(b) -0.406 (-1.053) 1.920 (5.911)*** - -0.409 (-0.341)
E c u ad o r (a) 2.151 (3.957)*** 1.175 (0.810) 2.291(7.702)*** -
(b) 0.942 (0.916) -2.597 (-0.985) - 0.688 (3.077)***
(a) 0.977 (0.897) -0.720 (-0.677) -0.734 (-0.338) -
(b) 1.655 (2.064)** -1.273 (-3.311)*** - 1.826 (2.604)**
K uw ait (a) 1.021 (1.958)* 1.832 (2.619)** 0.146 (0.355) -
(b) 0.522 (1.669)* 1.288(3.264)*** - -1.862 (-2.762)**
Libya (a) 0.902 (8.665)*** -0.061 (-0.362) 1.567 (3.910)*** -
(b) 0.924 (5.833)*** 0.394 (1.622) - -0.525 (-1.322)
N igeria (a) -0.337 (-0.617) 0.023 (0.013) -3.941 (-2.432)** -
(b) -0.026 (-0.062) -0.288 (-0.242) - 3.072 (4.191)***
Q a ta r (a) 1.472 (3.021)*** -0.236 (-0.163) 0.576 (0.542) -
(b) 1.240 (3.594)*** -0.150 (-0.179) - 0.440 (3.227)***
S aud i (a) -0.016 (-0.026) 2.470 (3.791)*** -1.263 (-2.396)** -
(b) 0.040 (0.089) 0.702 (1.708)* - -1.560 (-4.647)***
UAE (a) -1.429 (-3.404)*** 0.316 (0.878) -0.762 (-2.240)** -
(b) -1.515 (-4.157)*** 0.181 (0.535) - -0.570 (-2.583)**
V enezuela (a) 1.114 (2.427)** -2.320 (-3.333)*** -0.549 (-0.880) -
(b) 0.683 (2.290)** -1.904 (-4.429)*** - 1.123 (3.759)***
P a n e l (a) 0 .6 3 2  ( 5 . 7 3 9 ) * * * 0 . 3 3 7  ( 1 . 9 6 2 ) * - 0 . 0 2 1  ( 2 . 5 6 3 ) * * -
(b ) 0 . 4 0 4  ( 3 . 5 3 3 ) * * * - 0 . 1 7 0  ( 1 . 2 3 0 ) - 0 .2 2 2  ( 1 . 6 2 2 ) *
T ab le  A 4.7
In d iv id u a l FM O L S R esu lts  (O th e r  O il E x p o r t in g  C o u n tries)
In ( I / Y ) it In iqu In oprdu In o r s v u
A rg en tin a (a) 0.262 (0.903) 3.935 (7.175)*** -0 .580 (-1.367) -
(b) 0.634 (2.862)*** 3.102 (10.509)*** - 0.195 (0.713)
C olom bia (a) 2.676 (3.511)*** -1.115 (-0.642) 0.596 (1.172) -
(b) 2.642 (4.348)*** -2.385 (-2 .036)** - -0.531 (-2 .271)**
E g y p t (a) 0.573 (1.167) 1.051 (1 .641) -1 .059 (-4.163)*** -
(b) 0.353 (0.587) 0.192 (0.197) - -1 .724 (-2.520)**
In donesia (a) 0.178 (0.959) 1.467 (9.361)*** -1 .334 (-14.789)*** -
(b) 0.045 (0.096) 0.796 (1.706)* - -0 .930 (-4 .887)***
M alaysia (a) -1.006 (-2 .647)** 5.085 (6.841)*** 1.063 (0.937) -
(b) -1.021 (-3.643)*** 4.825 (6.402)*** - 0.842 (1.092)
M exico (a) 3.071 (2.817)** 7.266 (4.821)*** -0.722 (-0.661) -
(b) -0.390 (-0.971) 4.930 (9.636)*** - -0.475 (-10.140)***
O m an (a) 0.133 (0.572) 1.734 (4.238)*** -1 .840 (-4 .341)*** -
(b) 0.340 (1.097) 0.376 (0.837) - -3 .193 (-2.674)**
S yria (a) -0.649 (-2.891)*** 1.438 (5.619)*** -1.344 (-9 .274)*** -
(b) 0.297 (0.524) -0.158 (-0.326) - -1.721 (-3.398)***
T rin id ad (a) -0.500 (-1.277) 7.264 (6.013)*** 4.593 (5.642)*** -
(b) 0.455 (0.691) 2.373 (1.289) - 0.669 (0.772)
P a n e l 0 . 5 2 6  ( 1 . 0 3 6 )  
0 . 3 5 0  ( 1 .8 6 1 ) *
3 .1 2 5  ( 1 5 . 0 0 7 ) * * *  
1 .5 6 1  ( 9 . 3 9 5 ) * * *
- 0 . 0 6 9  ( - 8 . 9 3 9 ) * * *
- 0 . 6 2 0  ( - 7 . 4 9 4 ) * * *
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T a b l e  A 4 .8
I n d i v i d u a l  F M O L S  R e s u l t s  ( N e t  O i l  I m p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s )
In  ( I / Y ) it In i qu In op r d u In  o r s v u
(a) 0.396 (0.416) 4.720 (1.361) 0 .924(4 .647)** -
(b) 1.243 (1.573) 1.705 (0.638) - 0.916 (4 .165)***
C h in a (a) 2.584 (2.488)** -0.810 (-0.510) 9.289 (6.733)*** -
(b) 3.643 (3 .473)*** -1.502 (-0 .860) - -4.006 (-4 .140)***
In d ia (a) 2.545 (12.366)*** 0.275 (1.649) -0.176 (-0 .477) -
(b) 2.442 (22 .592)*** 0.114 (1.212) - -0.829 (-5 .513)***
P eru (a) 0.080 (0.180) 1.756 (2.500)** -0 .019 (-0 .037) -
(b) -0 .016 (-0 .039) 1.993 (5.617)*** - 0.506 (0.913)
R o m an ia (a) 2.498 (6 .092)*** -0.392 (-0.672) -1.662 (-3 .417)*** -
(b) 1.593 (3 .308)*** -0.531 (-1 .112) - -1.078 (-4 .778)***
T h a ila n d (a) 1.048 (7.979)*** 0.077 (0.282) 0.790 (15.466)*** -
(b) 0.904 (2.837)*** -1.335 (-1.699)* - 0.956 (5 .479)***
P an e l (a) 1.525 (12.054)*** 0.937 (1.881)* 1.524 (9.395)*** -
(b) 1.634 (13.767)*** 0.074 (1.548) - -0 .589 (-1 .580)
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4.8.4 A ppendix 4.4: Individual and Panel Error Correction E sti­
m ates
Similarly, the lamda-Person Group Error Correction Model also requires one 
to estimate the individual ECM before computing the group estimate. The 
individual ECMs are therefore reported in Appendix 4.4 in Tables A4.9, A4.10 
and A4.11, corresponding to each of the sub-groups.
T ab le  A 4.9
In d iv id u a l an d  P a n e l E rro r  C o rrec tio n E s tim a te s  (O P E C  G roup )
L ags A  In ( Z / r ) t - ,- A  In  i q t - j A  In o p r d t - j A  In o r s v t _ j e c t t - i
A lgeria (a) 1 1.390 (0.253) 0.323 (0.576) 0.152 (0.701) - 3.338 (0.084)*
(b) 1 1.404 (0.251) 0.023 (0.080) - 0.488 (0.493) 0.005 (0.944)
E c u ad o r (a) 2 1.066 (0.370) 5.050 (0.022)** 0 .353(0 .708) - 0.0002 (0 .991)
(b) 2 6.980 (0 .007)*** 9.310 (0.002)*** - 3.087 (0 .077)* 3.327 (0 .089)*
(a) 2 0.087 (0.916) 1.061 (0.372) 0.289 (0.752) - 0.019 (0 .891)
(b) 2 1.117 (0 .356) 1.553 (0.248) - 2 .869 (0.092)* 3.323 (0 .091)*
K uw ait (a) 1 1.723 (0 .205) 0.011 (0.917) 0.131 (0.721) - 4.627 (0 .045)**
(b) 1 0.826 (0 .375) 0.002 (0 .966) - 1.456 (0.242) 5.225 (0 .034)**
L ibya (a) 2 4.036 (0 .064)* 1.109 (0.357) 1.550 (0.246) - 8.649 (0 .010)***
(b) 2 2.125 (0.156) 0.005 (0.994) - 0.522 (0.603) 9.357 (0.008)***
N igeria (a) 2 0.682 (0.522) 0.257 (0.776) 0.010 (0.989) - 0.131 (0.722)
(b) 2 0.303 (0.743) 0.171 (0 .843) - 5.112 (0.041)** 7.728 (0.015)**
Q a ta r (a) 2 2.001 (0.174) 0.450 (0.647) 3.222 (0.095)* - 3.083 (0.101)*
(b) 2 3.477 (0.061)* 0.196 (0 .824) - 5.358 (0.020)** 9.498 (0.008)***
S aud i (a) 1 3.713 (0.069)* 1.329 (0.264) 1.177 (0.292) - 6.003 (0 .024)**
(b) 1 3.337 (0.084)* 0.257 (0.617) - 2.146 (0.160) 4.401 (0.050)**
U A E (a) 2 5.262 (0.019)** 3.705 (0.051)** 0.930 (0.417) - 11.128 (0 .004)***
(b) 2 3.460 (0.060)* 3.546 (0.056)* - 0.618 (0.553) 7.795 (0.014)**
V enezuela (a) 2 0.803 (0.468) 0.871 (0.441) 0.123 (0.884) - 0.727 (0 .408)
(b) 2 0.200 (0.820) 0.220 (0.805) - 0.684 (0.521) 0.174 (0.682)
P a n e l (a)
(b )
2 . 0 7 6  ( 0 . 0 5 5 ) *  
2 . 3 2 2  ( 0 .0 3 1 ) * *
1 . 4 1 6  ( 0 . 2 5 0 )  
1 . 5 2 8  ( 0 . 1 5 0 )
0 . 7 9 3  ( 0 . 4 5 5 )
2 .2 3 3  ( 0 . 0 5 1 ) *
3 . 7 7 1  ( 0 . 0 0 4 ) * * *  
5 .0 8 3  ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) * * *
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T ab le  A4.10
iv id u a l and  P a n e l E rro r  C o rrec tio n  E s tim a te s  (O th e r  O il E x p o r t in g  G roup )
Lags A  In ( f / y ) t _ j A  In i q t - j A  In o pr d t —j A  In  o r s v t —j e c t t - i
A rg en tin a (a) 2 1.508 (0.255) 1.231 (0.321) 4.057 (0.041) - 5.817 (0.031)**
(b) 2 0.174 (0.841) 0.552 (0.587) - 0.018 (0.981) 4.752 (0.046)**
C olom bia (a) 2 0.443 (0.650) 1.917 (0.183) 0 .295(0 .748) - 0.005 (0.941)
(b) 2 0.163 (0.851) 2.167 (0.151) - 2.472 (0.120) 0.077 (0.784)
E g y p t (a) 1 0.498 (0.488) 3.150 (0.092)* 0.753 (0 .396) - 5.650 (0.028)**
» 1 3.326 (0.084)* 4.888 (0.040)** - 6.848 (0.017)** 11.189 (0.003)***
Ind o n esia (a) 2 0.711 (0.508) 0.521 (0.604) 0.512 (0 .609) - 2.280 (0.153)
(b) 2 0.155 (0.857) 0.249 (0.782) - 0.068 (0.934) 0.295 (0.594)
M alaysia (a) 3 1.507 (0.278) 0.776 (0.536) 5.285 (0 .047)** - 4.691 (0.058)*
(b) 3 0.950 (0.456) 1.069 (0.409) - 1.119 (0.391) 0.450 (0.518)
M exico (a) 3 2.587 (0.117) 1.657 (0.244) 1.645 (0.247) - 2.108 (0.180)
(b) 3 1.134 (0.349) 3.313 (0.066)* - 0.001 (0.998) 4.519 (0.051)*
O m an (a) 1 5.846 (0.026)** 0.360 (0.555) 11.964 (0.002)** 0.632 (0.436)
(b) 1 1.380 (0.255) 2.356 (0.142) - 0.034 (0.853) 13.505 (0.001)***
S yria (a) 1 4.165 (0.066)* 6.517 (0.020)** 0.032 (0.859) - 1.094 (0.309)
(b) 1 3.825 (0.066)* 7.905 (0.011)** - 0.004 (0.985) 0.319 (0.578)
T rin id ad (a) 2 0.266 (0.769) 1.016 (0.387) 1.299 (0.303) - 0.017 (0.895)
(b) 2 0.299 (0.745) 1.404 (0.278) - 0.858 (0.444) 2.712 (0.121)
P a n e l ( a )
(b )
1.947 (0.10)* 
1.267 (0.145)
1.905 (0.114) 
2.655 (0.061)*
2.871 (0 .081)*
1.269 (0.211)
2.477 (0.144) 
4 .202 (0 .005)***
T ab le  A4.11
In d iv id u a l a n d  P a n e l E rro r  C o rrec tio n  E s tim a te s  (N et O il Im p o r t in g  G roup )
Lags A  In  ( I / Y ) t - j  A  In  i q t - j A  In  opr d t —j A  In o r sv t —j e c t t - i
(a) 2 0.108 (0.898) 2.542 (0.114) 1.649 (0.227) - 1.721 (0 .210)
(b) 2 0.268 (0.768) 1.814 (0.199) - 0.583 (0.571) 5.760 (0.030)**
C h in a (a) 1 2.702 (0.117) 1.646 (0.215) 9 .597 (0 .006)*** - 6.426 (0.020)**
(b) 1 0.003 (0.958) 1.982 (0.176) - 1.726 (0.205) 10.259 (0.004)***
In d ia (a) 2 2.021 (0.169) 2.575 (0.111) 0.549 (0 .588) - 0.998 (0.334)
(b) 2 1.878 (0.189) 3.821 (0.047)** - 2.078 (0.162) 0.952 (0.345)
P eru (a) 2 . 0 .030 (0.969) 0.120 (0.887) 0.528 (0.601) - 0.580 (0.458)
(b) 2 3.732 (0.050)** 1.564 (0.243) - 4 .697 (0.027)** 0.592 (0.453)
R o m an ia (a) 2 1.866 (0 .193) 2.650 (0.101)* 1.681 (0.224) - 1.646 (0.221)
(b) 2 0.213 (0.810) 0.802 (0.469) - 0.223 (0.794) 0.404 (0 .535)
T h a ila n d (a) 2 2.705 (0.101)* 1.906 (0.185) 3.494 (0.058)* - 14.417 (0.002)***
(b) 2 0.962 (0.405) 1.317 (0.299) - 0.328 (0.725) 4.355 (0 .055)*
P a n e l ( a ) 1.572 (0.251) 1.906 (0.121) 2.916 (0.071)* - 4.298 (0 .021)**
(b ) 1.176 (0.445) 1.883 (0.187) - 1.590 (0.211) 3.720 (0 .035)**
4.8.5 A ppendix 4.5: D iagnostic Tests
Tables A4.12 and A4.13 reports the diagnostic test results for the error cor­
rection model tests carried out in Chapter 4. According to the results, the 
models have passed almost all diagnostic tests undertaken.
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Table  A4.12 
D ia gnos ti c  Test
C o u n t ry C orre la t ion H e te ro sca das t ic i ty N orm a l i ty
F - S ta t P ro b ab i l i ty F - S ta t P ro b ab i l i ty Jaq .  be ra P ro b ab i l i ty
O P E C  M em be r C ountr ies
Algeria 0.42 0.74 0.69 0.70 8.29 0.01
E c u ad o r 0 66 0.59 0.36 0.93 3.25 0.19
Iran 2.05 0.17 2.13 0.10 0.18 0.94
K uwait 1.07 0.37 2.47 0.06 3.05 0.21
Libya 2.47 0.07 0.76 0.59 1.57 0.48
Niger ia 0.56 0.51 1.52 0.26 1.30 0.52
Q a ta r 1.07 0.41 0.67 0.71 0.99 0.63
S audi A rab ia 0.63 0.60 1.33 0.28 1.21 0.57
UAE 1.47 0.25 0.95 0.45 1.45 0.37
Venezue la 0.57 0.57 0.92 0.53 4.14 0.12
O th e r  Oil E x p o r t in g  Co un tr ies
A rgen t in a 0.20 0.81 1.87 0.23 2.51 0.35
Colo m bia 1.03 0.39 1.02 0.47 1.13 0.56
E g y p t 0.87 0.44 1.20 0.37 3.15 0.22
In dones ia 1.37 0.32 2.57 0.05 1.58 0.48
M ala ysia 0.95 0.44 1.23 0.36 2.13 0.37
Mexico 1.22 0.35 0.62 0.76 1.76 0.39
O m an 0.41 0.69 1.04 0.46 1.01 0.68
Syria 1.09 0.37 0.95 0.40 1.25 0.50
T r in id ad 1.36 0.31 1.06 0.45 1.58 0.56
Table  A4.13 
D ia gnos ti c  Test
C o u n try Serial Corre la ti on H e te ro sca d as t ic i ty N orm al i ty
F - S ta t P r ob ab i l i ty F - S t a t  P ro b ab i l i ty J aq .  be ra P r o b a b i l i ty
Net  Oil I m p o r t in g  C ountr ies
1.31 0.29 0.87 0.51 1.92 0.41
1.72 0.22 1.10 0.23 0.26 0.87
0.99 0.40 0.70 0.69 0.61 0.73
Peru 0.56 0.58 0.83 0.59 2.07 0.44
Rom ania 1.42 0 27 0.91 0.54 1.87 0.47
T h a i la n d 1.86 0.19 1.02 0.27 1.94 0.43
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Chapter 5
5 Sum m ary and C onclusions o f th e  T hesis
This chapter summarises the analysis conducted in this thesis including re­
viewing the specific results obtained within the three key chapters. The first 
key chapter (Chapter 2) analyses the relationship between aggregate oil con­
sumption, income and prices, and the estimates obtained are used to project 
oil demand up to 2030 based on different forecast scenarios. The second key 
chapter (Chapter 3) focus on the co-movements and causality relationship be­
tween oil prices and economic growth in non-OECD countries while the third 
key chapter (Chapter 4) evaluates the resource curse hypothesis by analysing 
the long-term effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth using 
oil production and oil reserve as proxies for natural resources. The thesis has 
engaged various econometric tools in addressing the research questions and 
the results obtained therein are used to draw a number of conclusions and pol­
icy reccommendations. The following sub-section revisits the specific research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1 and explains how the thesis addresses them.
5.1 T h e R esearch  Q u estion s R ev is ited
(RQ 1) How best can the impact o f technical progress (TP) and 
other exogeneous factors be captured w hen estim ating oil dem and  
relationships?
It is often argued that increased efficiency otherwise referred to as techni-
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cal progress has been one of the factors responsible for the declining growth in 
oil demand, particularly in the industrialised regions of the world. Following 
arguments in the energy economics literature on how to appropriately cap­
ture the impact of technical progress along with other exogenous factors when 
modelling energy demand, this study suggests that technical progress is best 
captured both endogenously via aymmetric price response and exogenously 
via a stochastic trend - as Hunt et al. (2003a and 2003b) referred to as the 
Underlying Energy Demand Trend (UEDT).
While many studies in the literature captured endogenous technical progress 
via asymmetric prices in oil demand models, a relatively fewer studies considers 
the exogenous effects which are mostly captured using a simple deterministic 
trend. As revealed by the estimated UEDTs shown in Chapter 2, a simple de­
terministic trend is generally not sufficient to capture the impact of exogenous 
technical progress and other exogenous factors.
This study therefore supports the idea that prices provide a key motivation 
for the development of new technology, which can be captured by asymmetric 
price specification, but there are other exogenous factors which have been 
captured by the UEDT - thus, technical progress can best be captured both 
endogenously and exogenously in oil demand models.
(RQ 2) W hat are the long-term  effects o f price and incom e on 
global oil demand, and what is the possible pattern o f future oil 
consum ption?
The study categorized the global economy into six geographical regions 
as contained in BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011). The regions
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are; North America, South and Central America, Europe and Eurasia, Middle 
East, Africa and Asia Pacific. The structural time-series modelling technique 
is adopted to estimate price and income elasticities for each region and the 
results obtained shows that the long-run elasticities for the various regions 
range between 0.20 and 1.06 for the income variable and -0.02 and -0.20 for the 
price variable accordingly. The results reveal that oil consumption responds 
more to income in North America than any other region while it responds least 
to income in the Middle East.
Using the estimated coefficients obtained and applying the reference case 
scenario assumption, global oil consumption is projected to rise from 87.38 
mb/d in 2010 to 110.27 mb/d in 2030. The forecast reveals that growth in oil 
consumption will mainly be supported by the less advanced regions - by 2030, 
oil consumption is projected to more than double in the Middle East (121%) 
and increase by more than two-thirds in Africa (72%), while oil consumption 
in South and Central Anerica and Asia Pacific are projected to rise by 26% 
and 25% respectively over the forecast period. Oil consumption in the more 
advanced regions of North America and Europe/Eurasia is projected to slightly 
grow by about 4% and 10% respectively.
According to the forecast, by 2030, Asia Pacific will over-take North Amer­
ica to become the region with the highest oil consumption (31%), followed by 
North America with 22% while Europe/Eurasia, Middle East, South/Central 
America and Africa will constitute 19%, 16%, 7% and 5% of global oil demand 
respectively. The analysis further reveals that per capita oil demand in North 
America peaked in 2010 while it is expected to peak in 2023 in South/Central 
America, 2024 in Asia Pacific and 2026 in Europe/Euroasia. Per capita oil
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consumption is expected to continue to grow beyond 2030 in Middle East and 
Africa.
(RQ 3) W hat is th e  short and long-run causality relationship  
betw een oil prices and G D P of non-OECD countries and  does the  
im pact for net oil exporting  countries differ from th a t of net oil 
im porting  countries?
In both a time-series and a panel context, the thesis empirically investigates 
the co-movements and causality relationship between oil prices and GDP in 
28 non-OECD countries, grouped according to whether a country is a net oil 
exporter or net oil importer.
After confirming that both series are integrated of the same order, it is 
established that a long-run cointegrating relationship exist between them in 
both time series and panel context. Furthermore, the time-series analysis 
shows oil prices Granger-causes GDP for almost all the countries analysed 
while the panel estimate shows oil prices Granger-causes GDP for the group 
of net oil exporting countries and fails to Granger-cause GDP for the net oil 
importing countries. The conclusion from the analysis is that oil prices have a 
strong influence on economic output of non-OECD countries, particularly the 
net oil exporting countries.
(RQ 4) Does oil abundance lead to  lower economic perform ance 
in oil rich exporting countries, and w hat are the  long-term  effects of 
oil abundance on levels of per-cap ita  ou tpu t?
The thesis also investigates the resource curse hypothesis by applying het­
erogeneous panel technique using oil production and oil reserve as proxies of
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natural resource. Again, the panel groupings is done according to whether a 
country is a net oil exporter or net oil importer and mixed results are found 
depending on the measure of resource abundance.
After controlling for the impact of institutional quality and investment, the 
analysis provides evidence of resource curse for the net oil exporting countries 
using oil production as a proxy for resource abundance while no evidence of 
resource curse is found using oil reserve as a proxy for resource abundance. It 
is concluded that oil abundance does not lead to negative per-capita output 
in oil exporting countries as shown by the oil reserve measure of resource 
abundance.
5.2 C losing  R em arks and  D iscu ssion
Looking forward to 2030, this thesis points to declining oil consumption in the 
industrialized regions of the world that, as the ‘low’ case scenario (from oil 
demand projections in Chapter 2) suggests might be quite far-reaching if new 
and improved technologies to help address the environmental challenges be­
come economically viable. These might include a revolutionary break-through 
in car engine technology that moves towards the use of alternative fuels in the 
transportation sector or the increased production of unconventional gas. New 
technologies are opening up possibilities for unconventional gas to play a major 
role in future global energy mix; a development that EIA (2012) argued would 
ease concerns about the reliability and security of energy supply. Considering 
gas is the closest substitute of oil, this development might have a direct effect 
on oil demand projections as cheaper gas is substituted for oil.
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The impact of higher oil prices on the oil importing countries of the non- 
OECD is minimal despite the rise in oil consumption from those countries. 
The reasons, varying in importance and country include greater energy ef­
ficiency, improved monetary and fiscal policies and deeper financial markets. 
As highlighted by Arbatli and Vasishtha (2012), emerging economies now have 
better instruments for responding to commodity shocks as their economies re­
lies more on import of primary commodities. The oil exporting countries can 
also reduce the negative effect that over-reliance on oil revenue can have on 
their economies with better fiscal and monetory policies geared towards im­
proved savings, particularly in periods of high oil prices, making the right 
investment that will support development of the real sector and also having 
a well-developed financial market. These measures will help diversify their 
economies and minimise the effect of oil price collapse.
The major oil exporting countries needs to adopt a more logical approach 
to macro-economic policy formulation and implementation. As indicated in 
Chapter 4, oil price/revenue volatility is among the major contributory fac­
tors to poor economic performance in these countries and, as pointed out by 
Iwayemi and Fawowe (2011), the negative effect of volatility is often aggravated 
by a rising interest rate which lowers productive investment and ultimately 
negatively affects output. Macro-economic policies therefore should be better 
coordinated towards minimising the negative effect of oil price volatility while 
encouraging productive investment.
Revenue management institutions could play a very important role in man­
aging volatility and providing long-term investable funds. This can be achieved 
through the establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) which can man­
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age the immediate impact of oil price volatility and save revenue for investment 
and use by future generations. Fortunately, most of the major oil exporting 
countries have established the SWF, holding various degrees of financial assets. 
This is a step in the right direction and should be sustained.
According to information obtained from the Sovereign Wealth Fund In­
stitute (2013), countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria are lagging behind 
other OPEC member countries in terms of their asset holdings. While Alge­
ria, Libya, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia have an asset base of more 
than $65 billion in their SWF,98 Nigeria and Venezuela only have $1 billion 
and $800 million respectively. Angola has around $5 billion while Ecuador is 
not listed among countries with SWF reserve. As explained a little earlier, 
the SWF remains one of the most effective means of long-term diversification 
and also control the effect of volatility. Therefore, the non-MENA countries of 
OPEC (despite their huge infrastructural requirement and large population) 
needs to do more to build-up their asset base, particularly now that for the 
past three years, the annual average price of a barrel of oil has been above 
$100. Officials in charge of policy formulation in these countries should al­
low for revenue above a particular benchmark of oil price be channeled to the 
SWF reserve. To sight an example of how this can be achieved; assuming the 
price of oil continues to move along the same path (at around $ 100/barrel), 
countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela that produces more than 2 million 
barrels of crude oil per day can easily save $1.8 billion every year if they chan­
nel $25/bbl on half of their daily production to the SWF reserve.99 This is
98Infact UAE and Saudi Arabia have an asset base of more than $500 billion
"M ost of oil exporting countries engage in joint operating agreement with multinational
oil companies and the parties involved lift the crude oil produced according to their equity 
share. The ‘half the daily production’ sighted in the text is a very conservative estimate as
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based on a crude oil price benchmark of $75 in their annual budget estimates 
and any revenue above the benchmark would be channeled to the SWF. This 
will go a long way in making funds available for long-term investment while 
controlling for the adverse effect of volatility.
OPEC, as an institution, can also play a major role in minimizing the im­
pact of oil price volatility on the oil exporting countries. The only instrument 
OPEC has ever used is fixing of ‘OPEC quotas’ which is alloting a certain vol­
ume of production to each member state. Even though OPEC has recorded 
relative success over the past decade in terms of price stability, clearly more 
needs to be done as the market does not react as OPEC would like, as there 
are always doubts whether such quotas would be respected. In fact, it has been 
argued100 that Saudi Arabia’s excess capacity is what keeps OPEC afloat all 
these years and by using its excess capacity, Saudi Arabia has played the role of 
discipliner who, from time to time, punishes members exceeding their quotas. 
One of the major pillars of Saudi Arabia’s oil policy is to maintain a back-up 
capacity in order to enhance the stability of the world oil market. This, Saudi 
needs to do more effectively by positioning her leadership as a price maker in 
the international oil market towards relative price stability over the short and 
mid-term period which, to a large extent, would foster growth and develop­
ment for the oil exporting countries in particular and the global economy at 
large.
most of the countries end up with around 65% of overall production.
100 See Fattouh (2007)
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